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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON BANK LIQUIDITY CREATION AND FUNDING LIQUIDITY RISK 
SEPTEMBER 2015 
FENG TU 
B.S., RENMIN UNIVERSITY OF CHINA  
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Sanjay Nawalkha 
 
 
 According to the modern theory of financial intermediation, liquidity creation is an 
essential role of banks. Chapter 1 investigates the relationship between diversification of 
activities conducted by banks and bank liquidity creation. We show that despite the passage of 
GLBA act in 1999, banks increased their specialization in the traditional loan market and thus 
became less diversified from 2004 until the end of 2008. In addition, we find evidence that more 
specialized banks tend to create more excess liquidity during normal times, suggesting too much 
specialization in mortgage and other types of loans created abundant liquidity leading up to the 
financial crisis.  
 Chapter 2 calculates the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) as defined in Basel III for 
virtually all US commercial banks during the 2001-2013 period. Compared to traditional liquidity 
risk measures and the NSFR estimated in the related literature, the NSFR based on our 
calculation is more comprehensive in evaluating funding liquidity risk on banks' balance sheet 
and off-balance sheet activities and also is superior in capturing the changes in liquidity risk over 
time. In addition, we graphically show that the deseasonalized and detrended NSFR based on 
our estimation is able to detect the excessive liquidity risk taking behavior of the banking sector 
in advance of financial stress. Furthermore, we examine the policy related issue of the effect of 
vii 
 
stricter capital requirements on bank funding liquidity risk. We find that large and medium 
banks with higher capital positions tend to increase exposure to liquidity risk during both normal 
times and the financial crisis. On the other hand, small banks with higher capital ratios tend to 
have lower liquidity risk exposure.  
 Chapter 3 applies a small variation to the NSFR measure to account for the liquidity risk 
of brokered deposits and examines the advantage of using the brokered deposits adjusted NSFR 
(adj.NSFR) in detecting bank financial distress during the period of 2007-2013. The in-sample 
test results show that the adj.NSFR measure does add significantly incremental explanatory 
power to the models relying on traditional liquidity ratios. However, its superior ability to 
identify failures is not so pronounced in the out-of-sample periods.  
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CHAPTER 1 
BANK DIVERSIFICATION AND LIQUIDITY CREATION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
As critical financial intermediaries within the financial system and the economy, liquidity 
creation is an essential role of commercial banks. They accomplish this on the balance sheet by 
issuing relatively liquid deposits to finance relatively illiquid loans (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983)  and off the balance sheet through loan commitments and other off-balance sheet 
guarantees (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998; Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002; Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009). On the one hand, bank liquidity creation is very important for the macro 
economy by facilitating production of goods and spurring economic growth (e.g., Dell’Ariccia, 
Detragiache, and Rajan, 2008). Its importance is heightened during financial crisis as the 
demand for liquidity by businesses and households can't be met by market-based sources of 
funding (e.g., Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer, 2009). Moreover, liquidity could dry up for an 
extended period of time, with severe consequences for the real economy. On the other hand, 
banks are more likely to fail when creating high amounts of liquidity on and off-balance sheet in 
a given period (Diamond and Rajan, 2001). Banks that create substantial liquidity may also 
pursue lending policies that generate asset price bubbles and thereby increase the fragility of 
the banking sector (Acharya and Naqvi, 2011). Berger and Bouwman (2012) show that the 
banking sector creating abnormally high liquidity from 2005:Q2 to 2007:Q4 results in an asset 
bubble, which contributes to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
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According to the bank lending channel literature, monetary policy may affect bank 
lending and deposits (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 1997) as well as off-
balance sheet activities (Woodford,1996; Morgan, 1998). Monetary policy is  typically tightened 
during the economic booms and loosened during financial crisis. However, Berger and Bowman 
(2012) provide evidence that during normal times monetary policy does not have a significant 
effect on liquidity creation by medium and large banks which create about 90% of aggregate 
bank liquidity, and the effect of monetary policy for banks of all sizes is statistically significantly 
weaker relative to its intent during financial crises than during normal times. Hence, it is very 
important and necessary to study the other possible factors that may affect bank liquidity 
creation. 
Since banks were legally forced to remain specialized for 66 years starting with the 
passage of Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, the expectation was that the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999 would increase the diversification of bank activities. However, 
we find that except for a very short window, diversification of bank activities decreased 
significantly from 2004, and banks of all sizes - small, medium, and large - were much more 
specialized in 2008 than they were prior to the passage of GLBA in 1999 (shown in Figure 1.3).1 
An intriguing possibility is raised by the fact that abnormally high amounts of liquidity creation 
by banks and decreased bank activity diversification (increased specialization) may be related. 
Motivated by the above discussion, we want to address two questions. First, are less 
diversified(more specialized) banks prone to create more excess liquidity during normal times? 
Second, does diversification of activities affect bank liquidity creation differently during financial 
crises versus normal times?  
                                                             
1 Bank diversification did not change much from 1999 until March 2001 due to the lag time 
needed to adjust to the new regulations. 
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 Most of the empirical literature has focused on diversification’s impact on banks’ 
profitability, total risk level and market value. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to 
examine the effect on the central role of banks in the economy and demonstrate that reduced 
diversification (increased specialization) is associated with excessive liquidity creation. We use 
an extensive database of individual bank information during the period of 2000 to 2010. We 
follow Berger and Bouwman(2009) to construct the liquidity creation measure. We use a 
modified version of the “chop-shop” approach introduced by LeBaron and Speidell (1987) and 
Lang and Stulz (1994) to quantify the independent impact of diversification on liquidity creation. 
Specifically, we calibrate the excess liquidity creation by subtracting the liquidity a diversified 
bank would have created if the bank were decomposed into a bank specialized in lending 
activities and a bank specialized in non-lending activities from its actual liquidity creation. To 
examine the effect of diversification on liquidity creation, we regress the dollar amount of bank 
excess liquidity creation per gross total asset for each bank-quarter observation against the 
bank’s diversification measure and a number of control variables. To mitigate the potential 
problems of endogeneity, we use twelve-quarter lagged average values of all control variables. 
Moreover, we split our sample by bank size and run the tests separately for large, medium, and 
small banks to see whether diversification may affect these banks’ liquidity creation differently. 
We find a strong inverse (direct) relationship between bank diversification 
(specialization) and excess liquidity creation for banks in all size groups, suggesting too much 
specialization in mortgage and other types of loans created abundant liquidity during economic 
booms leading up to the financial crisis. In addition, we find evidence that the effect of 
diversification (specialization) doesn't vary across financial crisis and normal times for large and 
medium banks, which indicates that diversification of activities may restrict the ability of banks 
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to produce liquidity during financial crises and more specialized banks may play a greater role in 
stimulating the economy. 
 We test the robustness of our main regression results in several ways. First, we use an 
alternative way to calculate the diversity measure. Second, we use another liquidity creation 
measure which excludes the off-balance sheet activities. Third, we rerun our regressions for the 
subsamples created by splitting banks based on holding company status, wholesale versus retail 
orientation, level of diversity, and merger activities. Although the intertemporal and cross-
sectional liquidity creation patterns are quite different for those subsamples (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009), all of the regression results show a significant negative (positive) effect of 
diversification (specialization) on excess liquidity creation.  Fourth, we use an instrumental 
variable approach to directly address the potential endogeneity problem. We select the asset 
diversity of other banks in the markets, the asset diversity of all banks in the markets, and the 
share of diversified banks in the markets where a bank operates, to serve as instruments for the 
diversity measures. With any set of these instruments, we still find significant negative (positive) 
impact of diversification (specialization) on banks’ excess liquidity creation. The results of all of 
the robustness checks reinforce our main findings that specialized banks tend to create 
excessive liquidity compared to diversified banks.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature. 
Section 1.3 discusses the construction of the liquidity creation measure and diversity measure 
used in this paper. Section 1.4 describes our datasets. Section 1.5 outlines the regression 
framework and presents the core results. Robustness tests are presented in section 1.6. Section 
1.7 concludes. 
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1.2 Literature review 
 This paper is related to two categories of literature: bank diversification and the 
measurement of bank liquidity creation. We review the two strands of literature in turn. 
1.2.1 Bank diversification 
 Existing literature on bank diversification has focused on diversification’s impact on 
banks’ profitability, risk level and market value. They take several distinct approaches: 
constructing a synthetic merger of banks with non-banks, building an efficient portfolio, 
examining actual performance of diversified banks, or using the “chop-shop” method. However, 
these approaches provide mixed results.  
Simulating mergers between banks and nonbank financial companies with data of 1970s 
and 1980s, Wall et al. (1993), Boyd et al. (1993) conclude that banks could have experienced 
higher returns and lower risk had they been able to merge with life insurance firms. Laderman 
(1998) applies a similar synthetic merger approach to data from the 1980s and 1990s, and 
concludes that BHCs could reduce the volatility of their accounting returns by offering “modest 
to relatively substantial amounts” of life insurance or casualty insurance underwriting.   
 Reichert and Wall (2000) construct efficient portfolios with the 23 U.S. financial industry 
sub-categories from 1974 to 1997. They show that the optimal portfolio is time-varying, and the 
benefits of diversification only contribute to a great increase in expected return but have 
nothing to do with risk reduction. 
 In contrast to the first two approaches, the third approach examines actual return and 
volatility data of banks that engage in multiple financial activities. DeYoung and Roland (2001) 
test the relationship between the profit, volatility and extent of diversification for 472 large 
commercial banks during the period 1988 to 1995. They find that diversification toward fee-
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based activities can potentially increase the level of profits but also increase the volatility of 
bank earnings and the degree of total leverage. Cornett, Ors and Tehranian (2002) examine the 
operation of commercial banks from the period of 1987 to 1997 and conclude that establishing 
Section 20 subsidiaries to conduct non-banking activities improves operating cash flow 
performance. Contrary to Cornett, et al. (2002), Mercieca, et al. (2007) find an inverse 
association between non-interest income and bank profitability. Studying a longer period from 
1984 to 2001, Stiroh (2002) provides evidence that the declining volatility of net operating 
revenue at the aggregate level found in some literature is attributed to the reduced volatility of 
net interest income rather than non-interest income. Stiroh (2004) provides further evidence 
that non-interest income is the more volatile component of bank revenues. Stiroh and 
Rumble(2006) present a more complete analysis and utilize a new source of data over a more 
recent time period (1997-2002). Their results reinforce the double-edged nature of the 
diversification trend toward non-banking activities: “increased revenue diversity does bring 
benefits, but there are offsetting effects from a greater reliance on the much more volatile 
activities, which are not necessarily more profitable than interest-generating activities.” Based 
on a sample of German banks over the period of 1995 to 2005, Böve and Pfingsten (2008) 
document that specialized banks possess a higher monitoring quality than diversified banks and 
have a lower ratio of actual to expected loan losses. 
 The final approach builds upon the non-financial corporate diversification literature. 
Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Servaes (1996) document a diversification 
discount in non-financial firms. The diversification discount refers to the phenomenon that the 
Tobin’s q of diversified firms is less than the q’s they would have if decomposed into portfolios 
of specialized firms. Laeven and Levine (2007) first examine the “diversification discount” in 
banking industry across 43 counties over the period of 1998 to 2002. They do find a 
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diversification discount in financial conglomerates: on average, diversified financial firms are 
valued less than a portfolio of comparable specialized ones. Based on the sales data for the US 
financial sector from 1985 to 2004, Schmid and Walter (2009) also show a substantial and 
persistent diversification discount among the financial conglomerates. We adopt a modified 
version of the fourth approach to identify the net impact of diversification on bank liquidity 
creation. 
1.2.2 Measurement of bank liquidity creation 
 Various liquidity measures have been suggested in monetary theory, financial 
intermediation theory, and liquidity risk management literature. However, they are designed to 
examine the vulnerability of banks to runs, not to measure the amount of liquidity banks create. 
Deep and Schaefer (2004) are the first to construct a measure to capture the extent of 
liquidity transformation performed by individual banks, which is defined as the difference 
between liquid liabilities and liquid assets as a percentage of total assets. They call it “the 
liquidity transformation gap” (LT gap hereafter). They consider all demand deposits and time 
deposits with a maturity of one year or less to be liquid liabilities. On the asset side, they 
consider cash and equivalents, and all loans with a maturity of one year or less to be liquid. They 
exclude loan commitments and other off-balance sheet activities as liquidity transformation 
because of their contingent nature. They analyze the 200 largest US commercial banks from 
1997 to 2001 and show that the amount of liquidity transformation performed by US banks is 
quite low – only 20% of total assets on average for their sample.  
Berger and Bouwman (2009) argue that the LT gap measure is not comprehensive 
enough. They construct a new set of liquidity creation measures. They consider all commercial 
banks rather than only large banks, and classify all bank balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
activities as liquid, semi liquid, or illiquid. In total they have four measures, “cat fat”, ”cat 
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nonfat”, ”mat fat”, and “mat nonfat”, which differ in the way that they classify loans entirely by 
category or maturity (“cat” versus “mat”), and the way that they include or exclude off-balance 
sheet activities (“fat” versus “nonfat”). “Cat fat” is the preferred liquidity measure in the paper. 
Deep and Schaefer (2004)'s LT gap measure is close to the “mat nonfat” measure in conception. 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) apply the four measures to data on almost all US banks from 1993 
to 2003, and show that the aggregate liquidity creation of the banking industry increased every 
year.  
The existing empirical studies examine the overall mechanism of liquidity creation, but 
do not focus on the impact of the diversification trend in the financial industry on bank liquidity 
creation. Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that there 
will be synergies to offer both commitment-based lending and deposit-taking. Deep and 
Schaefer (2004) show that deposit insurance does not help in promoting liquidity 
transformation, but the credit risk of loan portfolios appears to discourage liquidity 
transformation. Berger and Bouwman (2009) investigate the relationship between bank capital 
and liquidity creation, and find the relationship is positive for large banks and negative for small 
banks. Pana, Query, and Park (2010) use data from 189 commercial bank mergers between 1997 
and 2004, and find a positive impact of bank mergers on liquidity creation. Although Pana, 
Query, and Park (2010) include the revenue diversity measure in regressions of change in 
liquidity from before to after the merger, their results yield ambiguous predictions related to 
the effect of diversification on liquidity creation. 
Heretofore, not much attention has been given to activity diversification’s impact on the 
liquidity creation of banks. This paper is the first comprehensive study to investigate the 
relationship between activity diversification and bank liquidity creation. Secondly, we apply a 
modified version of the “chop-shop” method to study the issue, which is completely different 
9 
 
from the earlier work on bank liquidity creation. Thirdly, we include almost all U.S commercial 
banks with over 190,000 quarterly observations from 2000 to 2010. By examining the entire 
industry, we can gain a better view of the diversification trend and its influence on the industry. 
Finally, we compare the impact of diversification on different groups of banks. We group banks 
by size, holding company status, wholesale versus retail orientation, level of diversity and 
merger status.  
 
 
1.3 Construction of the diversity measure and liquidity creation measure 
1.3.1 Bank-level diversity measure  
 We follow Laeven and Levine (2007)’s method to construct the diversity measure. Due 
to data availability, we could not break down the investment banking activities into services like 
securities underwriting, brokerage services, advisory services, asset securitization, mutual funds, 
insurance, etc. For simplicity, we consider all the investment banking activities as “non-lending 
services” or “fee-generating services”. Thus, a pure lending bank is one that focuses on 
traditional banking services like taking deposits and making loans. A pure fee-generating bank is 
one that specializes in non-lending services. 
We have two measures here to describe the different traits of sample banks. The first 
one is an activity measure, which is used to determine if a bank belongs to the category of pure 
lending banks, pure fee-generating banks, or in-between. This measure is equal to the ratio of 
net loans to total earning assets. Total earning assets is the sum of net loans, securities and 
investments. The higher the ratio, the more the bank engages in lending activities. 
The second is a diversity measure, which is used to determine where a bank falls along 
the spectrum from highly specialized banks to highly diverse banks. This measure is calculated as 
follows: 
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           (1.1) 
where other earning assets include securities and investments. As it is based on assets, we call 
this measure “Asset diversity”. By definition, specialization is the opposite of diversity measure, 
and is given as follows: 
  Asset specialization = 1 - Asset diversity         (1.1a)  
 The values of asset diversity and asset specialization lie between zero and one. If a 
bank's total earning assets are equally divided between net loans and other earning assets, its 
asset diversity would equal 1 and asset specialization would equal 0. On the other hand, if a 
bank provides only lending services or only fee-generating services, then its asset diversity 
would equal 0 and asset specialization would equal 1. Hence, a lower asset diversity measure 
signals more specialization, while a higher asset diversity measure indicates greater 
diversification.  
 In the robustness test discussed below, we use another set of activity and diversity 
measures, which are based on income.2 The reason why we prefer the “asset”-based measure is 
that asset-based measures suffer less from measurement and manipulation problems than 
income-based measures. For example, as trading assets and investments can earn interest 
income, income-based measures may overestimate the extent to which banks engage in lending 
activities. Thus, we focus on the asset-based measure throughout the empirical analysis. 
                                                             
2 Activity measure based on income is calculated as the ratio of net interest income to total operating 
income. And Diversity measure based on income is calculated as  
                     
                                          
                      
 . 
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1.3.2 Bank-level liquidity creation measure 
 1.3.2.1 Cat fat 
 For the liquidity creation measure, we adopt the “cat fat” measure developed by Berger 
and Bouwman (2009). There are three steps to construct it. In the first step, bank assets, 
liabilities and equity items are classified as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid based on the ease, cost, 
and time to convert to liquid funds. Off-balance sheet guarantees and derivatives are classified 
according to the treatment of functionally similar on-balance sheet items. In step 2, all of the 
bank activities classified in step 1 are assigned a weight. Positive weights are assigned to both 
illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, as banks create liquidity when they hold illiquid assets and 
provide the public with liquid funds. Similarly, negative weights are assigned to both liquid 
assets and illiquid liabilities, as banks destroy liquidity when they finance liquid assets with 
illiquid liabilities or equity. The semi-liquid assets and liabilities are given a weight of zero. Off-
balance sheet items have weights that are consistent with functionally similar on-balance sheet 
items. Here, ½  is used as the positive weight, and -½  is used as the negative weight, as the 
amount of liquidity created or destroyed is only “half” determined by the source of the funds 
alone. In the third step, we multiply the weights of ½ , 0, or -½ , respectively, by the dollar value 
of corresponding bank activities, and add the weighted dollar value of all bank activities to arrive 
at the total dollar value of liquidity creation for an individual bank. The Appendix gives more 
details on the “cat fat” measure.  
In the robustness test, we use an alternative liquidity creation measure “cat nonfat”. If 
we excluded off-balance sheet activities in the third step, and only add up the weighted dollar 
value of on-balance sheet activities, we get the “cat nonfat” measure. Thus, the only difference 
between “cat fat” and “cat nonfat” is that the former includes off-balance sheet activities, but 
the later does not. 
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1.3.2.2 Activity-adjusted liquidity creation and excess liquidity creation 
 Different banking activities play different roles in encouraging liquidity creation. Lending 
activities may create more liquidity than non-lending activities in banks. It is very important to 
control for the degree to which banks engage in either activity such that we could isolate the 
relationship between liquidity creation and diversification. Hence, we adopt a modified version 
of the “chop-shop” method created by LeBaron and Speidell(1987) and Lang and Stulz(1994) to 
quantify the independent impact of diversification. Specifically, we compare the liquidity 
creation of each diversified bank with the liquidity it would have created if the bank were 
decomposed into a bank specialized in lending activities and a bank specialized in non-lending 
activities. Here we call the amount of liquidity it would have created as “Activity-adjusted 
liquidity creation” and the difference between the bank’s actual liquidity creation and the 
activity-adjusted liquidity creation as “Excess liquidity creation”.  
 Before we calculate the activity adjusted liquidity creation, we normalize “cat fat” by 
GTA so as to make the measure meaningful and comparable across banks and most importantly 
to avoid giving undue weight to the largest banks.3 Generally, consider bank i engages in n 
activities. Activity-adjusted liquidity creation for bank i is calculated as:     
      
      
 
   
, 
where   
 denotes the proportion of the kth activity in the total activity of bank i.       
denotes the average normalized liquidity creation of banks that specialize in activity k. Since we 
focus on the distinction of lending services versus non-lending services, we could simplify the 
activity-adjusted liquidity creation measure to 
              
         
         
            
                                        (1.2) 
                                                             
3 Although we control for size in all the empirical analysis presented below, normalization by GTA is still 
necessary as banks differ so greatly in size even within each size class.  
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where   
  denotes the proportion of lending activities in the total activity of bank i,       
denotes the average normalized liquidity creation of banks that focus on lending services, 
      denotes the average normalized liquidity creation of banks that focus on non-lending 
services. We follow the diversification literature in defining specialized banks. Banks that have 
over 90% of total earning assets associated with lending are classified as pure lending banks. So 
      equals the average normalized liquidity creation of banks with a ratio of net loans to 
total earning assets of more than 0.9. We classify banks that have over 80% of total earning 
assets used for fee-generating activities to be pure non-lending/fee-generating banks.4 Hence, 
      equals the average normalized liquidity creation of banks with a ratio of other earning 
assets to total earning assets of more than 0.8, or a ratio of net loans to total earning assets of 
less than 0.2. The weight    
  is equal to the ratio of net loans to total earning assets. 
 To calculate excess liquidity creation, we subtract the activity-adjusted liquidity creation 
from the actual liquidity creation. Thus, the excess liquidity creation for bank i is:  
Excess liquidity creation i            
         
        
                                                       
            
                          (1.3) 
 
1.4 Data description and summary statistics 
 We obtain the balance sheet, income statement and risk-based capital measures and 
off-balance sheet data from the Report of Condition and Income (also named as “Call Report”), 
which is updated quarterly. We download the branch-level data from FDIC Summary of Deposits 
(SOD). SOD is the annual survey of branch office deposits for all FDIC-insured institutions. The 
database has detailed deposit information for each branch office. We include almost all 
                                                             
4 For some quarters, we do not have a sufficiently large number of pure fee-generating banks to estimate 
      if using 90% as the cutoff for pure non-lending banks. In robustness test, we use 90% as the 
cutoff, which doesn’t affect our main results. 
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commercial banks in the U.S that filed the call report during the period of 2000 to 2010. To 
avoid having results biased by outliers, all variables are winsorized in their 1st and 99th 
percentiles. All the dollar values are expressed in real 2010 dollars using the implicit GDP price 
deflator.5  
We follow the standard criteria of liquidity creation literature to filter out noise banks. 
We exclude a bank if (1) it has zero or negative equity capital in the current year; (2) its average 
lagged GTA is below $25 million; (3) it has unused commitments exceeding four times GTA; (4) it 
is classified by the Federal Reserve as a credit card bank or has consumer loans exceeding 50% 
of GTA.  We also require banks to have at least 12 quarters of  historical data. The final dataset 
has 199,387 bank-quarter observations, with a maximum of 4745 observations in the first 
quarter of 2005 and a minimum of 4180 observations in the last quarter of 2010.  
In the following empirical analysis, we also split the sample by size, as several empirical 
studies provide evidence that size is important when studying bank liquidity creation (Kashyap, 
Rajan, and Stein, 2002; Berger and Bouwman, 2009, 2011). We expect that the net effect of 
diversification may be different for banks in different size groups. Therefore, we split the sample 
into large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA in between $1 billion and $3 
billion), and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). Our sample has 199,387 bank-quarter 
observations: 4108 for large banks, 7724 for medium banks, and 187,555 for small banks. 
Panel A of Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics of the main variables. Average across 
all bank-quarter observations, the average liquidity creation based on the preferred “cat fat” 
measure divided by GTA is 0.29 with a standard deviation of 18%. The average liquidity creation 
divided by equity is 3.20. These numbers indicate that on average banks create $0.29 of liquidity 
per $1 of GTA and $3.20 of liquidity per $1 of equity capital. And the liquidity creation is on 
                                                             
5 The implicit GDP price deflator is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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average about 20% less based on the “cat nonfat” measure, which is the same as “cat fat” 
except that it excludes off-balance sheet activities.  
Overall, the banking sector invests about 75% of total earning assets in loan assets, 
which in return produces about 85% of total operating income. It seems that loan assets are 
more profitable than other operating assets. The ratio of loans to total earning assets and the 
ratio of net interest income are not perfectly correlated, and the correlation between them is 
only 0.2041, suggesting the two ratios measure different aspects of banking activities. The 
average asset diversity is about 0.46, and the average income diversity is about 0.29. As we 
discussed above, income-based diversity measures suffer from measurement problems, which 
could help explain the relatively low correlation between the two measures.  
The sample variation of the asset diversity measure is substantial as suggested by the 
standard deviation of 27.56%. All the four liquidity creation measures are significant and 
negatively correlated with asset diversity, indicating that there may be a negative impact of 
diversification on liquidity creation. 
Panel B of Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics on bank liquidity creation and 
diversity for the entire banking industry and separately for large, medium, and small banks in 
2000 and in 2010, the first and the last years of the sample period, respectively. We find that the 
whole banking sector creates liquidity of $2611 billion in 2000 based on the preferred “cat fat” 
measure. Overall liquidity creation has almost tripled in real dollars to $7539 billion from 2000 
to 2010.6 
Large banks create about 79% of industry liquidity as of 2010, although they occupy less 
than 2% of the sample observations, Medium banks and small banks only contribute about 7% 
and 14% of industry liquidity in 2010, respectively. We also find that liquidity creation triples in 
                                                             
6 Liquidity creation (LC) hereafter refers to “cat fat”, unless otherwise specified. 
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real terms for large banks, while it only increases from 0.27 in 2000 to 0.33 in 2010 as a fraction 
of GTA and even falls from 3.59 to 3.27 times of equity. In sharp contrast, small banks show the 
greatest increase in liquidity creation divided by GTA and equity.  
Turning to overall liquidity creation based on the “cat nonfat” measure, we find that 
liquidity creation is over 50% less. Large banks still create most of the industry liquidity, 
although the percentage is lower (53% as of 2010 versus 79% based on the “cat fat” measure). 
The difference between liquidity creation based on “cat fat” and “cat nonfat” is the liquidity 
created by off-balance sheet items. We can see that large banks create more than one half of 
their liquidity off the balance sheet, while medium and small banks create about one fifth from 
the off-balance sheet activities. Therefore, it is very important to include off-balance sheet 
activities in the construction of the liquidity creation measure. 
Contrary to the two liquidity creation measures, average asset diversity measures for all 
banks drops from 0.53 in 2000 to 0.44 in 2010. Both medium banks and small banks have 
smaller asset diversity in 2010 than in 2000, while large banks show no change.  
To have a clearer view of how liquidity creation and bank diversity change over time and 
how they vary across different size classes, we show graphs with corresponding measures over 
the entire sample period. Figure 1.1 depicts liquidity creation based on “cat fat” divided by GTA 
for large, medium, and small banks from 2000 to 2010. As shown, the normalized “cat fat” 
measure for medium banks is much higher than that for large banks and small banks, despite 
the fact that medium banks only produce 7% of the industry liquidity, suggesting that medium 
banks create liquidity more efficiently than large and small banks. Additionally, the normalized 
“cat fat” measures for all three sizes are not monotonically growing, but all of them reach the 
highest level at around the mid of 2007. Figure 1.2 graphs the normalized “cat nonfat” measures 
for the three size groups. Similar to Figure 1.1, medium banks are the most efficient liquidity 
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creators. Perhaps surprisingly, small banks show a higher normalized “cat nonfat” than large 
banks over almost the entire sample period, which again indicates that large banks make more 
use of off-balance sheet activities to create liquidity. Figure 1.3 displays average asset diversity 
measures for large banks, medium banks and small banks from 2000 to 2010. Except for a very 
short window, diversification of bank activities decreased significantly, and banks of all sizes - 
small, medium, and large - were much more specialized in 2008 than they were in 2000.  
 Table 1.2 show the mean and median excess liquidity creation for the diversified banks.  
Again, a bank is classified as diversified if the ratio of net loans to total earning assets is between 
0.2 and 0.9. On average, diversified banks have significant negative excess liquidity creation of 
about -0.0154, which means on average diversified banks create $15.4 less of liquidity per 
$1000 of GTA than the amount of liquidity they would produce if they were separated into two 
pure banks. However, if we split banks by size, both large diversified banks and medium 
diversified banks have positive mean and median excess liquidity. In contrast, small banks show 
negative average excess liquidity creation.7 To gain a better understanding of how excess 
liquidity creation varies over time, we depict time series of average excess liquidity creation for 
the high-diversity banks versus low-diversity banks in the three size classes in Figures 1.4, 1.5, 
and 1.6. The high-diversity banks are those with asset diversity in the upper quartile, while the 
low-diversity banks are those with asset diversity in the lower quartile. We find that large and 
medium banks in the low-diversity (high-specialization) group produce much more excess 
liquidity than the high-diversity group in the years preceding to and during the financial crisis of 
2007-2009, while the high-diversity group create negative excess liquidity for some period.8 The 
                                                             
7 As small banks represent 93% of the sample observations, it is reasonable that the mean and median of 
all diversified banks are very close to that of small diversified banks. 
8 Our calculation shows that the average asset diversification of large banks in the low-diversity group 
decreased significantly from about 0.6 in 2004 to about 0.2 in 2008, while the diversification of the high-
diversity group decreased from 0.84 in 2004 to about 0.65 in 2008.   
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pattern of small banks is less pronounced. The excess liquidity creation of small low-diversity 
banks is positive but much lower than that of large and medium size banks. Moreover, small 
high-diversity banks create negative excess liquidity throughout the sample period. These 
findings seem to suggest a positive (negative) correlation between asset specialization 
(diversity) and excess liquidity creation. In the next section, we will systematically analyze the 
relationship between asset diversity (specialization) and liquidity creation across banks and over 
time.  
 
1.5 Regression framework and empirical results 
1.5.1 Regression framework 
 The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of activity diversification(specialization) on 
bank liquidity creation. Thus, we need to control for the possibility that different kinds of 
activities create different amounts of liquidity. To achieve this, we use the “chop-shop” method 
and compute excess liquidity creation with equation (1.3). While the liquidity creation measure 
incorporates the net impact of diversification as well as the individual impact of lending and 
non-lending activities, the excess liquidity creation measure controls for the individual impact of 
lending and non-lending activities by subtracting the activity-adjusted liquidity creation from the 
actual liquidity creation. Thus, the excess measure provides a more direct way of examining the 
net effect of diversification on the ability of banks to create liquidity.  
In the regressions presented below, we use panel datasets on all diversified banks from 
2000 to 2010. We regress the excess liquidity creation on the asset diversity measure while 
controlling for other factors that may affect bank liquidity creation. Our control variables include 
bank size, capital ratio, risk measure, bank performance, BHC status, local market competition 
and economic environment. Table 1.3 shows the definitions and summary statistics for the 
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exogenous variables.9 The key exogenous variable, Asset Diversity, takes values between zero 
and one, with higher values suggesting greater diversification of activity, as discussed in Section 
1.3. 
We use the natural log of bank gross total asset (GTA) to control for bank size. The bank 
capital ratio is also included as a control variable as bank capital could have positive or negative 
impact on bank liquidity creation.10 We use three risk measures to isolate the impact of 
diversification on the liquidity creation role of banks from the impact of diversification on the 
role of banks as risk transformers.11 The first measure is earning volatility, EARNVOL. The second 
measure, CREDITRISK, captures banks’ credit risk. The third measure, ZSCORE, indicates a bank’s 
distance from default. A higher EARNVOL, a higher CREDITRISK or a lower ZSCORE suggest that a 
bank is more risky. In order to capture all the information contained in the three measures in a 
single specification, we include three risk measures simultaneously in every regression.12 To 
avoid the multicollinearity problems, we follow Berger and Bouwman (2009) to orthogonalize 
CREDITRISK and ZSCORE and use the orthogonalized variables in all the regressions.13  
To control for past bank performance, we include the growth rate in GTA and the 
growth rate in net income over the last twelve quarters. Good past performance may enhance 
the ability of banks to create liquidity. 
                                                             
9
 All financial values are expressed in real 2010 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator. 
10 Diamond and Rajan(2000, 2001) and Gorton and Winton(2000) suggest that a higher capital ratio 
reduces liquidity creation, while Berger and Bouwman(2009) provide evidence that higher capital ratio 
help large banks to create more liquidity but discourage small banks to create liquidity. 
11 We follow Berger and Bouwman (2009) to choose the three risk measure.  
12
We also run the regressions by including risk measures one at a time. The results are similar to what we 
report in this paper. 
13 For simplicity, we use the term CREDITRISK and ZSCORE throughout the following analysis instead of 
orthogonalized CREDITRISK and orthogonalized ZSCORE.  
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We also control for bank holding company status with two dummy variables: D-MBHC 
and D-OBHC, as bank holding companies (BHC) and other banks in the same BHC could serve as 
internal capital markets to provide support in times of distress (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). 
Finally, we use HERF and SMARE-ML to control for the local market competition, as well 
as Ln(POP), Ln(DENSITY), and INC-GROWTH to control for local market economic conditions and 
business cycle variations. Here, we define the local market as the metropolitan statistical area 
(Metro area), the micropolitan statistical area (Micro area), or the county that does not belong 
to either Metro area or Micro area, where the bank offices are located. We calculate the 
weighted average values across these markets with the share of the bank's deposits in each of 
the markets as weights for banks that have offices in more than one local market.14 
Since we pool data across banks and over time, we also include bank dummy variables 
to control for average differences in liquidity creation over time across banks that are not 
captured by the other exogenous variables, as well as quarter dummy variables to account for 
average differences across quarters that are not captured by the other exogenous variables. 
Besides, quarter dummy variables help to reduce the serial correlation problem. Furthermore, in 
order to control for heteroskedasticity and possible correlation among observations of the same 
bank over time, all regressions are estimated with robust standard errors which are adjusted for 
clustering at the bank level.  
The exogenous variables other than Asset Diversity and dummy variables are lagged 
values calculated using quarterly data averaged over the previous twelve quarters.15 The use of 
lagged value is meant to reduce the endogeneity problems as lagged values reflect earlier 
                                                             
14 Taking deposit is the only banking business for which the geographic location information is 
publicly available. Therefore, we use the market share of deposits as weights. 
15 We obtain similar results if we use 12-quarter lagged average value of Asset Diversity in the regressions.  
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decisions. The use of a 12-quarter average could reduce the effects of fluctuations in the short 
run.  
1.5.2 Regression results 
 In this section, we show our regression results. We first present our main results based 
on the entire sample and then explore whether the results differ for the three size classes of 
banks. 
Panel A of Table 1.4 reports results from regressing excess liquidity creation on the asset 
diversity measure and different sets of control variables for all diversified banks. All of our 
regressions include the time and bank fixed effects. In Column 1, we only include Asset Diversity. 
The coefficient is -0.0591 and significant at the 1% level. The negative number suggests that 
banks with 1 percentage higher asset diversity create 0.06% less excess liquidity. The loading on 
Asset Diversity is negative and significant at the 1% level even after we control for size (Column 
2), bank capital (Column 3), bank risk (Column 4), and bank performance (Column 5) one by one 
or simultaneously (Column6). In Column 7, we also control for local market competition and 
economic conditions, but it does not alter our findings.16 Overall, we find that controlling for 
bank characteristics, local market traits, bank fixed effects and time fixed effects does not affect 
the negative (positive) relation between diversification (specialization) and excess liquidity 
creation.17 
Panel B of Table 1.4 also investigates the net impact of diversification on liquidity 
creation by examining the actual normalized liquidity creation measure, LC (cat fat)  / GTA, 
instead of the excess liquidity creation. To control for the lending and non-lending activities’ 
                                                             
16 We exclude Ln(POP) in the regression, as Ln(POP) are highly correlated with Ln(DENSITY) and would 
cause collinearity problem.  
17 As asset specialization is defined as 1 minus asset diversification, asset specialization should have a 
coefficient with opposite sign to the coefficient on asset diversity if it is included in the regression instead 
of asset diversity measure.  
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different contribution to liquidity, we include the activity measure based on assets, which is 
calculated as the ratio of net loans to total earning assets, in all of the regressions in Panel B. 
Similar to Panel A, we introduce the sets of control variables one by one at first, and then 
simultaneously in one regression. Asset diversity enters all of the regressions in Panel B 
negatively and significantly at the 1% level, which is consistent with the results of Panel A of 
Table 1.4: there is a negative association between the diversity of bank activities and the 
amount of liquidity created by banks while controlling for liquidity creation differences in 
different activities, other bank-specific factors, and economic conditions. The positive and 
significant coefficients on the activity measure, Loan to total earning assets, indicate that banks 
engaged in more lending activities generally create more liquidity than banks that are more 
specialized in fee-generating activities.  
To understand more deeply how diversification affects liquidity creation across different 
size classes, we present the regression results for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), 
medium banks (GTA range from $1 billion to $3 billion), and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 
billion) in Table 1.5, respectively. All of the six regressions include the full set of control variables 
and have bank and time fixed effects.18 The first three columns present results where the 
dependent variable is the excess liquidity creation. Asset Diversity (Specialization) enters 
negatively (positively) and significantly at 1% level for the three size classes.   
As we do not have a sufficient number of pure fee-generating banks in the medium-
bank group, the average liquidity creation of the pure fee-generating banks for the medium 
group could not be estimated for some quarters; hence the excess liquidity creation measure is 
missing for some observations. As a result, the sample size of the medium banks in the second 
regression of Table 1.5 is reduced by 2384 bank quarter observations. To avoid the problem of 
                                                             
18 Results are qualitatively similar if we only control for size and include bank and time fixed effects. 
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reduced sample size associated with the excess liquidity creation measure when we group banks 
by size, we use the actual normalized liquidity creation measure as a dependent variable in the 
last three columns of Table 1.5 for robustness. Again, we include the activity measure, Loans to 
total operating assets, to isolate the net impact of diversification on liquidity creation.  We still 
find a significant and negative correlation between diversity of activities and liquidity creation 
for every size group of banks. Thus, the results in Table 1.5 confirm our previous findings: 
diversity of bank activities is inversely related to bank excess liquidity creation. It indicates that 
more specialized banks tend to create more excess liquidity. Excessive liquidity creation could 
increase the fragility of the banking sector, and abundant availability of liquid funds may induce 
banks to lower their credit standards and pursue lending policies that generate asset price 
bubbles, which will lead up to a financial crisis. From this perspective, adequate diversification 
may benefit banks by restricting their excessive liquidity creation behavior during economic 
booms.  
1.5.3 Liquidity creation during the financial crisis 
 As our sample period includes the financial crisis, it is interesting to examine whether 
the effect of diversification on the liquidity provision role of banks varies across normal times 
and financial crisis. By examining how commercial bank deposits and lending evolved, Mora 
(2011) shows that it is harder for banks to provide liquidity during the 2007-09 financial crisis. In 
this part, we first explore whether banks produce less liquidity in times of the financial crisis.  
 To capture the impact of financial crisis on liquidity creation, we construct a financial 
crisis dummy variable (D-FC) which takes value of one for the crisis period. The excess liquidity 
creation measure is regressed upon the financial crisis dummy variables and the asset diversity 
measure, as well as the full set of control variables. The results for large banks, medium banks, 
and small banks are presented in Panel A of Table 1.6. We observe that the coefficients of D-FC 
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are significant and negative in all the regressions, indicating that banks are less able to provide 
excess liquidity during the financial crisis. This is consistent with the findings of Mora(2011). As 
banks are at the center of the 2007-2009 crisis, the safety of banks is questioned which prevents 
banks from receiving deposit inflows. Moreover, wholesale funds become more difficult to raise 
during the bank-centered crisis as these funds are the least likely to be protected in a bank 
failure (Brunnermeier, 2009; Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010; Mora, 2011). Banks would have to 
reduce lending if they were not able to find alternative sources of funds. Thus, banks cannot 
maintain their advantage in liquidity creation during the bank-centered crisis.  
 Next, we investigate whether the effect of diversification is less pronounced during the 
financial crisis. To accomplish that, we introduce an interaction term equal to the product of the 
asset diversity measure and the financial crisis dummy variable. This approach allows us to 
contrast the effect of diversification during crises and normal times. Panel B of Table 1.6 shows 
the regression results with the interaction terms for all bank size classes. Asset diversity 
continues to enter all the regressions negatively and significantly. The coefficients on the 
interaction term are negative, but only significantly for small banks. The findings indicate that 
the effect of asset diversification (specialization) doesn't vary significantly across normal times 
and financial crisis for large and medium banks, but stronger for small banks during the financial 
crisis. Therefore, diversification of activities may restrict the ability of banks to produce liquidity 
during financial crises, while more specialized banks providing relatively more liquidity play a 
better role in stimulating the economy in times of stress.  
 
1.6 Robustness test 
 In Section 1.5, we find that diversification (specialization) and bank liquidity creation are 
negatively (positively) correlated for large banks, medium banks and small banks, which is based 
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on the asset diversity measure and the preferred “cat fat” measure of liquidity creation. We 
now test the robustness of our main findings in the following ways. First, we use an alternative 
measure of diversity. Second, we use an alternative measure of liquidity creation which excludes 
off-balance sheet activities. Third, we split the sample by bank holding company status, 
wholesale versus retail orientation, level of diversity, and merger activities. Finally, we use an 
instrumental variable approach.  
1.6.1 Using an alternative diversity measure 
 In our empirical analysis in Section 1.5, we use Asset Diversity defined in Equation (1.1), 
which is based on stock variables, as our key exogenous variable. We now use Income Diversity 
instead of Asset Diversity to see whether the effect of diversity differs based on flow variables 
on liquidity creation. Income Diversity measures diversification across different sources of 
income and is calculated as: 
                     
                                          
                      
             (1.4) 
where net interest income is interest income minus interest expenses, other operating income 
includes the net fee income, net commission income, and net income from trading, and the 
total operating income is the sum of net interest income and other operating income. The 
income diversity measure also takes a value between zero and one. Generally, a bank with 
higher income diversity measure is more diverse. 
 Similar to the construction of excess liquidity creation based on asset diversity, the 
excess liquidity creation based on income diversity for bank i is:  
Excess liquidity creation i          
         
        
                                                       
            
                            (1.5) 
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 where   
  represents the relative importance of interest income to total operating income in 
bank i, i.e., the proportion of net interest income in total operating income of bank i,       
denotes the average normalized liquidity creation of banks that receive over 90% of their 
operating income from net interest income,       denotes the average normalized liquidity 
creation of banks with over 80% of total operating income from other operating income. 
 Before proceeding, we note that the income diversity measure suffers from more 
manipulation and measurement problems. Therefore, we require a positive correlation between 
the degree to which banks engage in a particular activity and the net income generated from 
that activity. 
 The results based on this alternative diversity measure are shown in Table 1.7. The first 
four columns present regression results where the dependent variable is the excess liquidity 
creation. The last four columns report the regression results where the dependent variable is 
the actual normalized liquidity creation measure, LC (cat fat)  /GTA. To control for the fact that 
banks engage in different mixes of lending and fee-generating activities and to therefore isolate 
the relation between liquidity creation and diversification, regressions in the last four columns 
include an activity measure based on income, which is calculated as the ratio of net interest 
income to total operating income. In these regressions, we also include the full set of control 
variables and bank and time fixed effects, and adjust the standard errors for clustering at the 
bank level. Regressions (1) and (5) are based on the whole sample, while the other regressions 
are based on samples split by size. Income Diversity enters all of the eight regressions negatively 
and significantly, indicating that banks with more diverse income source tend to restrict liquidity 
production. Hence, the results in Table 1.7 reinforce our main findings. 
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1.6.2 Using an alternative measure of liquidity creation 
 Thus far, we use the preferred “cat fat” measure to construct the normalized liquidity 
creation and excess liquidity creation. As shown, “cat fat” includes off-balance sheet activities. 
An alternative measure is “cat nonfat” which is identical to the “cat fat” measures except for the 
exclusion of off-balance sheet items. With this alternative measure, liquidity creation of the 
banking sector is over 50% lower in 2010 (see Table 1.1 Panel B) than using the preferred “cat 
fat” measure. We also show in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 that the pattern of liquidity creation over the 
sample period based on “cat nonfat” is quite similar to the one based on “cat fat”. Next, we test 
whether our results hold with a liquidity creation measure excluding off-balance sheet items.  
 Table 1.8 shows the results with Panel A focusing on the asset diversity measure and 
Panel B focusing on the income diversity measure.  Similar to Table 1.7, we examine both the 
entire sample and the subsample split by size. Additionally, we not only analyze the effect on 
the excess liquidity creation based on “cat nonfat”, but also the normalized liquidity creation 
based on “cat nonfat”. Besides the full set of control variables, we include the ratio of net loans 
to total operating assets and net interest income to total operating income in regressions (5) to 
(8) of Panel A and Panel B, respectively. We find that with either Asset Diversity or Income 
Diversity, there is a significantly negative relation between liquidity creation and diversity 
measures for all but one case, suggesting that our main results are generally robust to the 
exclusion of off-balance sheet activities from our liquidity creation measure. 
1.6.3 Grouping by bank holding company status, wholesale versus retail orientation, the level 
of diversity, and merger activities 
 In all of the regression results presented so far, we only split our sample by size. Next, 
we investigate whether our results are sensitive to the grouping method. 
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 First, we group the sample by bank holding company status. We rerun the regressions 
for MBHC members, OBHC members, and independent banks separately (Panel A in Table 1.9). 
The results are similar to our main findings.  
Second, we group the sample by wholesale versus retail orientation (Panel B in Table 
1.9). Here we define the banks with an above average number of branches as retail oriented and 
banks with a below average number of branches as wholesale oriented. Again, results are not 
affected.  
Third, we divide the diverse banks into two groups: banks with a diversity measure 
smaller than 2/3 and banks with a diversity measure between 2/3 and 1. We use the two 
subsamples to test whether the negative relationship between diversification and liquidity 
creation only exist at high levels of diversity. Results in Panel C of Table 1.9 show that both 
groups have significant and negative loadings on Asset Diversity.  
Finally, we split the sample by merger activities. Following Laeven and Levine (2007), we 
identify all banks that experience a change in assets of more than 50% from quarter t-1 to 
quarter t, which could reflect a large acquisition. Banks that do not have a large change in assets 
over the sample period are classified into the group that is not involved in merger activities. 
Regressions are re-estimated for the two subsamples. As shown in Panel D of Table 1.9, our 
main results are not biased by merger activities. 
 For robustness, we rerun all the regression in Table 1.9 with income diversity measures. 
The findings are quite similar (not shown for brevity’s sake).19 Similar to previous regression 
analysis, we include the full set of control variables and time and bank fixed effects in all 
                                                             
19 Income diversity enter all the subsamples negatively and significantly except for the subsample of 
observations on banks that experience a change in assets of more than 50% in recent years.   
29 
 
regressions presented in this part. The coefficients for the control variables are not reported for 
brevity. 
1.6.4 Using an instrumental variable approach 
 Since banking institutions choose whether to diversify their services or not, the same 
bank-level traits that induce this decision could also affect the ability of banks to create liquidity. 
In all the analysis presented so far, we include numerous variables as well as the fixed effects for 
each bank to control for bank-specific traits, and we also use the 12-quarter lagged average 
values of control variables to mitigate endogeneity problems. Next, we will use an instrumental 
variable approach to address the endogeneity problem more deeply. Specifically, we use three 
instrumental variable (IV) specifications.  
The first IV specification uses the diversity of other banks, i.e., the weighted average 
asset diversity of other banking institutions in all markets in which a bank has offices, using the 
proportion of deposits held by a bank in each market as weights.  
 The second IV specification uses the diversity of all banks, i.e., the weighted average 
asset diversity of all banks in all markets in which a bank has offices, using the proportion of 
deposits held by a bank in each market as weights.  
The third IV specification uses the share of diversified banks, i.e., the weighted average 
share of diversified banks in all markets in which a bank has offices, using the same weights as 
the first and second IV. 
Our three IVs satisfy the two requirements of instruments: the three IVs show sufficient 
variation within a bank’s observations over time; all of the three IVs are correlated with asset 
diversity, but do not directly affect the amount of liquidity a bank creates. Panel A of Table 1.10 
offers summary statistics on the three instrument variables.  
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Next, we regress our potentially endogenous variable, Asset Diversity, on an instrument 
variable in the first stage. In the second stage, we regress the excess liquidity creation on the 
predicted value for Asset Diversity from the first stage. We include the full set of control 
variables and the bank and time fixed effects in both the first and second stage. Panel B of Table 
1.10 reports the first and second stage regression results. We find that the regression results 
continue to suggest that less diversified (more specialized) banks tend to create more excess 
liquidity, as the instrumented asset diversity enters negatively and significantly in all of the three 
instrumental specifications. As expected, the first stage regression results show that the average 
diversity of other banks, average diversity of all banks, and share of diversified banks are all 
positively related with the asset diversity measure.  
Furthermore, we apply the three IV specifications to large banks, medium banks, and 
small banks, respectively. We find all of the three IV have a significantly positive effect on the 
diversity of activity at small banks. But they do not significantly affect diversity at large and 
medium banks, perhaps because large and medium banks’ decision with regards to whether or 
not to diversify are not affected by the diversity of financial firms in the local markets. Thus, we 
focus on the second stage regression results of the small bank group. When we use 
instrumented Asset Diversity for small banks, our results are consistent with our earlier findings 
(Results not shown for brevity). For robustness, we reexamine the endogeneity issues by 
applying the three IVs to the income diversity measure. Results are qualitatively similar to what 
we report in Panel B of Table 1.10. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 Banks play a crucial role in creating liquidity to facilitate production, yet the extent to 
which bank activity diversification (specialization) affects this role has not been studied 
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systematically. This paper is the first to explore the net impact of activity diversification on 
banks’ role as liquidity creator.  
We use a modified chop-shop method to subtract the independent impact of 
diversification on liquidity creation, and adopt several econometric procedures to control for the 
possibility that the same traits that guide banks to diversify also affect banks’ ability to create 
liquidity. We find that diversity measures based on either assets or income flows are negatively 
related to excess liquidity creation for banks in all size classes. This result indicates that highly 
specialized banks tend to create excessive liquidity, which is not good when the economy is 
overheating. Too much liquidity creation would increase the fragility of the banking sector and 
build asset price bubbles, thereby resulting in financial crisis. From this perspective, adequate 
diversification may benefit banks by limiting their excessive liquidity creation behavior during 
economic booms. 
 In addition, we find that the effect of asset diversification (specialization) doesn't vary 
significantly across normal times and financial crisis for large and medium banks, but stronger 
for small banks during the financial crisis. This evidence suggests that diversification of activities 
may restrict the ability of banks to produce liquidity during financial crises, while specialized 
banks providing relatively more liquidity play a better role in stimulating the economy in times 
of crisis.  
  
32 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Average normalized Liquidity creation based on “cat fat” measure from 2000 to 
2010.  
The normalized liquidity creation based on “cat fat”, i.e., the dollar amount of liquidity a bank 
has created (calculated using the preferred “cat fat” liquidity creation measure) divided by GTA, 
is averaged across banks for each size class at each quarter. The time series is plotted for large 
banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and 
small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion).   
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Figure 1.2. Average normalized Liquidity creation based on “cat nonfat” measure from 2000 to 
2010.  
The normalized liquidity creation based on “cat nonfat”, i.e., the dollar amount of liquidity a 
bank has created (calculated using the preferred “cat nonfat” liquidity creation measure) 
divided by GTA, is averaged across banks for each size class at each quarter. “cat nonfat” is 
identical to the “cat fat” measures except for the exclusion of off-balance sheet items. The time 
series is plotted for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 
billion and $3 billion) and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). 
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Figure 1.3. Average Asset diversity for banks in each size class from 2000 to 2010.  
Asset diversity is a measure of diversification across different type of assets and is calculated as 
1-|(Net loans-Other earning assets)/Total earning assets|. Asset diversity takes values between 
0 and 1, and higher value indicates greater diversification. It is averaged across banks for each 
size class at each quarter. The time series of average asset diversity is plotted for large banks 
(GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and small 
banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). 
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Figure 1.4. Average excess liquidity creation for large banks in the low and high diversity 
groups from 2000 to 2010.  
The high-diversity banks are those with asset diversity in the upper quartile. The low-diversity 
banks are those with asset diversity in the lower quartile. 
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Figure 1.5. Average excess liquidity creation for medium banks in the low and high diversity 
groups from 2000 to 2010.  
The high-diversity banks are those with asset diversity in the upper quartile. The low-diversity 
banks are those with asset diversity in the lower quartile. 
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Figure 1.6. Average excess liquidity creation for small banks in the low and high diversity 
groups from 2000 to 2010.  
The high-diversity banks are those with asset diversity in the upper quartile. The low-diversity 
banks are those with asset diversity in the lower quartile. 
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Table 1.1. Summary Statistics 
LC (cat fat) and LC (cat nonfat) are the bank liquidity creation based on “cat fat” and “cat nonfat” measure, respectively. The “cat fat” measure 
classifies all bank activities other than loans based on product category and maturity, and loans by category only. The “cat nonfat” measure is 
the same as “cat fat” except for the exclusion of off-balance sheet activities. The Asset diversity is a measure of diversification across different 
type of assets and is calculated as 1-|(Net loans-Other earning assets)/Total earning assets|. Asset diversity takes values between 0 and 1, and 
higher value indicates greater diversification. Income diversity is a measure of diversification across different sources of income and is 
calculated as 1-|(Net interest income-Other operating income)/Total Operating Income|. Income diversity measure takes values between 0 
and 1, and higher value indicate greater diversification. We include almost all banks in the U.S. that file “Call Report” during the period of 2000 
to 2010. We exclude a bank if (1) it has zero or negative equity capital in the current year; (2) its average lagged GTA is below $25 million; (3) it 
has unused commitments exceeding four times of GTA; (4) it is classified by the Federal Reserve as a credit card bank or has consumer loans 
exceeding 50% of GTA. We also require banks to have at least 12 quarter history. Panel A shows summary statistics of the bank liquidity 
creation divided by gross total assets (GTA) and equity, as well as the diversity measures and activities measures based on asset and income for 
the period of 2000 to 2010. Panel B shows summary statistics on bank liquidity creation measures and asset diversity for all banks and 
separately for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion), and small banks (GTA smaller 
than $1 billion) in 2000 and in 2010. All the dollar values are expressed in real 2010 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics and correlation of liquidity creation and diversity measures  
Variable Sample size Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Correlation(p-value) 
      
LC(cat fat) 
/Equity 
LC(cat 
nonfat) 
/GTA 
LC(cat 
nonfat) 
/Equity 
Asset 
diversity 
Loans to 
total 
earning 
assets 
Income 
diversity 
Net 
Interest 
income to 
total 
operating 
income 
LC(cat fat)/GTA 199387 0.2887 0.2967 0.1820 0.1432 0.9677 0.1265 -0.6239 0.7181 -0.0245 0.0591 
 
 
   
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LC(cat fat)/Equity 199387 3.2038 3.0344 14.3722 1 0.1401 0.9991 -0.0926 0.1031 0.0025 0.0031 
 
 
    
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2967) (0.1940) 
LC(cat nonfat)/GTA 199387 0.2339 0.2441 0.1649 
 
1 0.1304 -0.6321 0.7453 -0.0534 0.1157 
 
 
     
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LC(cat nonfat)/Equity 199387 2.6072 2.4894 13.6672 
  
1 -0.0873 0.0978 -0.0034 0.0100 
 
 
      
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1522) (0.0000) 
Asset diversity 199387 0.4611 0.4406 0.2756 
   
1 -0.8563 0.1755 -0.1472 
 
 
       
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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Loans to total earning  199387 0.7472 0.7762 0.1745     1 -0.1753 0.2041 
assets  
        
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Income diversity 199387 0.2867 0.255 0.1678 
     
1 -0.8395 
 
 
         
(0.0000) 
Net Interest income to 
total operating income 
199387 0.8510 0.8721 0.1051             1 
 
Panel B: Bank liquidity creation and asset diversity over time(2000-2010) for banks split by size 
       2000 liquidity creation and diversity   2010 liquidity creation and diversity 
  All banks Large Medium Small   All banks Large Medium Small 
Observations 18341 268 592 17481 
 
17189 315 852 16022 
Overall LC(cat fat) $ bill 2611.16 1650.12 296.71 664.33 
 
7539.59 5969.26 524.89 1045.44 
Overall LC(cat nonfat) $ bill 1446.12 731.42 199.82 514.88 
 
2802.93 1498.32 426.78 877.82 
Average LC(cat fat) $ bill  0.14 6.16 0.5 0.04 
 
0.44 18.95 0.62 0.07 
Average  LC(cat nonfat) $ bill  0.08 2.73 0.34 0.03 
 
0.16 4.76 0.5 0.05 
LC(cat fat)/GTA 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.22 
 
0.29 0.33 0.37 0.29 
LC(cat fat)/Equity 2.58 3.59 3.59 2.53 
 
3.24 3.27 4.38 3.18 
LC(cat nonfat)/GTA 0.18 0.16 0.2 0.17 
 
0.24 0.23 0.3 0.24 
LC(cat nonfat)/Equity 2.05 2.16 2.46 2.04 
 
2.75 2.31 3.59 2.72 
Asset diversity 0.53 0.58 0.55 0.53 
 
0.44 0.58 0.48 0.44 
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Table 1.2. Excess liquidity creation of diversified banks  
The excess liquidity creation for a diversified bank is defined as the difference between its actual normalized liquidity creation and the activity-
adjusted normalized liquidity creation. The normalized liquidity creation is calculated by dividing liquidity creation measure by GTA. The activity 
–adjusted normalized liquidity creation of a bank is the weighted average liquidity creation of pure lending banks and pure non-lending banks. 
The weights are determined by the relative importance of net loans to total earning assets. The liquidity creation of pure lending banks are 
approximated by the average normalized liquidity creation of banks with a ratio of net loans to total earning assets greater than 0.9 and the 
liquidity creation of pure non-lending banks are approximated by the average normalized liquidity creation of banks with a ratio of net loans to 
total earning assets less than 0.2. The sample period is 2000-2010. Sample means and medians are provided for all banks, large banks (GTA 
greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Variable         All banks Large banks Medium banks Small banks 
       
   
Mean excess liquidity creation 
  
-0.0154 
 
0.0177 0.0207 -0.0153 
(t-statistic) 
   
(46.33)*** 
 
(6.01)*** (8.98)*** (45.57)*** 
       
   
Median excess liquidity creation 
  
-0.0135 
 
0.0212 0.0206 -0.0123 
(p-value for non-parametric sign test) 
 
(<0.0001)*** 
 
(<0.0001)*** (<0.0001)*** (<0.0001)*** 
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Table 1.3. Definitions and summary statistics for exogenous variables 
The exogenous variables except Asset Diversity and dummy variables are created by using the 12-quarter lagged average values. The sample 
period is 2000-2010.  Sample means are provided for all banks, large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 
billion and $3 billion) and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). All the dollar values are expressed in real 2010 dollars using the implicit 
GDP price deflator.  
Data source: Bank Call Reports, FDIC Summary of Deposits, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Variable Definition 
Mean for 
all banks 
Mean for 
large banks 
Mean for 
medium 
banks 
Mean for 
small banks 
Bank diversity 
     Asset Diversity A measure of diversification across different type of assets, which is calculated as 
1-|(Net loans-Other earning assets)/Total earning assets|. It takes values 
between 0 and 1, and higher value indicates greater diversification.   
0.4611 0.5581 0.4734 0.4652
Bank size 
     Ln(GTA) Natural log of gross total asset(GTA thereafter), where GTA equals total assets 
plus the allowance for loan and lease losses 
11.7441 15.9153 14.007 11.5595
Bank capital ratio 
     EQRAT Equity capital ratio: total equity capital divided by GTA 0.1059 0.0961 0.0953 0.1065 
Bank risk measure 
     EARNVOL Earning volatility: calculated as the standard deviation of the bank's quarterly 
return on assets over the previous twelve quarters, multiplied by 100 
0.4095 0.4483 0.4206 0.4082 
     
CREDITRISK Credit risk measure: calculated as the banks' Basel I risk-weighted assets and off-
balance sheet activities divided by GTA 
0.6695 0.6822 0.7135 0.6674 
     
ZSCORE Distance to default: measured as the bank's return on assets plus the equity 
capital/GTA ratio, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets 
32.8971 28.0033 29.0391 33.1631 
Bank performance 
 
    
GROWTH IN ASSET The quarterly growth rate in GTA measured over the previous twelve quarters 0.0227 0.0457 0.0435 0.0213 
GROWTH IN INCOME The quarterly growth rate in net income  measured over the previous twelve 
quarters 
0.0178 0.0422 0.0337 0.0166 
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Bank holding company status 
     D-MBHC A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the bank has been part of a multibank 
holding company over the previous three years 
0.2104 0.4951 0.2979 0.2006
D-OBHC A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the bank has been part of a one-bank 
holding company over the previous three years 
0.5787 0.4144 0.5876 0.5819 
Local market competition 
     HERF A bank-level Herfindahl index of concentration based on bank deposits 0.1855 0.1416 0.1433 0.1882
SHARE-ML Local market share of bank deposits held by medium and large banks (GTA 
greater than $1 billon) 
0.4932 0.8535 0.7838 0.4734 
Local market economic environment 
    
Ln(POP) Natural log of weighted average population in all markets in which a bank has 
deposits, using the proportion of deposits held by a bank in each market as 
weights 
12.2312 15.0129 14.2162 12.092 
     
Ln(DENSITY) Natural log of weighted average population density (population per square mile) 
in all markets in which a bank has deposits, using the proportion of deposits held 
by a bank in each market as weights 
4.7176 6.6184 6.0812 4.6222 
     
INC-GROWTH Weighted average income growth in all markets in which a bank has deposits,  
using the proportion of deposits held by a bank in each market as weights 
0.017 0.0144 0.0142 0.0172 
Fixed effects  
     
Time fixed effects Set of dummy variables for all but one year 
    Bank fixed effects  Set of dummy variables for all but one bank         
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Table 1.4. The effect of diversification on liquidity creation: controlling for bank-level characteristics 
This table presents regression results. The dependent variable in Panel A is the excess liquidity creation, i.e., the difference between actual 
normalized liquidity creation and the activity-adjusted normalized liquidity creation, based on the preferred “cat fat” and asset diversity 
measure. The dependent variable in Panel B is the dollar amount of liquidity a bank has created, based on the “cat fat” measure, divided by 
GTA. We include the ratio of net loans to total earning assets in Panel B to control for the lending and non-lending activities’ different 
contribution to liquidity. The other exogenous variables are defined in Table 1.3. All regressions are run with both time fixed effects and bank 
fixed effects.  
The sample period is 2000-2010. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel  A: Excess liquidity creation       
Asset Diversity -0.0591 -0.0593 -0.0588 -0.0762 -0.0560 -0.0786 -0.0779 
 (0.0034)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0043)*** 
Ln(GTA)  -0.0052    -0.0083 -0.0099 
  (0.0027)*    (0.0031)*** (0.0031)*** 
EQRAT   -0.2937   -0.4338 -0.4381 
   (0.0398)***   (0.0515)*** (0.0509)*** 
EARNVOL    -0.0111  -0.0038 -0.0036 
    (0.0041)***  (0.0042) (0.0042) 
CREDITRISK    0.1018  0.1178 0.1181 
    (0.0108)***  (0.0109)*** (0.0110)*** 
ZSCORE    -0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0002 
    (0.0001)*  (0.0001)** (0.0001)*** 
GROWTH IN ASSET     0.0521 0.0945 0.0891 
     (0.0223)** (0.0227)*** (0.0225)*** 
GROWTH IN INCOME     0.0271 0.0230 0.0231 
     (0.0024)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0025)*** 
D-MBHC       0.0127 
       (0.0039)*** 
D-OBHC       0.0084 
       (0.0031)*** 
HERF        -0.0040 
       (0.0152) 
SHARE-ML        0.0062 
       (0.0058) 
Ln(DENSITY)       0.0098 
44 
 
       (0.0050)* 
INC-GROWTH        0.0070 
       (0.0044) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 155129 155129 155129 126504 142490 126504 126504 
R2 0.891 0.892 0.892 0.906 0.900 0.908 0.908 
Adjusted R2 0.885 0.886 0.886 0.900 0.894 0.902 0.902 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel B: LC(Cat fat)/ GTA        
Asset Diversity -0.0293 -0.0294 -0.0296 -0.0517 -0.0252 -0.0550 -0.0553 
 (0.0062)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0078)*** 
Loans to total earning assets 0.5924 0.5924 0.5909 0.5823 0.5955 0.5801 0.5782 
 (0.0132)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0144)*** (0.0128)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0140)*** 
Ln(GTA)  -0.0034    -0.0069 -0.0085 
  (0.0026)    (0.0030)** (0.0031)*** 
EQRAT   -0.2965   -0.4270 -0.4314 
   (0.0397)***   (0.0518)*** (0.0512)*** 
EARNVOL    -0.0113  -0.0038 -0.0037 
    (0.0041)***  (0.0042) (0.0042) 
CREDITRISK    0.0949  0.1114 0.1121 
    (0.0117)***  (0.0117)*** (0.0119)*** 
ZSCORE    -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0002 
    (0.0001)*  (0.0001)** (0.0001)*** 
GROWTH IN ASSET     0.0573 0.1003 0.0952 
     (0.0216)*** (0.0222)*** (0.0221)*** 
GROWTH IN INCOME     0.0278 0.0242 0.0243 
     (0.0024)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0025)*** 
D-MBHC       0.0124 
       (0.0039)*** 
D-OBHC       0.0082 
       (0.0031)*** 
HERF       -0.0033 
       (0.0149) 
SHARE-ML       0.0066 
       (0.0057) 
LN(DENSITY)       0.0094 
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       (0.0049)* 
INC-GROWTH       0.0062 
       (0.0044) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 155129 155129 155129 126504 142490 126504 126504 
R2 0.940 0.940 0.941 0.949 0.945 0.950 0.950 
Adjusted R2 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.945 0.942 0.946 0.946 
 
  
46 
 
Table 1.5. The effect of diversification on liquidity creation for banks in each size group 
This table presents regression results for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and 
small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion) separately. The dependent variable in Columns 1 to 3 is the excess liquidity creation, i.e., the 
difference between actual normalized liquidity creation and the activity-adjusted normalized liquidity creation, based on the preferred “cat 
fat” and asset diversity measure. The dependent variable in Columns 4 to 6 is the dollar amount of liquidity a bank has created, based on the 
“cat fat” measure, divided by GTA. We include the ratio of net loans to total earning assets in Panel B to control for the lending and non-
lending activities’ different contribution to liquidity. The other exogenous variables are defined in Table 1.3. All regressions are run with both 
time fixed effects and bank fixed effects.  
The sample period is 2000-2010. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Excess liquidity creation  LC(cat fat)/GTA 
 Large banks Medium banks Small banks  Large banks Medium banks Small banks 
Asset Diversity -0.1685 -0.0919 -0.0717  -0.1934 -0.0960 -0.0488 
 (0.0562)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0042)***  (0.0754)** (0.0450)** (0.0061)*** 
Loans to total earning assets     0.4660 0.6130 0.5817 
     (0.0961)*** (0.0793)*** (0.0108)*** 
Ln(GTA) 0.0124 -0.0186 -0.0130  0.0142 -0.0163 -0.0110 
 (0.0254) (0.0124) (0.0032)***  (0.0217) (0.0103) (0.0032)*** 
EQRAT -0.7114 -0.5482 -0.4382  -0.6512 -0.4874 -0.4239 
 (0.5372) (0.2398)** (0.0439)***  (0.4672) (0.2432)** (0.0437)*** 
EARNVOL -0.0512 -0.0338 -0.0031  -0.0451 -0.0201 -0.0031 
 (0.0686) (0.0249) (0.0037)  (0.0664) (0.0200) (0.0037) 
CREDITRISK 0.4927 0.1827 0.1065  0.5021 0.1801 0.0995 
 (0.1611)*** (0.0769)** (0.0102)***  (0.1774)*** (0.0648)*** (0.0104)*** 
ZSCORE 0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0002  0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0002 
 (0.0012) (0.0006)*** (0.0001)***  (0.0011) (0.0005)** (0.0001)*** 
GROWTH IN ASSET -0.0164 -0.0427 0.1215  -0.0267 -0.0120 0.1292 
 (0.1255) (0.0735) (0.0224)***  (0.1207) (0.0614) (0.0222)*** 
GROWTH IN INCOME 0.0663 0.0364 0.0216  0.0637 0.0382 0.0235 
 (0.0273)** (0.0178)** (0.0025)***  (0.0277)** (0.0133)*** (0.0024)*** 
D-MBHC 0.0526 0.0090 0.0127  0.0378 -0.0076 0.0124 
 (0.0501) (0.0319) (0.0041)***  (0.0441) (0.0234) (0.0040)*** 
D-OBHC 0.0249 0.0046 0.0087  0.0129 -0.0065 0.0084 
 (0.0475) (0.0302) (0.0032)***  (0.0412) (0.0216) (0.0032)*** 
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HERF -0.5302 0.0168 0.0136  -0.5316 -0.0277 0.0139 
 (0.1086)*** (0.0785) (0.0131)  (0.1087)*** (0.0418) (0.0129) 
SHARE-ML -0.0590 0.0238 0.0056  -0.1033 0.0079 0.0058 
 (0.2618) (0.0256) (0.0059)  (0.2329) (0.0234) (0.0058) 
LN(DENSITY) -0.0382 0.0613 0.0111  -0.0338 0.0466 0.0106 
 (0.0751) (0.0259)** (0.0047)**  (0.0715) (0.0239)* (0.0046)** 
INC-GROWTH -0.1571 0.0370 0.0069  -0.1255 0.1040 0.0066 
 (0.1928) (0.1136) (0.0044)  (0.1911) (0.0646) (0.0044) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 2721 2592 118807  2721 4976 118807 
R2 0.860 0.927 0.909  0.899 0.951 0.952 
Adjusted R2 0.845 0.910 0.903  0.888 0.945 0.949 
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Table 1.6. The effect of the financial crisis on liquidity creation 
This table presents regression results for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and 
small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion) separately. The dependent variable is the excess liquidity creation, i.e., the difference between actual 
normalized liquidity creation and the activity-adjusted normalized liquidity creation, based on the preferred “cat fat” and asset diversity 
measure. D-FC is a financial crisis dummy variable which equals one if the bank is in the period of bursting of dot-com bubble(Q1:2001-
Q4:2002) or the 2007-2009 financial crisis(Q4:2007-Q2:2009), and zero otherwise. The exogenous variable (Asset Diversity × D-FC) is an 
interaction term between Asset Diversity and D-FC. The other exogenous variables are defined in Table 1.3. All regressions are run with both 
time fixed effects and bank fixed effects.  
The sample period is 2000-2010. The standard errors adjusted for correlation across time are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: regression results with the financial crisis dummy D-FC 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Excess liquidity creation 
 Large banks Medium banks Small banks 
Asset Diversity -0.1373 -0.1253 -0.0645 
 (0.0573)** (0.0305)*** (0.0043)*** 
D-FC -0.0222 -0.0352 -0.0478 
 (0.0134)* (0.0153)** (0.0020)*** 
Ln(GTA) 0.0069 -0.0179 -0.0160 
 (0.0212) (0.0099)* (0.0028)*** 
EQRAT -0.8521 -0.3927 -0.3889 
 (0.5763) (0.1841)** (0.0395)*** 
EARNVOL -0.0596 0.0082 -0.0056 
 (0.0355)* (0.0252) (0.0035) 
CREDITRISK 0.5253 0.2658 0.1192 
 (0.1619)*** (0.0680)*** (0.0119)*** 
ZSCORE 0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0002 
 (0.0007)* (0.0006) (0.0001)*** 
GROWTH IN ASSET -0.0129 0.0273 0.1364 
 (0.1148) (0.0551) (0.0207)*** 
GROWTH IN INCOME 0.0366 0.0388 0.0251 
 (0.0225) (0.0140)*** (0.0026)*** 
D-MBHC -0.0009 0.0011 0.0090 
 (0.0469) (0.0193) (0.0037)** 
D-OBHC -0.0054 0.0035 0.0090 
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 (0.0429) (0.0174) (0.0030)*** 
HERF -0.3735 -0.0225 0.0070 
 (0.1378)*** (0.0483) (0.0137) 
SHARE-ML 0.2263 -0.0032 0.0074 
 (0.2630) (0.0211) (0.0060) 
LN(DENSITY) -0.0524 0.0162 0.0139 
 (0.0723) (0.0228) (0.0043)*** 
INC-GROWTH -0.1806 0.1326 0.0049 
 (0.1763) (0.0627)** (0.0045) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3324 6376 152126 
R2 0.853 0.899 0.900 
Adjusted R2 0.838 0.888 0.895 
 
 
Panel B: regression results with the interaction term between Asset Diversity and D-FC 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Excess liquidity creation 
 Large banks Medium banks Small banks 
Asset Diversity -0.1314 -0.1210 -0.0609 
 (0.0572)** (0.0300)*** (0.0043)*** 
Asset Diversity × D-FC -0.0174 -0.0153 -0.0115 
 (0.0193) (0.0117) (0.0017)*** 
Ln(GTA) 0.0069 -0.0192 -0.0165 
 (0.0211) (0.0098)* (0.0028)*** 
EQRAT -0.8570 -0.4000 -0.3958 
 (0.5761) (0.1845)** (0.0396)*** 
EARNVOL -0.0587 0.0070 -0.0057 
 (0.0352)* (0.0249) (0.0035) 
CREDITRISK 0.5214 0.2645 0.1182 
 (0.1611)*** (0.0678)*** (0.0119)*** 
ZSCORE 0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0002 
 (0.0007)* (0.0006) (0.0001)*** 
GROWTH IN ASSET -0.0145 0.0230 0.1340 
 (0.1146) (0.0546) (0.0207)*** 
GROWTH IN INCOME 0.0370 0.0395 0.0257 
 (0.0223)* (0.0138)*** (0.0026)*** 
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D-MBHC -0.0013 0.0014 0.0090 
 (0.0466) (0.0194) (0.0037)** 
D-OBHC -0.0060 0.0040 0.0090 
 (0.0425) (0.0175) (0.0030)*** 
HERF -0.3753 -0.0215 0.0065 
 (0.1379)*** (0.0484) (0.0137) 
SHARE-ML 0.2294 -0.0032 0.0077 
 (0.2634) (0.0210) (0.0060) 
LN(DENSITY) -0.0526 0.0154 0.0138 
 (0.0722) (0.0229) (0.0043)*** 
INC-GROWTH -0.1719 0.1448 0.0068 
 (0.1765) (0.0616)** (0.0045) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3324 6376 152126 
R2 0.853 0.899 0.900 
Adjusted R2 0.838 0.888 0.895 
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Table 1.7. The effect of diversity on liquidity creation based on an alternative diversity measure  
This table presents regression results based on an alternative diversity measure, i.e., Income Diversity, for all banks, large banks (GTA greater 
than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). Income diversity is a 
measure of diversification across different sources of income and is calculated as 1-|(Net interest income-Other operating income)/Total 
Operating Income|. Income diversity measure takes values between 0 and 1, and higher value indicate greater diversification. The dependent 
variable in Columns 1 to 4 is the excess liquidity creation, i.e., the difference between actual normalized liquidity creation and the activity-
adjusted normalized liquidity creation, based on “cat fat” and income diversity measure. The dependent variable in Columns 5 to 8 is the dollar 
amount of liquidity a bank has created, based on the “cat fat” measure, divided by GTA. We include the ratio of net loans to total earning 
assets in Columns 5 to 8 to control for the lending and non-lending activities’ different contribution to liquidity. The other exogenous variables 
are defined in Table 1.3. All regressions are run with both time fixed effects and bank fixed effects. 
The sample period is 2000-2010. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Excess liquidity creation   LC(Cat fat)/GTA 
 All banks Large banks Medium banks Small banks  All banks Large banks Medium banks Small banks 
Income Diversity -0.0699 -0.1280 -0.0736 -0.0591  -0.1254 -0.1511 -0.1411 -0.1148 
 (0.0092)*** (0.0447)*** (0.0410)* (0.0096)***  (0.0193)*** (0.0635)** (0.0597)** (0.0232)*** 
Net interest income to       0.0612 -0.0259 0.1065 0.0908 
total operating income      (0.0351)* (0.1033) (0.1107) (0.0423)** 
LN(GTA) -0.0136 -0.0013 -0.0309 -0.0204  -0.0136 0.0015 -0.0297 -0.0202 
 (0.0045)*** (0.0174) (0.0153)** (0.0047)***  (0.0044)*** (0.0182) (0.0135)** (0.0047)*** 
EQRAT -0.3948 -0.3313 -0.0712 -0.4501  -0.3911 -0.3209 -0.2834 -0.4494 
 (0.0684)*** (0.5648) (0.2658) (0.0662)***  (0.0683)*** (0.5729) (0.2557) (0.0662)*** 
EARNVOL 0.0142 -0.1115 0.0324 0.0151  0.0136 -0.1155 0.0389 0.0149 
 (0.0066)** (0.0432)** (0.0406) (0.0064)**  (0.0065)** (0.0481)** (0.0365) (0.0064)** 
CREDITRISK 0.3924 0.4737 0.5567 0.3792  0.3938 0.5366 0.5118 0.3804 
 (0.0187)*** (0.1169)*** (0.0918)*** (0.0193)***  (0.0187)*** (0.1205)*** (0.0800)*** (0.0194)*** 
ZSCORE -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0002  -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0001) 
GROWTH IN ASSET 0.1901 -0.1527 0.1081 0.2445  0.1912 -0.0837 0.1031 0.2468 
 (0.0349)*** (0.1631) (0.0986) (0.0360)***  (0.0349)*** (0.1574) (0.0899) (0.0360)*** 
GROWTH IN INCOME 0.0322 0.0293 0.0351 0.0302  0.0310 0.0218 0.0429 0.0293 
 (0.0037)*** (0.0259) (0.0235) (0.0037)***  (0.0037)*** (0.0260) (0.0200)** (0.0037)*** 
D-MBHC 0.0179 0.0056 0.0256 0.0151  0.0178 0.0248 0.0179 0.0152 
 (0.0057)*** (0.0609) (0.0159) (0.0061)**  (0.0058)*** (0.0579) (0.0143) (0.0061)** 
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D-OBHC 0.0167 -0.0033 0.0028 0.0176  0.0169 0.0149 0.0020 0.0179 
 (0.0044)*** (0.0587) (0.0123) (0.0046)***  (0.0044)*** (0.0557) (0.0100) (0.0046)*** 
HERF -0.0527 -0.6109 0.0147 -0.0405  -0.0533 -0.5845 0.0162 -0.0400 
 (0.0227)** (0.2087)*** (0.0646) (0.0201)**  (0.0231)** (0.2220)*** (0.0645) (0.0203)** 
SHARE-ML 0.0174 -0.0789 -0.0095 0.0184  0.0179 -0.1064 -0.0080 0.0188 
 (0.0092)* (0.2094) (0.0334) (0.0097)*  (0.0092)* (0.2251) (0.0304) (0.0096)* 
LN(DENSITY) 0.0296 -0.0386 0.0507 0.0305  0.0294 -0.0297 0.0496 0.0304 
 (0.0068)*** (0.0524) (0.0279)* (0.0072)***  (0.0068)*** (0.0538) (0.0314) (0.0072)*** 
INC-GROWTH -0.0131 -0.0268 0.1349 -0.0140  -0.0117 -0.0413 0.1262 -0.0135 
 (0.0089) (0.1936) (0.1077) (0.0090)  (0.0089) (0.1762) (0.0803) (0.0089) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102835 2719 3779 95178  102835 2719 4938 95178 
R2 0.913 0.902 0.920 0.915  0.916 0.901 0.926 0.918 
Adjusted R2 0.907 0.891 0.907 0.909  0.910 0.889 0.917 0.912 
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Table 1.8. The effect of diversity on liquidity creation based on alternative measure of liquidity creation 
This table presents regression results based on an alternative liquidity creation measure, i.e., “cat nonfat”, for all banks, large banks (GTA 
greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). The “cat nonfat” 
measure is the same as “cat fat” except for the exclusion of the off-balance sheet activities. Income diversity is a measure of diversification 
across different sources of income and is calculated as 1-|(Net interest income-Other operating income)/Total Operating Income|. Income 
diversity measure takes values between 0 and 1, and higher value indicates greater diversification. The dependent variable in Panel A, Columns 
1 to 4, is the excess liquidity creation, i.e., the difference between actual normalized liquidity creation and the activity-adjusted normalized 
liquidity creation, based on “cat nonfat” and asset diversity measure. The dependent variable in Panel B, Columns 1 to 4, is the excess liquidity 
creation, i.e., the difference between actual normalized liquidity creation and the activity-adjusted normalized liquidity creation, based on “cat 
nonfat” and income diversity measure. The dependent variable in Columns 5 to 8 is the dollar amount of liquidity a bank has created, based on 
the “cat nonfat” measure, divided by GTA. We include the ratio of net loans to total earning assets in Columns 5 to 8 to control for the lending 
and non-lending activities’ different contribution to liquidity. The other exogenous variables are defined in Table 1.3. All regressions are run 
with both time fixed effects and bank fixed effects. 
The sample period is 2000-2010. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Asset diversity         
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Excess liquidity creation based on “cat nonfat”  LC(cat nonfat)/GTA 
 All banks Large banks Medium banks Small banks  All banks Large banks Medium banks Small banks 
          
Asset Diversity -0.0789 -0.0612 -0.1068 -0.0780  -0.0529 -0.0896 -0.1254 -0.0478 
 (0.0036)*** (0.0266)** (0.0215)*** (0.0037)***  (0.0053)*** (0.0291)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0056)*** 
Loan to total earning assets      0.5412 0.4468 0.4802 0.5483 
      (0.0096)*** (0.0364)*** (0.0487)*** (0.0101)*** 
Ln(GTA) -0.0096 -0.0092 -0.0057 -0.0099  -0.0070 -0.0054 -0.0004 -0.0074 
 (0.0024)*** (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0028)***  (0.0024)*** (0.0122) (0.0081) (0.0027)*** 
EQRAT -0.4272 -0.2966 -0.6826 -0.4322  -0.4141 -0.2152 -0.5987 -0.4153 
 (0.0385)*** (0.2666) (0.2826)** (0.0389)***  (0.0380)*** (0.2604) (0.1898)*** (0.0386)*** 
EARNVOL -0.0011 -0.0569 -0.0260 -0.0006  -0.0006 -0.0455 -0.0169 -0.0007 
 (0.0033) (0.0331)* (0.0229) (0.0033)  (0.0033) (0.0345) (0.0172) (0.0033) 
CREDITRISK 0.1011 0.1171 0.1564 0.0999  0.0961 0.1474 0.1882 0.0905 
 (0.0088)*** (0.0607)* (0.0623)** (0.0090)***  (0.0089)*** (0.0651)** (0.0517)*** (0.0091)*** 
ZSCORE -0.0002 0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0002  -0.0002 0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0002 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0006)** (0.0006)* (0.0001)***  (0.0001)*** (0.0006)** (0.0005)* (0.0001)*** 
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GROWTH IN ASSET 0.0739 -0.0028 -0.0029 0.0976  0.0817 -0.0070 0.0538 0.1034 
 (0.0174)*** (0.0719) (0.0600) (0.0194)***  (0.0171)*** (0.0701) (0.0440) (0.0191)*** 
GROWTH IN INCOME 0.0145 0.0303 0.0071 0.0148  0.0153 0.0304 0.0089 0.0158 
 (0.0021)*** (0.0197) (0.0160) (0.0022)***  (0.0021)*** (0.0195) (0.0105) (0.0022)*** 
D-MBHC 0.0112 0.0345 0.0157 0.0121  0.0110 0.0191 0.0012 0.0116 
 (0.0034)*** (0.0374) (0.0234) (0.0035)***  (0.0033)*** (0.0285) (0.0164) (0.0035)*** 
D-OBHC 0.0090 0.0161 0.0147 0.0093  0.0088 0.0036 0.0037 0.0087 
 (0.0027)*** (0.0347) (0.0222) (0.0028)***  (0.0026)*** (0.0243) (0.0152) (0.0028)*** 
HERF 0.0052 -0.2638 0.0372 0.0125  0.0056 -0.2242 -0.0155 0.0129 
 (0.0113) (0.0989)*** (0.0815) (0.0111)  (0.0110) (0.0969)** (0.0412) (0.0109) 
SHARE-ML 0.0047 -0.2001 0.0087 0.0055  0.0049 -0.1938 -0.0111 0.0056 
 (0.0051) (0.1675) (0.0227) (0.0053)  (0.0049) (0.1643) (0.0187) (0.0051) 
LN(DENSITY) 0.0095 0.0258 0.0555 0.0092  0.0090 0.0362 0.0317 0.0085 
 (0.0041)** (0.0264) (0.0241)** (0.0042)**  (0.0040)** (0.0259) (0.0204) (0.0041)** 
INC- GROWTH -0.0044 0.1136 0.0363 -0.0036  -0.0051 0.0867 0.0561 -0.0036 
 (0.0036) (0.1009) (0.0810) (0.0036)  (0.0036) (0.0984) (0.0481) (0.0036) 
          
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 126504 2721 2592 118807  126504 2721 4976 118807 
R2 0.902 0.905 0.932 0.903  0.951 0.944 0.958 0.952 
Adjusted R2 0.896 0.895 0.917 0.897  0.948 0.938 0.953 0.949 
 
Panel B: Income Diversity         
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Excess liquidity creation based on “cat nonfat”  LC( cat nonfat)/GTA 
 All banks Large banks Medium banks Small banks  All banks Large banks Medium banks Small banks 
          
Income Diversity -0.0408 -0.0552 -0.0503 -0.0414  -0.1122 -0.0891 -0.0882 -0.1226 
 (0.0079)*** (0.0379) (0.0257)* (0.0084)***  (0.0170)*** (0.0348)** (0.0420)** (0.0200)*** 
Net interest income to       0.0773 0.0708 0.1387 0.0653 
total operating income      (0.0303)** (0.0414)* (0.0824)* (0.0360)* 
Ln(GTA) -0.0130 0.0059 -0.0199 -0.0165  -0.0126 0.0100 -0.0169 -0.0157 
 (0.0038)*** (0.0122) (0.0113)* (0.0042)***  (0.0038)*** (0.0131) (0.0102)* (0.0041)*** 
EQRAT -0.3690 -0.3922 -0.2447 -0.4202  -0.3647 -0.4150 -0.4035 -0.4140 
 (0.0584)*** (0.3122) (0.2161) (0.0588)***  (0.0580)*** (0.3298) (0.2002)** (0.0589)*** 
EARNVOL 0.0158 -0.0685 0.0139 0.0174  0.0158 -0.0672 0.0221 0.0176 
 (0.0057)*** (0.0308)** (0.0252) (0.0057)***  (0.0057)*** (0.0343)* (0.0228) (0.0057)*** 
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CREDITRISK 0.3522 0.3036 0.4384 0.3472  0.3577 0.3656 0.3975 0.3522 
 (0.0163)*** (0.0975)*** (0.0681)*** (0.0171)***  (0.0164)*** (0.0993)*** (0.0582)*** (0.0172)*** 
ZSCORE -0.0002 0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0001  -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0001) 
GROWTH IN ASSET 0.1601 -0.0795 0.1148 0.2038  0.1699 -0.0122 0.1075 0.2119 
 (0.0296)*** (0.1236) (0.0720) (0.0325)***  (0.0293)*** (0.1121) (0.0648)* (0.0324)*** 
GROWTH IN INCOME 0.0229 0.0341 0.0176 0.0225  0.0222 0.0199 0.0165 0.0217 
 (0.0032)*** (0.0201)* (0.0153) (0.0033)***  (0.0032)*** (0.0213) (0.0128) (0.0033)*** 
D-MBHC 0.0166 0.0027 0.0306 0.0152  0.0171 0.0308 0.0269 0.0156 
 (0.0050)*** (0.0493) (0.0164)* (0.0053)***  (0.0050)*** (0.0432) (0.0145)* (0.0053)*** 
D-OBHC 0.0172 -0.0019 0.0147 0.0182  0.0181 0.0227 0.0153 0.0189 
 (0.0039)*** (0.0482) (0.0145) (0.0041)***  (0.0039)*** (0.0416) (0.0121) (0.0041)*** 
HERF -0.0350 -0.3619 0.0158 -0.0303  -0.0355 -0.3195 0.0196 -0.0302 
 (0.0188)* (0.2045)* (0.0546) (0.0179)*  (0.0189)* (0.2099) (0.0541) (0.0181)* 
SHARE-ML 0.0128 -0.0231 -0.0179 0.0148  0.0128 -0.0177 -0.0194 0.0150 
 (0.0084) (0.1489) (0.0294) (0.0089)*  (0.0084) (0.1688) (0.0277) (0.0088)* 
LN(DENSITY) 0.0279 -0.0590 0.0439 0.0289  0.0276 -0.0485 0.0456 0.0286 
 (0.0061)*** (0.0340)* (0.0227)* (0.0064)***  (0.0061)*** (0.0358) (0.0219)** (0.0064)*** 
INC-GROWTH -0.0249 0.2421 0.1054 -0.0277  -0.0277 0.2097 0.1003 -0.0292 
 (0.0079)*** (0.1357)* (0.0843) (0.0079)***  (0.0078)*** (0.1173)* (0.0615) (0.0079)*** 
          
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102835 2719 3779 95178  102835 2719 4938 95178 
R2 0.906 0.906 0.927 0.908  0.913 0.916 0.934 0.914 
Adjusted R2 0.899 0.896 0.915 0.901  0.906 0.906 0.926 0.908 
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Table 1.9. The effect of diversity on liquidity creation for banks split by bank holding company status, wholesale versus retail orientation, 
level of diversity and merge activities  
This table presents regression results. . The dependent variable in Panel A, Columns 1 to 3, Panels B, C, and D, Columns 1 to 2, is excess 
liquidity creation, i.e., the difference between actual normalized liquidity creation and the activity-adjusted normalized liquidity creation, 
based on “cat fat” and asset diversity measure. The dependent variable in Panel A, Columns 4 to 6, Panels B, C, and D, Columns 3 to 4, is 
normalized liquidity creation, i.e., the dollar amount of liquidity a bank has created, based on the “cat fat” measure, divided by GTA. 
The sample is split in four ways. First, by the bank holding company status: MBHC members, OBHC members, and independent banks. Second, 
by the wholesale versus retail orientation: banks with below average number of branches versus banks with above average number of 
branches. Third, by the level of activity diversity: banks with diversity measure smaller than 2/3 versus banks with diversity measure between 
2/3 and 1. Fourth, by merger activities: banks that involved in merger and acquisitions activity in recent years versus banks that did not engage 
in merger and acquisition activity recently. Panel A, B, C, and D contain the results for the subsamples split in the four ways, respectively. All 
panels show only the coefficients on Asset Diversity and Loans to total earning assets (regressions with normalized liquidity creation as 
dependent variables only) for the sake of brevity, although we include the full set of exogenous variables as defined in Table 1.3. All regressions 
are run with both time fixed effects and bank fixed effects. 
The sample period is 2000-2010. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Split by bank holding company status 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Excess liquidity creation based on “cat fat”   LC(cat fat)/GTA  
 MBHC members OBHC members Independent banks  MBHC members OBHC members Independent banks 
        
Asset Diversity -0.0915 -0.0796 -0.0435  -0.0707 -0.0497 -0.0446 
 (0.0122)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0087)***  (0.0259)*** (0.0085)*** (0.0121)*** 
        
Loan to total earning assets     0.5809 0.5933 0.5197 
     (0.0423)*** (0.0153)*** (0.0223)*** 
        
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25695 75228 25581  25695 75228 25581 
R2 0.885 0.904 0.923  0.940 0.951 0.955 
Adjusted R2 0.875 0.898 0.917  0.935 0.948 0.952 
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Table 1.9. (continued) 
 
Panel B: Split by bank wholesale versus retail orientation 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Excess liquidity creation based on “cat fat”  LC(cat fat)/GTA 
 Wholesale banks Retail Banks  Wholesale banks Retail Banks 
Asset Diversity -0.0698 -0.0860  -0.0540 -0.0547 
 (0.0055)*** (0.0067)***  (0.0108)*** (0.0100)*** 
      
Loan to total earning assets    0.5635 0.5969 
    (0.0197)*** (0.0165)*** 
      
Time fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 78935 47569  78935 47569 
R2 0.910 0.911  0.950 0.955 
Adjusted R2 0.903 0.905  0.946 0.951 
 
Panel C: Split by level of activity diversity 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Excess liquidity creation based on “cat fat”  LC(cat fat)/GTA 
 Lower level of diversity Higher level of diversity  Lower level of diversity Higher level of diversity 
Asset Diversity -0.0693 -0.0715  -0.1002 -0.0464 
 (0.0057)*** (0.0065)***  (0.0268)*** (0.0075)*** 
      
Loan to total earning assets    0.4667 0.6020 
    (0.0516)*** (0.0123)*** 
      
Time fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 81464 45040  81464 45040 
R2 0.913 0.917  0.942 0.940 
Adjusted R2 0.905 0.910  0.937 0.935 
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Table 1.9. (continued) 
 
Panel D: Split by merger activities 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Excess liquidity creation based on “cat fat”  LC(cat fat)/GTA 
 No merger activities Recent merger activities  No merger activities Recent merger activities 
Asset Diversity -0.0693 -0.0715  -0.0612 -0.0260 
 (0.0057)*** (0.0065)***  (0.0081)*** (0.0244) 
      
Loan to total earning assets    0.5611 0.6443 
    (0.0143)*** (0.0514)*** 
      
Time fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 118892 7612  118892 7612 
R2 0.913 0.873  0.953 0.930 
Adjusted R2 0.908 0.857  0.950 0.922 
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Table 1.10. The effect of diversification on liquidity creation: controlling for endogeneity 
This table presents results from the instrumental variable approach. Panel A shows summary statistics on the instruments. Panel B contains the 
first stage and second stage regression results. The dependent variable in the first stage regression is Asset diversity, which is calculated as 1-
|(Net loans-Other earning assets)/Total earning assets|. Asset diversity takes values between 0 and 1, and higher value indicates greater 
diversification. In the second stage regressions, the dependent variable is excess liquidity creation, i.e., the difference between actual 
normalized liquidity creation and the activity-adjusted normalized liquidity creation, based on “cat fat” and asset diversity measure, and Asset 
diversity is alternatively instrumented with Diversity of other banks, Diversity of all banks and Share of diversified banks.  
Diversity of other banks is calculated as the weighted average asset diversity of other banking institutions in all markets in which a bank has 
offices. Diversity of all banks is calculated as the weighted average asset diversity of all banks in all markets in which a bank has offices. Share 
of diversified banks is calculated as the weighted average share of diversified banks in all markets in which a bank has offices. All the three 
instrument variables use the proportion of deposits held by a bank in each market as weights. 
The first stage regressions show only the coefficients on the instruments, and the second stage regressions show only the coefficients on the 
instrumented Asset diversity for brevity, although the regressions include the full set of exogenous variables as defined in Table 1.3. All 
regressions are run with both time fixed effects and bank fixed effects. 
The sample period is 2000-2010. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics on the instrument variables 
      Variable Observation Mean for all 
banks 
Mean for 
large banks 
Mean for 
medium 
banks 
Mean for small 
banks 
Std. Dev. for 
all banks 
Min for  
all banks 
Max for 
all banks 
         Diversity of other banks 131302 0.2403 0.3070 0.2681 0.2374 0.1296 0 0.6860 
Diversity of all banks 131302 0.3218 0.3200 0.2902 0.3232 0.1339 0.0173 0.9810 
Share of diversified banks 131302 0.3241 0.3291 0.2892 0.3255 0.1895 0 1 
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Table 1.10. (Continued) 
   
Panel B: Regression results 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Excess liquidity creation 
 OLS IV: Diversity others IV: Diversity local  IV: Share of diversified banks 
     
Asset Diversity (instrumented) -0.0779 -0.0138 -0.0165 -0.0161 
 (0.0043)*** (0.0073)* (0.0072)** (0.0071)** 
     
First-stage:     
Diversity of other banks  0.1363   
  (0.0256)***   
Diversity of all banks   0.3292  
   (0.0226)***  
Share of diversified banks    0.1992 
    (0.0134)*** 
     
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  119751 119751 119751 
R
2
  0.903 0.903 0.903 
Adjusted R
2
  0.897 0.897 0.897 
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CHAPTER 2 
BANK FUNDING LIQUIDITY RISK: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BALANCE 
SHEET SOLVENCY AND LIQUIDITY SOLVENCY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 According to the theory of financial intermediation, liquidity creation is an essential role 
of banks. By funding long term, illiquid assets with short term, liquid liabilities, banks support 
efficiency in financial intermediation and spur economic growth. However, these functions  
leave banks vulnerable to liquidity risk since banks must provide liquidity to depositors on 
demand while also holding illiquid loans (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). According to the definition 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision (BCBS), liquidity risk, or, funding 
liquidity risk,  is the possibility that over a specific horizon the bank will become unable to fund 
increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due. Diamond and Rajan (2001) note that 
banks could use the loans as collateral, or sell the loans, when they require liquidity to settle 
obligations. However, liquidating assets is more difficult for banks when market liquidity dries 
up. Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, funding was readily available at a low cost. During the early 
phase of the 2007 financial crisis, liquidity evaporated so quickly that many banks faced funding 
liquidity problems despite adequate capital levels. Furthermore, illiquidity could last for an 
extended period of time, putting the whole banking system under severe stress (BCBS, 2010).   
 The global financial crisis revealed important weaknesses in the management of the 
funding liquidity risk in individual banks, and has prompted a call for new liquidity risk 
regulation. Academic and regulatory discussion on different banking risks, such as credit risk, 
market risk, and operation risk, has been extensive (Landskroner and Paroush, 2008). However, 
62 
 
relatively little attention has been paid to funding liquidity risk. Recognizing the importance of 
liquidity to the proper functioning of the banking sector and financial markets, the Basel 
Committee introduced a liquidity regulation framework as part of the Basel III accord. This is a 
significant departure from the Basel I and II accords, which focus on strengthening capital 
regulation.  
 The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is one of two measures designed to capture the 
bank funding liquidity risk in Basel III. It is developed to provide a metric to be used to promote 
the resilience of a bank's liquidity risk profile over a 1-year horizon by encouraging banks to fund 
their illiquid assets with more stable and longer term liabilities on an ongoing basis (BCBS, 
2010).20 It is defined as the amount of stable sources of funding a bank employs relative to the 
amount of required stable funding for long-term asset and off-balance sheet (OBS) exposures. A 
higher value of NSFR implies a lower funding liquidity risk. In this context, the bank might 
experience fewer difficulties in meeting its obligations and commitments with its liquid liabilities 
in a 1-year horizon. The use of this measure is expected to go into effect in January, 2018. 
 The main goals of this paper are threefold. Our first goal is to estimate the NSFR with 
publicly available data. The main dataset we use is the quarterly bank Call Report data, which 
provides a detailed breakdown of on-balance and off-balance sheet categories. We include 
virtually every US bank from 2001:Q1 until 2013:Q4, and group them by bank size. Our 
calculations show that at the end of 2013 about 66% of large banks (gross total assets, or GTA, 
                                                             
20 The Basel Committee has also developed the Liquidity Coverage Ratio(LCR) to promote the 
short-term resiliency of a bank's liquidity risk profiles by ensuring that it has sufficient high-
quality liquid resources to survive a significant stress scenario lasting for one month (BCBS, 
2010). This chapter focuses on a one-year horizon, so this ratio, which requires monthly data, is 
not included in our study.   
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exceeding $3 billion) had a NSFR shortfall, while more than 80% of small banks (GTA up to $1 
billion) met the 100% NSFR threshold.21  
 Our second goal is to evaluate whether our NSFR estimation is a relatively good 
assessment for bank funding liquidity risk. Compared to the traditional liquidity risk measures 
and the NSFR calculated in the recent literature, our estimated NSFR is found to be more 
comprehensive in evaluating funding liquidity risk on banks' balance sheet and OBS activities 
and do a better job of capturing the changes in liquidity risk over time. In addition, we 
graphically show that the deseasonalized and detrended NSFR based on our estimation can help 
to detect the excessive liquidity risk-taking behavior of banking sectors in advance of financial 
stress.  
 The third goal of this paper is to examine the policy related issue involving the effect of 
capital on bank funding liquidity risk. Understanding how bank capital affects bank liquidity risk 
is very important for regulators contemplating micro- and macro-prudential banking regulations. 
A negative effect of capital on funding liquidity risk would suggest that raising capital 
requirements may help reduce both liquidity risk and solvency risk, and promote a more stable 
banking system, which supports the implementation of stricter capital standards. However, a 
positive effect of capital would indicate that higher capital leads to greater funding liquidity risk, 
and hence existence of a trade-off between the benefits of solvency safeguards and financial 
stability and the costs of higher funding liquidity risk. Thus, this paper helps to assess the 
potential impact of stronger capital requirements, such as those proposed in the Basel III, on 
bank liquidity risk. 
                                                             
21 In the robustness test, we also estimate the NSFR with the latest NSFR weights and 
calibrations issued for consultation in January 2014 by the BCBS. Some of the revisions are 
expected to help improve the NSFR for most banks. Based on the latest revision, only 40% of 
large banks and less than 4% of small banks did not meet the requirement of 100% NSFR at the 
end of 2013.  
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 Some recent banking theories predict that higher capital will expand banks risk-bearing 
capacity and induce banks to take more liquidity risk, while another strand of theories argue 
that banks with more capital choose more liquid loans and collect less liquid deposits, and 
thereby take less liquidity risk. We test the relationship between capital and bank funding 
liquidity risk by regressing the estimated NSFR for each bank-quarter observation on the bank's 
equity capital ratio and a set of control variables. The tests are run separately for large, medium, 
and small banks because the effects of capital likely differ by bank size. To reduce the potential 
endogeneity problems, all exogenous variables except quarter dummy variables and bank 
dummy variables are four-quarter lagged averages values. Furthermore, we explore whether the 
effect of capital is sensitive to the sample period by running the regression separately for two 
sub periods, i.e., the pre-crisis period (2001:Q1-2007:Q2) and the period after the crisis emerged 
(2007:Q3-2013:Q4).22 
 Our results provide empirical support for both of the two sets of theories. We find large 
and medium size banks with stronger capital positions tend to decrease their liquidity profile, 
i.e., increase exposure to liquidity risk during both normal times and times of financial crisis. On 
the other hand, small banks with higher capital ratios tend to exhibit lower liquidity risk 
exposure. To understand more deeply why capital affects banks differently, we also test the 
effect of capital on the individual components of the NSFR (i.e., ASF and RSF), and find that the 
relationship between capital and components varies greatly by bank size. Our empirical findings 
lend support for imposing stricter capital requirements  for illiquid small banks, and minimum 
liquidity standards to curb excessive liquidity risk-taking at large and medium banks.  
                                                             
22 We obtain qualitatively similar results if the period of the dot-com bubble bursting is excluded 
from the pre-crisis subsample. 
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 We perform robustness checks in various ways. First, we use regulatory capital ratios 
instead of the equity to GTA ratio. Second, in each size class we split the sample by capitalization 
status, and by funding liquidity status, and we rerun our regressions for these subsamples. 
Third, we estimate the NSFR based on the latest BCBS revision (BCBS, 2014). Fourth, we 
estimate a simultaneous equation model to address the endogeneity issue directly. Additional 
robustness tests include (i) employing the net stable funding gap (=ASF/GTA-RSF/GTA) as the 
dependent variable, (ii) using an alternative cutoff to separate large and medium banks , (iii) 
examining the subsample of banks that are considered as systemically important financial 
institutions.  Our main findings stand up to all these robustness checks.  
 Our paper contributes to the relevant literature in several ways. First, we follow almost 
all the decompositions of on-balance and off-balance sheet categories and the associated 
weights proposed in the Basel III to calculate the NSFR, rather than estimating a simplified 
version of the NSFR.23 Second, we are the first to estimate the NSFR for virtually all US banks. 
The sample of recent literature is restricted to either publicly traded banks, or the largest global 
banks. Third, we study a relatively long period from 2001 to 2013, allowing us to analyze if the 
time series of the estimated NSFR could capture the changes in liquidity risk over time. Fourth, 
this paper complements the existing literature which focuses on the potential impact of 
introducing the NSFR on bank profitability and economic growth, by exploring if the NSFR is able 
to identify banks and the banking sector exposed to excessive funding liquidity risk and by 
discussing the effect of higher capital requirements such as those proposed in the Basel III on 
banks' liquidity risk assessed by the NSFR. Finally, we extend the earlier studies on bank liquidity 
                                                             
23 The earlier studies on the NSFR typically exclude liquidity risk exposure to off-balance sheet 
activities, and do not differentiate between short-term wholesale funding and short-term retail 
and SME funding. See Section 2.3 for detailed discussion. 
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risk and compare the relationship between capital and liquidity risk among different groups of 
banks in different time periods.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 is the literature review. 
Section 2.3 presents the calculation of the NSFR measure. Section 2.4 describes the panel 
dataset of US banks over the period of 2001-2013. Section 2.5 outlines the regression 
framework and Section 2.6 discusses the regression results. Robustness tests are presented in 
Section 2.7, while Section 2.8 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
 In this section, we briefly review the literature related to this paper.  
2.2.1 Measure of funding liquidity risk 
 Liquidity creation is an essential role of banks. Banks create liquidity on both sides of 
their balance sheet by funding illiquid assets with relatively liquid liabilities (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998), and also create liquidity via off balance sheet 
commitments and guarantees (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002). Due to the unique role of banks 
as liquidity creators, the associated exposure to funding liquidity risk is an intrinsic characteristic 
of banks. The more liquidity is created, the more severe are the losses associated with having to 
dispose of illiquid assets to meet the liquidity demands of customers, and the greater is the 
likelihood that banks will become unable to settle obligations with immediacy (Allen and 
Santomero, 1998; Allen and Gale, 2004; Distinguin, Roulet, and Tarazi, 2013; and Imbierowicz 
and Rauch, 2014). 
  Earlier literature focuses on the use of liquidity ratios for funding liquidity risk. Shen et 
al. (2001) use liquid assets to deposits ratio, Kosmidou et al. (2005) employ the ratio of liquid 
assets to customer plus short-term funding. The two ratios indicate what percentage of deposits 
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or short-term funds could be met by disposing of the liquid assets if they were withdrawn 
suddenly. Therefore the lower the value of the ratios, the more illiquid the bank is and more 
vulnerable it is to a classic run on the bank. Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) and Kosmidou (2008) 
use the ratio of net loans to customers and short-term funding to capture the funding gap 
between comparatively illiquid assets  (i.e. loans) and comparatively stable funding sources (i.e. 
deposits and other short term funding). A higher value of the ratio implies banks will be more 
exposed to funding liquidity risk.  
 Bonfim and Kim (2013) argue that the liquidity ratios mentioned above are unable to 
take into account the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, and thus do not allow 
for a complete assessment of funding liquidity risk. Poorman and Blake (2005) indicate that 
measuring funding liquidity risk just with the liquidity ratios was incomplete. Saunders and 
Cornett (2006) suggest that banks can measure liquidity risk exposure by determining their 
financing gap, which is defined as the difference between a bank’s average loans and average 
core deposits. Matz and Neu (2007) also indicate banks can use the financing gap ratio, or 
maturity mismatch approach to assess funding liquidity risk.  
 Huang and Ratnovski (2011), Borio (2010), among many others note that as banks gain 
access to a more diversified funding source through time, they are exposed not only to 
traditional runs from depositors, but also to the drying up of funds in wholesale and interbank 
markets.  
 Bonfim and Kim (2013) test the determinants of liquidity risk based on the analysis of 
three complementary liquidity risk indicators: loan to deposit ratio, liquidity asset to short-term 
funding ratio , and interbank assets to interbank liabilities ratio. The interbank ratio evaluates 
whether banks are net borrowers or net lenders in interbank markets. A ratio above 100% 
means that a bank is a net lender in interbank markets, thus signaling a more comfortable 
68 
 
liquidity position than otherwise. Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) calculate the short-term 
funding liquidity risk by subtracting the volume of all liquid assets from the volume of liabilities 
that can be withdrawn from the bank on short notice. They also account for a bank’s risk 
exposure to the interbank lending market and the off-balance sheet activities. A high value 
indicates high liquidity risk.  
 Central banks use the spread between unsecured interbank rates and the overnight 
index swap rate to measure funding liquidity risk (IMF, 2008). Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008) 
argue that interbank market rates may not be representative of actual funding conditions during 
a crisis. Also some panel members appeared to have tried to manipulate interbank lending rates 
in the global financial crisis. Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) use aggressive bidding at the central 
bank auction to approximate funding liquidity risk.  
 The role played by funding liquidity during the 2007-2009 financial crisis made clear that 
a new international regulatory framework was necessary. The Basel Committee disclosed the 
liquidity risk regulation of the Basel III framework in December 2010 (BCBS, 2010). The new 
regulation is based upon two funding liquidity risk measures: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR measure requires a bank to maintain an 
adequate level of high-quality liquid assets to meet its liquidity liability for a 30 calendar day 
period under a significantly severe liquidity stress scenario, being defined as the value of the 
stock of high-quality liquid assets in stressed conditions divided by total net cash outflows. The 
Basel Committee requires that the value of the ratio be no lower than 100%. The NSFR measure 
is designed to promote longer term funding of assets and off-balance sheet activities in times of 
stress and limit over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding sources, which complements the 
LCR standard. It is defined as the amount of available stable funding to the amount of required 
stable funding. This ratio should be greater than 100% on an on-going basis. A lower value of 
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this ratio is associated with higher bank funding liquidity risk. Starting with MAG (2010a), a 
strand of research to study potential effects of the new Basel III rules has emerged. King (2010) 
provides a method to map the increases in capital and liquidity requirements proposed in the 
Basel III to bank lending spreads. He makes a number of assumptions to calculate the NSFR with 
Bankscope data. Radoselovics and Monsálvez (2012), and King (2013) also make similar 
assumptions to calculate the NSFR. Roulet (2011), Angora and Roulet (2011), and Distinguin, 
Roulet, and Tarazi (2013) compute a simplified version of the NSFR with data provided by 
Bloomberg.  
 The liquidity creation measure "cat fat" developed in Berger and Bouwman (2009) is 
also used in recent literature (e.g., Roulet, 2011; Distinguin, Roulet, and Tarazi, 2013; 
Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014) as an alternative liquidity risk proxy in their robustness tests. The 
notion of bank liquidity creation in the literature is closely related to the regulatory concept of 
funding liquidity risk. A bank with a larger gap between the required amount of stable funding 
and the available amount of stable funding would create greater liquidity. However, "cat fat" 
has several shortcomings as a measure of bank funding liquidity risk. First, the weights used in 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) are relatively simple to evaluate the liquidity risk imbedded in 
different categories of assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet items.24 Second, deposits are 
classified by maturity, not by stability, in the "cat fat" measure. Maturity is too generous to 
capture the liquidity risk of liabilities. Despite the fact that they both mature within one year, 
short-term whole sale funding is a relatively unreliable and unstable funding source during 
                                                             
24 In their empirical work, Berger and Bouwman (2009) classify all bank assets, liabilities and 
equity, and off-balance sheet activities as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid. A positive weight of  
"1/2" is assigned to all illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, and a negative weight of "-1/2" to all 
liquid assets and illiquid liabilities or equity. The semi-liquid assets and liabilities are given a 
weight of "0". Off-balance sheet activities have weights that are consistent with the functionally 
similar on-balance sheet items. See the first chapter for a longer discussion on the liquidity 
creation measures used in Berger and Bouwman (2009). 
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either normal or stress times compared with short-term retail funding (Huang and Ratnovski, 
2011; Gorton and Metric, 2012; Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013; and Shleifer and Vishny, 
2010). Moreover, the "cat fat" measure does not indicate the level of liquidity creation beyond 
which a bank may not be able to meet its obligations without fire sale liquidation of illiquid 
assets. Thus, the “cat fat” measure is not able to capture the whole picture of funding liquidity 
risk. 
 In this paper, we use the NSFR measure as the proxy for funding liquidity risk and we 
use quarterly bank call report data to estimate the NSFR. 
2.2.2 Theoretical and empirical literature of capital and funding liquidity risk. 
 Two opposing theoretical perspectives can help explain the relationship between bank 
capital and bank liquidity risk.  
 Under the first view, additional equity capital makes banks either invest less in illiquid 
assets or reduce holding of liquid deposits, leading to a lower liquidity risk. Diamond and Rajan 
(2000, 2001) focus on fragile capital structure. They model a relationship bank that raises funds 
from depositors and lends them to entrepreneurs. Banks have specific loan collection skills. By 
threatening to withhold effort, banks extort rents from depositors. Thus the depositor will 
withdraw their deposits, which limit a bank’s ability to collect funds. A demandable deposit 
contract can mitigate the bank’s holdup problem. On one hand, the deposit claims offer an ex 
ante assurance of liquidity to investors who may have a liquidity need. On the other hand, the 
guarantees of liquidity discipline the bank to not absorb too much of the rents and commit 
human capital to monitor and collect the loans. Consequently, a fragile capital structure, subject 
to runs, favors investment in illiquid loans. Additional capital requirement may discourage 
investment in illiquid loans by making the bank’s capital structure less fragile. Gorton and 
Winton (2000) develop a general equilibrium model with the assumption of a single and 
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unsegmented capital market, and risk neutral consumers. If banks raise more equity capital, 
market clearing implies that bank deposits fall by the same amount. Combining the two theories 
yields the prediction that a higher capital ratio may reduce bank funding liquidity risk.  
 Under an alternative view, higher capital increases the bank's incentive to take more 
funding liquidity risk. Besanko and Kanatas (1993) argue that a higher capital requirement may 
lead to greater outside equity, which could increase the moral hazard of managers. Gennotte 
and Pyle (1991) and Blum (1999) show that a higher capital requirement can induce the bank to 
take greater risk. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Repullo (2004), and Coval and Thakor (2005) 
posit that bank capital expands the risk-bearing capacity of banks and allows them to take more 
liquidity risk.  
 Berger and Bouwman (2009) is the first comprehensive paper to test these recent 
theories empirically with an emphasis on bank liquidity creation. They argue that the first view 
applies more strongly to small banks, as small banks engage in more relationship-specific 
lending and monitoring, they operate in smaller and less segmented markets, and they primarily 
fund themselves with deposits and capital compared to large banks.25 They also point out that 
the second view is most applicable to large banks, since large banks involve increasing capital 
value as part of its overall risk management and they may boost equity capital in anticipation of 
more opportunities to offer large loan commitments. 
 European evidence on this topic is starting to emerge. Fungáčová, Weill and Zhou (2010) 
investigate how a deposit insurance scheme affects the relationship of bank capital and liquidity 
creation in Russia. They find the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme does not change 
the negative sign of the relationship. Moreover, they show that the relation is significantly 
negative for small and medium banks, and for private domestic banks, while it is not significant 
                                                             
25 Large banks also employ other illiquid liabilities such as subordinated debt. 
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for large banks, foreign banks, and state-owned banks. Horváth, Seidler, and Weill (2012) 
perform Granger-causality tests on an exhaustive dataset of Czech banks and find that capital 
and liquidity creation are negatively related, supporting the first view. They suggest that the 
Basel III Accords may lead to reduced bank liquidity creation by introducing tighter capital 
requirements. 
 Distinguin, Roulet, Tarazi(2013) investigate the relationship between capital ratios and 
bank liquidity risk for US and European publicly traded banks. They find that banks will decrease 
their regulatory capital ratios when they have a higher funding liquidity risk measured by Berger 
and Bouwman (2009)’s “cat fat“. In addition, they show that small banks strengthen their 
solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity.  
 Despite a handful of recent papers studying the relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation, relatively little attention has been given to the relationship between capital 
and funding liquidity risk. This chapter examines the relationship between capital and funding 
liquidity risk with the new liquidity risk indicator NSFR proposed in the Basel III. The issue is of 
interest to determine the potential impact of tighter capital and liquidity requirements such as 
those proposed in the Basel III on the funding liquidity risk of banks.  
 
2.3 Calculation of the funding liquidity risk indicator: Net Stable Funding Ratio 
 In this section, we pursue our first main goal of estimating the liquidity risk indicator 
NSFR for the US commercial banks as defined in the Basel III. We first explain the construction of 
the NSFR measure, and then show how the results of King (2010) and Roulet (2011) differ from 
our estimation.  
 The net stable funding ratio is one of the two measures proposed in the Third Basel 
Accord to assess the liquidity risk. The NSFR measure is designed to promote longer term 
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funding of assets and off-balance sheet activities in times of stress and limit over-reliance on 
short-term wholesale funding sources in banks. It is calculated as: 
 
     
                                       
                                      
 
 
                                     
                          
 
   
                  
 
                    
    
   
 
 
where the available amount of stable funding(ASF) is defined as the portion of equity and 
liabilities expected to be reliable over a one-year horizon, and the amount of such funding 
required (RSF) is a function of the liquidity characteristics of various types of assets held and 
OBS commitments and contingencies. The ASF and RSF factors range from 100 percent to 0 
percent to reflect the stability of funding for liability categories and the liquidity of assets and 
OBS categories, respectively. A higher ASF factor is assigned to more stable and reliable funding 
sources, while relatively more liquid assets and OBS exposures receive lower RSF factors. 
Generally, the higher the required amount of stable funding is in comparison to the available 
amount of stable funding, the more funding liquidity risk a bank experiences. In other words, a 
lower value of NSFR implies that banks may face more difficulties in meeting commitments and 
obligations.  
 Due to data limitations, previous studies (e.g., King, 2010; Roulet, 2011) estimate a 
simplified version of the NSFR. They typically do not differentiate corporate loans and loans to 
small- and medium-sized entities (SME), the liquidity characteristics of which are quite different. 
They also apply the same weights to wholesale funding and retail and SME funding, the former 
of which is a relatively unreliable and unstable funding source during both normal times and 
74 
 
times of stress.26 Additionally, King(2010) make several assumptions to calculate the NSFR. He 
assumes that "75% of deposits are stable, 25% of wholesale funding is less than 1 year in 
maturity, government debt makes up 25% of investments, 25% of investments are less than 1 
year in maturity study, and 25% of corporate and retail loans have residual maturity less than 1 
year". Although these assumptions are based on the estimates of banks given by supervisors in 
some countries, these fixed percentage numbers are not able to capture the time-series and 
cross-sectional variation in bank liquidity risk. Roulet (2011), and most of the following studies, 
consider the bank liquidity needs only from on-balance-sheet positions, because a detailed 
breakdown of off-balance sheet exposures is not available in standard databases. However, 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) note that commercial banks generate a substantial portion of their 
liquidity exposures off the balance sheet. In times of market or idiosyncratic stress, OBS 
exposures can lead to severe funding source drains (BCBS, 2010). Thus, Roulet (2011) may 
underestimate the funding liquidity risk for banks with a long net off-balance sheet position.  
 Table 2.1 briefly summarizes the composition of asset, liability, and OBS categories and 
the associated factors as defined in the Basel III accords, also the factors used in King (2010) and 
Roulet (2011), respectively. Herein, we use a different dataset from the above cited studies, 
which provides more detailed bank balance sheets, allowing us to follow almost all the 
decompositions of on and off balance sheet categories and the associated weights defined in 
the Basel III. On the liability side, rather than assume the percentages of "stable deposits" and 
"less stable deposits", we follow the specification in BCBS (2010) to treat the insured portion of 
non-maturity deposits and term deposits with a residual maturity less than 1 year provided by 
retail and SME customers as "stable short-term deposits" with a 90% ASF factor, and the 
                                                             
26 Shleifer and Vishny (2010),  Huang and Ratnovski (2011), Gorton and Metric (2012), and 
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) show that reliance on wholesale funding can be a source of 
destabilization in banking. 
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uninsured portion as "less stable short-term deposit" with a 80% ASF factor.27 Non-maturity 
deposits and time deposits provided by wholesale clients with a residual maturity of one year or 
less are treated as "short-term wholesale funding" with a 50% ASF factor, and interbank 
deposits and foreign deposits are given a 0% ASF factor in this study.28 On the asset side, we 
break down loans according to their types and maturities. Loans to retail and SME customers are 
assigned a RSF factor different from that of loans to wholesale clients. Rather than give 
corporate bonds that are assigned 20% or higher risk weight under the Basel II a uniform 100% 
RSF factor, we  assign 20%, 50%, 100% RSF factors  to securities with a credit rating of AA- or 
higher, A+ to A-, and BBB+ and lower, respectively. Bank call reports do not contain the detailed 
maturity information for each type of loans, but instead provide the maturity information for all 
loans. Thus, we use the percentage of total loans that will mature within one year to 
approximate the percentage of each type of loans with a remaining maturity of one year or less. 
Specifically, we multiply the percentage of total loans with a maturity smaller than one year by 
the amount of a type of loan to arrive at the amount of that type of loan with a maturity less 
than one year.  
 We also consider the OBS positions. As the RSF factors for each OBS category are not 
specified in the BCBS (2010), we use the risk weighted total derivatives and off-balance sheet 
items reported in the Schedule RC-R of the Call Report to approximate the potential total OBS 
liquidity exposure. 
 
                                                             
27 Retail deposits are defined as deposits placed with a bank by a natural person (BCBS, 2010)). 
Small- and medium-sized entities (SMEs) are defined in paragraph 273 of the Basel II framework 
(see BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised 
Framework – Comprehensive Version June 2006, available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm). 
28 Wholesale clients include non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks, multilateral 
development banks and PSEs with SME customers excluded. Because SME customers are 
treated the same way as retail customers in the Basel III accord. 
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2.4 Bank funding liquidity risk over time, and in the cross section 
 In this section, we pursue our second main goal. We first describe our data and 
summary statistics, and then we compare our estimated NSFR with the ones in the related 
literature in capturing the variations in bank funding liquidity risk over time and in the cross 
section. In addition, we explore the implications of the detrended NSFR data. 
2.4.1 Data description and summary statistics 
 We collect the balance sheet, income statement, risk-based capital measures, and off-
balance sheet data from the Report of Condition and Income (also named as “Call Report”), 
which is updated quarterly. We download the branch-level data from FDIC Summary of Deposits 
(SOD). SOD is the annual survey of branch office deposits for all FDIC-insured institutions. They 
have detailed deposit information for each branch office. We include almost all commercial 
banks in the U.S that file the call report during the period of 2001 to 2013. All the dollar values 
are expressed in real 2009 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator.29  
We exclude a bank if it has zero or negative equity capital in the current year, or its 
average lagged GTA is below $25 million. We also require banks to have at least 12 quarters of 
historical data. The final dataset has 358,201 bank-quarter observations, with a maximum of 
7,456 banks in the third quarter of 2001 and a minimum of 5,896 banks in the last quarter of 
2013.  
 In Panel A of Table 2.2 we summarize the traditional liquidity risk measures and new 
liquidity risk indicators for all banks included in the sample. To avoid having results biased by 
outliers, all variables are winsorized in their 1st and 99th percentiles. NSFR_King denotes the net 
stable funding ratio calculated with King (2010)'s assumptions and specifications of ASF, RSF and 
their corresponding weights. NSFR_Roulet represents the ratio we get by following Roulet 
                                                             
29 The implicit GDP price deflator is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  
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(2011). NSFR represents the value of our estimation. Average across all bank-quarter 
observations, the average NSFR based on our estimation is about 1.219 with a standard 
deviation of 0.291, which means an average bank has ASF 1.219 times of its RSF. Both 
NSFR_King and NSFR_Roulet have a lower average value with a much smaller standard deviation, 
compared with NSFR. The loan to deposit ratio, short term funding ratio, and core funding ratio 
are the traditional measures to assess liquidity risk. On average, a commercial bank finances 
loan portfolios with 78.2% of deposits, 90.4% of short-term funding, or 98.5% of core deposits. 30 
The loan to deposit ratio tends to underestimate liquidity risk, as not all deposits are readily 
available during normal or distressed times. Thus, the average value of the loan to deposit ratio 
is the lowest among all the ratios. The short-term funding ratio is defined as the ratio of loan to 
short-term funding. On the one hand it ignores other sources of stable funding such as longer 
term funding. On the other hand it does not take into account the fact that short-term 
wholesale funding and interbank funding are not stable and dry up quickly in times of market 
stress. The core funding ratio is calculated as the total loan divided by the core deposits. Core 
deposits derived from a bank's regular customer base are considered to be the most stable and 
least costly source of funding for banks (Harvey and Spong, 2001; FDIC, 2011). Only the insured 
portion of non-maturity deposits and time deposits are included in the core deposits. The core 
funding ratio is therefore superior to the other two traditional measures. The average core 
funding ratio is 0.985, suggesting on average banks could fund their loan portfolio with mere 
core deposits. However, like the other traditional liquidity risk measures, the core funding ratio 
ignores the potential liquidity call arising from other earning assets and off-balance sheet items. 
                                                             
30 For periods before March 2011, core deposits are defined as the sum of demand deposits, all NOW and 
ATS accounts, MMDAs, other savings deposits and time deposits under $100,000, minus all brokered 
deposits under $100,000. As of Mar 31,2011, core deposits are defines as the sum of demand deposits, all 
NOW and ATS accounts, MMDAs, other savings deposits and time deposits under $250,000, minus all 
brokered deposits under $250,000 (FDIC, 2011).   
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For the purpose of comparison, we also calculate the inverse NSFR (iNSFR), which 
represents the portion of the ASF required to support the RSF. A higher value of the inverse 
NSFR indicates higher funding liquidity risk. Compared with traditional liquidity ratios, iNSFR is 
more comprehensive in capturing funding risks on banks' asset and liability side, as well as off 
balance sheet positions. The average value of iNSFR_King and iNSFR_Roulet are closer to the 
average core funding ratio; however, the core funding ratio has a much greater standard 
deviation. The average value of iNSFR is 0.864, suggesting banks on average are able to fund 
their assets with about 86.4% of available stable funding. Both the average NSFR and the 
average total risk based capital ratio are higher than the minimum requirement of Basel III. 
2.4.2 Funding liquidity risk over time and in the cross section  
 Several empirical studies provide evidence that bank funding liquidity risk varies with 
size (e.g., Roulet, 2011; Distinguin, Roulet, and Tarazi, 2013; Gobat, Yanase, and Maloney, 2014). 
Thus, we split the sample by size in all the following empirical analysis. We follow Berger and 
Bouwman (2009)'s definitions to split the sample into large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), 
medium banks (GTA in between $1 billion and $3 billion), and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 
billion). Table 2.3 shows the summary statistics on the funding liquidity risk based on King(2010), 
Roulet(2011) and our estimation for the entire banking sector and separately for large, medium, 
and small banks in 2001 and in 2013, the first and last years of our sample period, respectively. 
Overall, the number of banks fell by 21% from 7,441 in 2001 to 5,901 in 2013, which is due 
mainly to the consolidation of the banking industry. 
We find that the available amount of stable funding (ASF) for the whole banking sector 
has increased over 70% from $4.394 trillion in 2001 to $7.465 trillion in 2013 based on our 
estimation, while the required amount of stable funding(RSF) rose by 46% from $5.777 trillion in 
2001 to $8.441 trillion in 2013. Since ASF is smaller than RSF, there is a stable funding shortage. 
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As RSF increased less than ASF, the stable funding shortage of the banking industry became 
smaller in 2013, so the inverse NSFR which indicates the overall funding liquidity risk was smaller 
in 2013 than in 2001. As shown, overall ASF also increased as a fraction of overall GTA, 
suggesting ASF grew at a faster rate than GTA. Contrary to ASF, RSF for all banks decreased as a 
fraction of overall GTA in 2013. 
Splitting banks by size, we find that the significant increase in the real dollar value of 
banking sector ASF and RSF is mainly driven by large banks.  Despite the fact that large banks 
only represent about 3% of the sample, they collected about 70% and 82% of industry ASF in 
2001 and 2013, and provided about 80% and 86% of industry RSF to facilitate economic growth 
in 2001 and 2013, respectively.31 Figure 2.4 shows the ASF and RSF based on our estimation for 
large banks over the entire sample period. As shown, RSF is always above ASF for large banks.  
As of 2001, they had a stable funding shortage of $1.552 trillion. The funding shortage became 
worse around the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In the post-crisis period, RSF increased at a 
relatively slower speed than ASF. Thus, the stable funding shortage reduced to $1.091 trillion in 
2013, and NSFR increased to 0.85, which was still less than 1. Small banks comprise about 93% 
of our sample. Although they showed the highest ASF to GTA ratio, their market share of ASF 
decreased from 22% in 2001 to 12% in 2013, and market share of RSF fells from 14% in 2001 to 
9% in 2013.32 Comparing large and small banks, we find that small banks have higher ASF/GTA 
ratios, but lower RSF/GTA ratios, which makes small banks overall less vulnerable to funding 
liquidity risk. Figure 2.5 and 2.6 plot the ASF and RSF based on our estimation for medium and 
                                                             
31 Excluding the 83 banks with the real GTA growing from below $3 billion in 2001 to above $3 
billion by 2013, large banks still collected over 78% of industry ASF and provided about 82% of 
industry RSF in 2013.  
32 If the 219 banks with the real GTA increasing from below $1 billion in 2001 to above $1 billion 
by 2013 are still classified as small banks, the market share of ASF for small banks fell to about 
16% and the market share of RSF only decreased by 1% to around 13% in 2013.  
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small banks over the period of 2001-2013, respectively. Contrary to large banks, the total RSF of 
small banks was always below its total ASF. For some years ASF was much higher than RSF, 
which implies that the role of small banks in maturity transformation is limited by other factors. 
Different from large and small banks, the ASF and the RSF curve of medium banks intersected 
twice in the sample period. From mid-2004 to mid-2010, medium banks had larger RSF than ASF, 
while in other periods their ASF was slightly higher than RSF. The largest funding shortage 
occurred around 2008, and equaled about $50 billion. As the gap between ASF and RSF was the 
smallest among the three size classes, NSFR of medium banks was closest to one.  
Based on King (2010) and Roulet (2011)'s methods, the real dollar amount of ASF and 
RSF are higher, while their estimated NSFR is higher for large banks but lower for medium and 
small banks than our calibration. As mentioned in the previous section, Roulet (2011) applies the 
same weights to short-term retail funding and short-term wholesale funding, therefore the 
available stable funding is overstated for banks that rely on short-term wholesale funding. King 
(2010) does not estimate the amount of "stable deposits", "less stable deposits", and "wholesale 
deposits" from bank balance sheet data, but assume the fractions of deposits for each category 
of ASF. Thus, his assumptions either overstate the amount of stable or less stable deposits, or 
understate the amount of wholesale short-term deposits. Moreover, both King (2010) and 
Roulet (2011) ignore the liquidity needs from off-balance sheet positions, and do not 
differentiate corporate loans and SME loans, and thus potentially underestimate RSF for banks 
actively engaging in off-balance sheet activities and overestimate RSF for banks that primarily 
provide loans to local SMEs.  
Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 display the NSFR distribution based on the three estimation 
methods over 2001-2013 for large, medium, and small bank, respectively. The variation of NSFR 
is much larger than NSFR_King and NSFR_Roulet, as we use fewer assumptions. Large banks 
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tend to have a lower NSFR when compared to medium and small banks. Some small banks had a 
NSFR much higher than 100%, which can be seen from the dispersion of the NSFR. It suggests 
that other factors are at play limiting the role of these banks in liquidity risk transformation. The 
mean and medium NSFR of medium banks were closest to one, and the standard deviation was 
also the smallest among the three size classes, implying that medium banks are more funding 
liquid than large banks.  
To get a better idea of how many banks do not meet the minimum NSFR threshold, 
which is going to be implemented in 2018, we plot the percentage of banks in each size class 
with the NSFR smaller than 1 for the period of 2001-2013 in Figures 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 respectively. 
Based on our calculations, more than 50% of large banks had a NSFR smaller than one, especially 
for the year of 2006 to 2009 with over 75% of large banks not meeting the requirement, while 
only less than 25% of small banks had a net stable funding shortage except for the period of 
2007-2009. The percentage of unqualified medium banks was smaller than large banks but 
larger than small banks. At the end of 2013, about 65% of large banks, 45% of medium banks, 
and 18% of small banks experienced a NSFR shortfall. Based on King (2010) and Roulet (2011)'s 
calculations, the number of unqualified banks is much higher. For the period of 2001-2008, the 
percentage of unqualified large banks assessed by NSFR_King or NSFR_Roulet varied in a 
relatively small range around 85%. However, a significant increasing trend in the pre-crisis 
period and a decreasing trend in the post-crisis period can be detected in the percentage of 
unqualified large banks based on our estimated NSFR. The same pattern can be found for 
medium banks and small banks in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. 
Figures 2.10, 2.11, and 2.12 further show the time series of average NSFR for banks in 
each size class based on the three estimation methods over the entire sample period. Similar to 
previous findings, the variation of average NSFR_King and NSFR_Roulet was quite small prior to 
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2009 for banks in all size groups. However, based on our calculations, the average NSFR of large 
banks deteriorated remarkably from around 0.98 in the end of 2002 to about 0.83 in mid-2008. 
This reflects a trend that large banks resorted to the short-term wholesale funding to expand 
their balance sheet, which involved investing in illiquid assets and providing funding 
commitments, prior to the global financial crisis. The steady rise in the average NSFR of large 
banks since 2009 suggests that large banks have made progress in addressing their funding 
liquidity risk with the enactment of emergency measures by the government.33 A similar pattern 
can be found for medium and small banks in Figures 2.11 and 2.12 respectively.  
2.4.3 Implications of detrended NSFR 
 Several recent studies show that excessive exposure to funding liquidity risk could be a 
major source of bank failure (e.g., Ratnovski and Huang, 2010; Vazquez and Federico, 2012). 
Berger and Bouwman (2012) also note that an abnormally high liquidity creation by banks in a 
given period may increase the probability of bank failures.  
 Thus, we next investigate whether the NSFR was abnormally low preceding the financial 
crisis. Combining all the figures and summary statistics presented in section 2.4.2, we find a 
broad deterioration of NSFR prior to the global financial crisis in every size class. However, the 
time series of NSFR contains seasonal and trend components. The low level of NSFR is probably 
driven by both the long-run trend and the seasonal components. We follow the procedures used 
                                                             
33 The emergency measures include the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 enacted 
on October 3, 2008 and the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) adopted by FDIC on 
Oct 14, 2008. The Act authorized the United States Secretary of the Treasury to spend up to 
$700 billion to purchase distressed assets, especially mortgage-backed securities, and supply 
cash directly to banks. The Act also increased the deposit insurance limit from $100,000 to 
$250,000 per depositor. The main purposes of the TLG program are "to decrease the cost of 
bank funding so that bank lending to consumers and businesses will normalize" and "to 
strengthen confidence and encourage liquidity in the banking system by guaranteeing newly 
issued senior unsecured debt of banks, thrifts, and certain holding company, and by providing 
full coverage of non-interest bearing deposit transaction accounts, regardless of dollar amount." 
(FDIC).  
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in Berger and Bouwman (2012) to deseasonalize and detrend the NSFR.34 For brevity, we call the 
deseasonalized and detrended NSFR "detrended NSFR" thereafter. If the NSFR measure is a 
good proxy of funding liquidity risk, the detrended NSFR is expected to be low prior to the crisis. 
 Figure 2.13 illustrates the detrended NSFR based on our calculation for large banks over 
the sample period. Detrended NSFR of large banks declined to a point below zero in 2006:Q2, 
then increased slightly for three quarters until 2007:Q1, which was negative even after it 
increased. Detrended NSFR dropped dramatically in the second quarter of 2007. Figures 2.13 
provides evidence that large banks take more liquidity risk relative to the trend before the crisis, 
supporting  the needs for a prudential minimum liquidity requirement for large banks. Figure 
2.14 shows that the pattern for detrended NSFR of medium banks is very similar to that of large 
banks. The pattern of small banks presented in Figure 2.15 is less pronounced. Consistent with 
the findings of Berger and Bouwman (2012), abnormally low detrended NSFR can be detected 
about one year prior to the financial crisis as shown in the three graphs. In contrast, detrended 
NSFR_King and NSFR_Roulet for banks in every size class were high and positive before the crisis, 
although the detrended values fell in 2007:Q2 (See Figures 2.16 to 2.21). By comparing the 
detrended NSFR based on the three estimation methods, we find that our calculated NSFR is a 
relatively consistent measure for capturing the excessive liquidity risk-taking behaviors of the 
banking sector in advance of financial stress. 
 
2.5 Regression framework 
 The third main goal of this paper is to assess the impact of tighter capital requirements 
on bank funding liquidity risk. In this section, we present our regression framework. We use a 
                                                             
34 We use the X11 procedure, developed by the U.S. Census Bureau, to deseasonalize the data. 
This procedure identifies and adjusts for outliers. For detrending, we use the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. 
84 
 
panel dataset on large, medium and small banks from 2001 to 2013. We regress the NSFR 
calculated using the three estimation methods on the lagged capital ratio while controlling for 
other factors that may affect bank funding liquidity risk. The dependent variable, NSFR, is always 
positive, with higher values suggesting lower liquidity risk. The methods to construct NSFR are 
discussed in Section 2.3. The key exogenous variable, capital ratio (EQRAT), is calculated as 
equity divided by the gross total asset(GTA).35  We do not use the Tier 1 capital ratio or total 
risk-based capital ratio employed in Roulet (2011), and Distinguin, Roulet, Tarazi (2013). The tier 
1 capital ratio or total risk-based capital ratio is defined as the tier 1 capital or total capital 
divided by the risk-weighted assets.36 Their use in the regression would cause endogeneity and 
lead to significant bias, since our dependent variable NSFR is also a weighted sum of liabilities 
divided by a weighted sum of assets and off-balance sheet activities. Our control variables 
include a large set of bank-level indicators, local market competition, and the macro-economic 
environment. Table 2.4 gives the definitions and summary statistics for all the regression 
variables.37  
 The natural log of bank GTA is included to control for bank size. The empirical results 
indicate that large banks tend to hold more illiquid loans or maintain less liquid funds, and thus 
have higher liquidity risk (e.g., Loutskina, 2011; Roulet, 2011; Shen, Chen, Kao, and Yeh, 2009). 
Large banks benefit from economies of scale in screening and monitoring loans. In addition, 
because of their “too-big-to-fail” position and easier access to the lender of last resort, large 
banks might build up more liquidity risk, hence less funding liquid. Therefore, a negative 
relationship is expected between bank size and the NSFR. As the dependent variable NSFR 
                                                             
35 The gross total asset(GTA) equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and 
the allocated transfer risk reserve (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). 
36 The risk-weighted assets in the tier 1 or total capital ratio are calculated as the weighted sum 
of assets and off-balance sheet activities with the weights assigned according to their credit risk. 
37 All financial values are expressed in real 2009 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator. 
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generally varies between zero and two, we take the natural logarithm of all the exogenous 
variables that may take on large values to avoid potential specification distortions.  
 We control for bank credit risk and profit risk with four variables. The three risk 
variables adopted in Berger and Bouwman (2009) are introduced into the regression. They are 
earnings volatility (EARNVOL), credit risk (CREDITRISK), and z-score (ZSCORE). In addition, we use 
the ratio of allowance for loan and lease loss to total loans (ALLLratio) to capture the riskiness of 
loan assets. Controlling for bank credit risk is important as we need to isolate the effect of 
capital on liquidity risk from the effect of capital on credit risk. Lower credit risk or profit risk as 
well as a  higher quality of bank loans allow banks to increase exposure to funding liquidity risk. 
So we expect a positive coefficient of EARNVOL, CREDITRISK and ALLLratio, and a negative 
coefficient of ZSCORE in the determination of the NSFR. We orthogonalize CREDITRISK, ZSCORE, 
and ALLLratio to avoid the multicollinearity problems associated with including them in the 
regression simultaneously.38 In all the following analysis, we include EARNVOL, orthogonalized 
CREDITRISK,  orthogonalized ZSCORE, and orthogonalized ALLLratio.39  
 This study includes the ratio of retail and SME loans to total loans (RetailSMEloanRatio) 
to control for the effect of potentially securitizable loans on funding liquidity risk. Angora and 
Roulet (2011) find that concentration on Loans that are potentially securitizable such as loans to 
retail and SME customers is likely to mitigate liquidity pressures on banks and hence decrease 
funding liquidity risk. Alternatively, as argued by Loutskina (2011), a bank that holds a significant 
                                                             
38 We follow Berger and Bouwman(2009)'s method to orthogonalize the variables. We regress 
CREDITRISK on EARNVOL, ZSCORE, ALLLratio and the other exogenous variables. The residuals of 
the regression are the orthogonalized CREDITRISK, which is not captured by EARNVOL, ZSCORE, 
ALLLratio, or the other control variables. We use a similar procedure to calculate orthogonalized 
ZSCORE and orthogonalized ALLLratio. 
39 For simplicity, we use the term "CREDITRISK", "ZSCORE", and "ALLLratio" throughout the 
following analysis instead of orthogonalized CREDITRISK,  orthogonalized ZSCORE, and 
orthogonalized ALLLratio. 
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amount of securitizable loans tends to be less dependent on the traditional sources of funding 
and more willing to supply illiquid business loans. Thus, the expect sign for the relationship 
between the ratio of retail & SME loan ratio and the NSFR is not clear-cut.  
 To control for bank's activity diversity, we include the ratio of other earning assets to 
total earning assets (OtherEarningAssetRatio), where other earning assets include securities and 
investments. Bonfim and Kim (2013) show that banks that concentrate most of their assets in 
lending tend to have worse liquidity ratios. If so, we would expect a positive correlation 
between other earning asset ratio and the NSFR. 
 We also control for the bank credit expansion with the real loan growth rate (Growth in 
Loan). Credit expansion on one hand may require banks to hold more capitals, but on the other 
hand tends to increase bank liquidity risk. Failure to control for it would give misleading 
econometric results. In addition, we control for past performance by including the real growth 
rate in net income (Growth in Income). A good performing bank may have fewer incentives to 
engage in excessive liquidity risk taking. Therefore, a positive sign is expected for the coefficient 
of this variable in the regression. Moreover,  the portion of insured deposits (InsuredDepRatio) 
is included to control for bank deposit insurance coverage.  
 Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) indicate that Bank holding companies (BHC) and 
other banks in the same BHC could serve as internal capital markets to provide liquidity support 
in times of distress. Berger and Bouwman (2009) point out that banks substantially change their 
lending behavior following a merger or acquisition. Pana, Query, and Park(2010) stress the 
importance to control for bank mergers when assessing  the liquidity risk. In accordance with 
these studies, we control for the bank’s  bank holding company status with two dummy 
variables: D-MBHC and D-OBHC, as well as the bank's merger and acquisition history with a 
dummy variable D-M&A.  
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 This paper further controls for the effects of ownership structure on liquidity risk with a 
dummy variable D-PUBLIC, as Nichols, Wahlen, and Wieland (2005) find that public-traded 
banks and private-held banks differ in profitability, risk, growth, and accounting conservatism.  
Finally, local market competition and economic conditions are considered, as they can 
affect bank liquidity risk. We follow Berger and Bouwman (2009) to use HERF, the Herfindahl 
index of concentration for the markets in which the bank is present, and SMARE-ML, the local 
market share of medium and large banks, to control for the local market competition. In 
addition, we include Ln(POP), the log of population, Ln(DENSITY), the log of population density,  
and INC-GROWTH, personal income growth, to control for local market economic conditions and 
business cycle variations. Similar to the first chapter, we define the local market as the 
metropolitan statistical area (Metro area), the micropolitan statistical area (Micro area), or the 
county that doesn’t belong to either Metro area or Micro area, where the bank offices are 
located.40 We use the weighted average values across these markets with the share of bank’s 
deposits in each of the markets as weights for banks that have offices in more than one local 
market.41 
Since commercial banks could determine their capital level, the same bank-level 
characteristics that guide this decision could also affect the liquidity risk of banks. A proper 
evaluation of the effect of capital on bank liquidity risk should take into account the bank 
specific traits that bear both on capital level and on the liquidity risk. To mitigate the potential 
endogeneity problems, we adopt two approaches. First, in addition to controlling for the wide 
                                                             
40 According to Office of Management and Budget (OMB), a metro area contains a core urban 
area of 50,000 or more population, and a micro area contains an urban core of at least 10,000 
(but less than 50,000) population. The list of Metro area and Micro area counties are 
downloaded from http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/msalist.cfm. 
41 Branch office deposits for all FDIC-insured institutions are collected from FDIC Summary of 
Deposits. We use the share of deposits as weights as it is the only banking service for which the 
geographic location information is publicly available.  
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range of bank specific characteristics described above, in all the following regressions we include 
bank dummy variables to control for average differences in funding liquidity risk over time 
across banks that are not captured by the other exogenous variables, as well as quarter dummy 
variables to capture the effects that vary over time but affect all banks equally such as demand 
condition, monetary policy, and regulations.42 Second, the exogenous variables except bank 
dummy variables and quarter dummy variables are lagged values created using quarterly data 
averaged over the previous four quarters.43 Furthermore, in order to control for 
heteroskedasticity and possible correlation among observations of the same bank over time, all 
regressions are estimated with robust standard errors which are adjusted for clustering at the 
bank level.  
 
2.6 Regression results 
 In this section, we present our regression results. We note that a higher NSFR implies a 
lower liquidity risk. Therefore a negative coefficient on the lagged capital ratio in the regression 
represents a positive relationship between EQRAT and funding liquidity risk, while a positive 
coefficient represents a negative relationship between EQRAT and funding liquidity risk.  
2.6.1 The effect of capital on liquidity risk for large, medium, and small banks 
 Panels A, B, and C of Table 2.5. display regression results for large banks (GTA greater 
than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and small banks (GTA 
smaller than $1 billion), respectively. The dependent variable is the estimated NSFR based on 
three methods. All of the regressions include the full set of control variables and have bank and 
                                                             
42 Besides, bank dummy variables could help to reduce correlations across error terms and 
quarter dummy variables could help to reduce the serial correlation problems. 
43 We obtain similar results if the exogenous variables use 12-quarter lagged average values.   
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quarter dummy variables. The results are qualitatively similar if we control only for bank size 
and include bank and quarter dummy variables (not shown for the sake of brevity).  
 The Results in Panel A of Table 2.5 show that there is a significant negative relationship 
between capital and our estimated NSFR for large banks, which indicates that large banks with a 
higher lagged capital ratio tend to decrease funding liquidity, i.e., increase their exposure to 
liquidity risk. The magnitude of the coefficient on the lagged capital is -0.6355, which indicates 
that for large banks a 1 percentage point higher equity capital ratio for the prior four quarters is 
associated with a 0.6355 percentage point decrease in the net stable funding ratio (i.e., ASF 
decreases by 0.6355% relative to RSF). The results for medium banks in Panel B of Table 2.5 are 
similar to those for large banks. However, neither NSFR_King nor NSFR_Roulet show a significant 
relationship with the capital ratio for large and medium banks. The distinct results indicate that 
empirical analysis of bank liquidity risk based on a simplified version of the NSFR measure may 
lead to a significant bias. So in the following regression analysis , we only use NSFR based on our 
calibrations as the dependent variables. 
 In stark contrast to large and medium banks, the coefficient on the lagged capital ratio is 
positive and significant at the 1% level as shown in Panel C of Table 2.5, suggesting that small 
banks with a higher lagged capital ratio tend to enhance their liquidity profile, i.e., reduce their 
exposure to liquidity risk. Using our estimated NSFR, the value of the coefficient on the lagged 
capital ratio, 0.7571, implies that for small banks, a 1 percentage point increase in lagged equity 
capital ratio is associated with a 0.7571 percentage point increase in the net stable funding ratio 
(i.e., ASF rises by 0.7571% relative to RSF). 
 Regarding the other determinants of NSFR, most of the findings are consistent with 
what we expect in Section 2.5. The most relevant factors to explain NSFR are bank size 
(Ln(GTA)), the risk variables (CREDITRISK and ALLLRatio), potentially securitizable loans 
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(RetailSMEloanRatio), activity diversification (OtherEarningAssetRatio), credit expansion 
(Growth in Loan), deposit insurance coverage (InsuredDepRatio), and the dummy variable for 
the multibank holding company status (D-MBHC). More important for the goal of this paper, 
controlling for these bank-level variables does not affect the relationship between capital and 
the liquidity risk indicator NSFR. 
2.6.2 Asymmetric effect of capital on the components of the NSFR measures 
 To understand more deeply why the relationship between equity capital and funding 
liquidity risk differs among large, medium, and small banks, we test the relationship between 
capital and the two components of the net stable funding ratio (i.e., ASF and RSF) based on our 
estimation. To make ASF and RSF comparable across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to 
the largest banks, we normalize ASF and RSF by GTA. Specifically, we regress the dollar amount 
of ASF or RSF divided by GTA on the lagged equity capital ratio while controlling for other factors 
defined in Section 2.5. Table 2.6 presents the regression results for large banks, medium banks 
and small banks respectively. 
 As we note, the total capital is assigned a weight of 100% in the ASF calculation. This 
does not imply that the coefficient on EQRAT should be positive or close to 1 in the "ASF/GTA" 
regression. The coefficient depends on bank behavior. For example, if banks with higher lagged 
capital collect significantly more reliable funding than banks with lower capital ratios, we would 
expect the coefficient to be positive. Nevertheless, if banks with higher lagged capital ratios 
have significantly less stable funding, the coefficient is expected to be negative.  
 The results for large banks are shown in Columns 1 and 2. We can see than the lagged 
capital ratio enters the "RSF/GTA" regression with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.6464, 
suggesting that a large bank with 1% increase in the lagged capital ratio would hold more assets 
that require stable funding by about 0.65% of its GTA. Additionally, the insignificant coefficient 
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in the "ASF/GTA" regression indicates stable funding shortage will also rise by about 0.65% of 
GTA for a large bank with a 1% increase in the lagged capital ratio. Thus, the negative 
relationship between lagged capital ratio and NSFR for large banks (see Column 1 of Table 2.5) is 
attributable to the positive effect of capital on the RSF to GTA ratio. Large banks with a higher 
capital ratio for the prior four quarters tend to hold more illiquid assets such as corporate loans 
and fewer relatively liquid assets such as government bonds, as well as provide more illiquid 
guarantees such as loan commitments, and therefore take more liquidity risk. This finding is 
consistent with the second set of theories discussed in Section 2.2. Large banks are usually  
perceived as being more likely to be bailed out in case of distress, as they are too-big-to-fail. This 
moral hazard problem in large banks encourages excessive risk-taking (Rochet, 2004; Dam and 
Koetter, 2012). Moreover, higher capital ratios allow large banks to bear significantly more risk 
(Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; and Coval and Thakor, 2005). Thus, a higher 
capital ratio is associated with higher exposure to liquidity risk for large banks. 
 The results for medium banks shown in Columns 3 and 4 are quite similar to large banks. 
Their RSF to GTA ratio is positively related with lagged EQRAT which yields the negative 
relationship between EQRAT and NSFR in Table 2.5.  
 Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.6 report the regression results for small banks. In sharp 
contrast to large and medium banks, lagged EQRAT is positively related with ASF to GTA ratios, 
while negatively related with RSF to GTA ratios. This implies that small banks that face an 
improved capital position tend to hold significantly more stable funding and fewer illiquid assets 
that require funding support. Therefore, the positive relationship between lagged capital and 
NSFR for small banks in Table 2.5 is due to the positive effect of lagged capital on the ASF to GTA 
ratio as well as the negative effect of lagged capital on the RSF to GTA ratio. The results for small 
banks are consistent with the "fragile capital structure" argument made in Diamond and Rajan 
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(2001). Additional capital results in bank’s capital structure becoming less fragile. A fragile 
capital structure, subject to runs, disciplines the bank to not extort too much of the rents and 
commit her human capital to monitor and collect the loans. As analyzed in Ongena and Smith 
(2001), Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002), and Bharath, et al. (2007), small banks engage in more 
relationship lending, which involves bank monitoring, than large banks. Small banks with higher 
capital ratios may withhold efforts for monitoring borrowers. As a result, they invest more in 
liquid assets, rather than lending more illiquid loans, and thus take less exposure to liquidity risk.  
 Since the current total capital is included in the ASF with a weight of 100%, we are not 
able to determine if the lagged capital ratio and stable deposits are positively or negatively 
related directly from the sign of the coefficients on EQRAT in the "ASF/GTA" regression. To 
examine the "crowding out" of deposits effect as in Gorton and Winton(2000), we regress the 
dollar amount of ASF with total capital excluded divided by GTA on the lagged EQRAT while 
controlling for other factors.44 The coefficient on EQRAT is significantly negative for banks in 
every size class, implying that banks with a higher lagged capital ratio tend to exhibit a 
significantly lower share of stable deposits in ASF. Hence, on the liability side, the crowding out 
of stable deposits exists in banks of every size class. In addition, we regress the current total 
capital ratio (=Total Capital/GTA) on the lagged EQRAT and the full set of control variables, and 
find a consistent positive effect on current total capital in every size class. The results presented 
above suggest that for large and medium size banks, the positive relationship between lagged 
capital and current capital approximately cancels out the negative relationship between lagged 
capital and current stable deposits, yielding the overall insignificant effect of lagged capital on 
the ASF to GTA ratio.45 Nonetheless, for small banks the positive effect on current capital is only 
                                                             
44 The results are not shown for brevity. 
45 The results are not shown for brevity. 
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partially offset by the negative effect on current stable deposits, yielding a net positive effect on 
the ASF to GTA ratio.  
2.6.3 Sub-period analysis of the effects of capital on liquidity risk 
 As our sample includes the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, whether the effects of 
capital on liquidity risk are different before and after the financial crisis is interesting to explore. 
To address the issue, we split the sample into two sub periods: the period preceding the 
crisis(2001:Q1-2007:Q2) and the period after the crisis emerged(2007:Q3-2013:Q4).46 In their 
analysis of the relationship between capital and bank performance measured by the probability 
of survival and market share, Berger and Bouwman (2012) show that capital affects large and 
medium banks differently during financial crises and normal periods. Based on a dataset of all 
banks operating in Germany between 1999 and 2009, Berger and Bouwman (2014) find that 
authorities' regulatory intervention and capital support during the financial crisis succeed in 
reducing bank risk taking, and the effects materialize quickly and  persist in the long run. These 
empirical studies suggest that the global financial crisis might well have influenced the liquidity 
risk taking behavior of banks. The negative effects of capital on the liquidity risk indicator NSFR 
are expected to be weaker for large and medium banks after the crisis emerged, while the 
positive effects on the NSFR are expected to be stronger for small banks. 
 We rerun our regressions separately for large, medium, and small banks in the two sub 
periods, and show the results in Table 2.7. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficients on 
EQRAT for large and medium banks in the second period become less negative compared with 
those in the pre-crisis period, indicating that the negative impact of capital on NSFR is weaker 
for large and medium banks. In other words, after 2007:Q2 large and medium banks with higher 
                                                             
46 We obtain qualitatively similar results if the period of the dot-com bubble bursting is excluded 
from the first subsample. 
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lagged capital ratios tend to take more liquidity risk, but to a lesser extent than pre-crisis.47 We 
also find that small banks have a more positive coefficient on EQRAT in the second period, 
indicating that capital plays a greater role in enhancing funding liquidity for small banks since 
the start of the financial crisis. 
 
 2.7 Robustness test 
 In this section, we perform a variety of robustness tests. First, we use an alternative 
capital ratio. Second, we split the sample by capitalization status, and funding liquidity status. 
Third, we follow the latest NSFR weights and calibrations issued for consultation in January 2014 
by the BCBS to calculate NSFR. Fourth, we estimate a simultaneous equation model. 
2.7.1 Using regulatory capital ratios 
 In the first robustness check, we test whether our results are similar when we use 
regulatory capital ratios. In our main analysis presented in Section 2.6, we use EQRAT, the ratio 
of equity to GTA, as our key exogenous variable. Now, we rerun the regression with TOTRAT, the 
ratio of total capital to GTA, instead of EQRAT. Total capital is defined in the Basel I capital 
standards (1988) as the sum of the bank’s Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital, including equity plus 
limited amounts of other financial instruments, such as mandatory convertible debt instruments 
and subordinated long term debt. The results are shown in Panel A of Table 2.8, and are 
quantitatively similar to our main findings. The effect of the alternative capital ratio on NSFR is 
                                                             
47 We also rerun the regression with the ASF to GTA ratio or the RSF to GTA ratio as independent 
variables for the two sub periods. We find the weaker negative effects of EQRAT on the NSFR for 
large and medium banks after 2007:Q2 are mainly due to the weaker positive effects of EQRAT 
on the RSF to GTA ratio, and the stronger positive effects on the NSFR for small banks in the 
second period are the results of small banks holding much more stable funding (stronger 
positive effects on the ASF to GTA ratio) and further reducing investment in the illiquid risky 
assets (stronger negative effects on the RSF to GTA ratio). Results are not shown for brevity.  
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negative and significant for large and medium banks, and positive and significant for small 
banks. This implies that our results are robust to a broader definition of capital. 
2.7.2 Splitting the sample by capitalization status, and funding liquidity status 
 In all of the regression results presented so far, we consistently find that higher lagged 
capital ratios are associated with higher liquidity risk for large and medium size banks, but lower 
liquidity risk for small banks. One may wonder if this positive effects on liquidity risk for large 
and medium size banks primarily exist in well capitalized ones, and if the negative effects on 
liquidity risk for small banks are driven by the weakly capitalized ones. To address the issues, in 
each size class we split the sample into "strongly capitalized banks" and "weakly capitalized 
banks". We define strongly and weakly capitalized banks as those in the top 25% and bottom 
25% by EQRAT, respectively. We then rerun our regressions by size class for strongly capitalized, 
and weakly capitalized banks. Results are shown in Panel B of Table 2.8. We observe that large 
banks in the weakly capitalized subsample do not alter their liquidity risk taking behavior when 
facing a higher capital ratio for the prior four quarters. As these banks are more likely to become 
insolvent and fail, it is not surprising that they become more cautious about taking liquidity risk. 
To the contrary, large banks in the strongly capitalized subsample significantly increase their 
exposure to liquidity risk. Large banks that ex-ante choose to be relatively conservative(the 
strongly capitalized subsample) and build higher capital buffer tend to take more liquidity risk. 
For medium size banks, we find a negative significant relationship between NSFR and lagged 
EQRAT for both strongly capitalized and weakly capitalized institutes. And a positive significant 
relationship is found for both subsamples in the small size class. 
 Next, we explore if the positive relationship between EQRAT and liquidity risk for large 
and medium banks is more pronounced at a low level of liquidity risk, and if the negative 
relationship for small banks is driven by the funding illiquid subsamples. Here, banks in each size 
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class with NSFR below 100% are classified as "funding illiquid banks", and with NSFR above 100% 
as "funding liquid banks". We then re-estimate the regression by size class for the two 
subsamples. Panel C of Table 2.8 presents the results. In the large and medium bank regressions, 
EQRAT enters negatively and significantly at either the 1% or 10% level for the two subsamples. 
For both funding illiquid and liquid small banks, the coefficients of EQRAT still are found to be 
positive and significant at the 1% level. For robustness, we further test the relationship on the 
most illiquid large and medium banks, which are defined as those with NSFR in the bottom 25%. 
As shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, the bottom 25% of large and medium banks in terms of funding 
liquidity have NSFR far below 100%. Regression results are not shown for brevity. We continue 
to find that the coefficient on lagged EQRAT is negative and significant for the bottom 25% of 
medium size banks, but not significant for those large banks. Since they generally have a higher 
NSFR than large banks, medium banks that ex-ante choose to be more risky tend to take more 
liquidity risk when facing a higher capital ratio. Similar to the weakly capitalized members of 
large banks, the most illiquid large banks tend to be more prudent in taking additional liquidity 
risk despite the fact that they become more balance sheet solvent.48 
2.7.3 Estimating the NSFR based on the latest BCBS revision(BCBS, 2014) 
 The design of the NSFR has changed since its initial proposal in December 2010, with 
some of the revisions expected to help improve the NSFR for most banks. These revisions are 
captured in the consultation paper published in January 2014 (BCBS, 2014). Table 2.9 shows the 
changes since 2010. We re-estimate the NSFR based on the latest reversion. On average, the 
2014 NSFR ( NSFR_2014) , increases by 14% for large banks, 16% for medium banks, and 28% for 
small banks, compared with the 2010 NSFR. The reason why small banks benefit more from the 
                                                             
48 We also run the regression for the bottom 10% of large and medium banks in terms of the 
NSFR. The coefficients on EQRAT are insignificant in both two subsamples.  
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revision could be that they engage more in relationship lending and their clients are primarily 
local small business and retail customers, while the key changes of the NSFR calibration are 
reflected in the greater ASF factors for short-term retail and SME deposits and the smaller RSF 
factors for retail and SME loans. Figures 2.22, 2.23, 2.24 display the percentage of large, 
medium, and small banks that do not meet the requirement of 100% NSFR over the entire 
sample period based on the latest BCBS revision. We observe that the percentage of funding 
illiquid banks is greatly reduced in every size class, and all of the small banks in the period of 
2001:Q1 to 2003:Q2 meet the threshold. We also examine the time series of average 
NSFR_2014, and the detrended NSFR_2014, which exhibit  similar patterns to the 2010 NSFR. 
 We then investigate whether the regression results are sensitive to the weights of ASF 
and RSF. With NSFR_2014 as the dependent variable, we rerun our regression with the full set of 
control variables. Panel D of Table 2.8 contains the results. EQRAT continues to enter negatively 
and significantly for large and medium banks, and positively and significantly  for small banks. 
Hence, our main findings are robust to the latest revisions to the NSFR measure.  
2.7.4 Estimating a simultaneous equation model 
 Several empirical studies indicate that bank capital level and bank risk level can be 
jointly determined (Roulet, 2011; Horváth, et al., 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2014). Thus, we 
use the four-quarter lagged average values of capital ratio and all other exogenous variables in 
all the regression analysis presented above to mitigate the potential endogeneity issues. We 
now deal with this concern more directly. We follow Roulet (2011) to construct a simultaneous 
equation model. In the capital ratio equation, EQRAT is regressed on NSFR and all the control 
variables defined in Section 2.5 as well as ROA and ROE.49 In the liquidity risk equation, NSFR is 
                                                             
49 ROA and ROE are included to proxy bank profitability. To avoid colinearity, ROE are 
orthogonalized before introducing it in the capital equation. 
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regressed on EQRAT and the full set of exogenous variables. To avoid the potential endogeneity 
issues with some explanatory variables, all the explanatory variables are four-quarter lagged 
average values  in both the capital and the liquidity risk equations. The quarter dummy variables 
and bank dummy variables are also included. The simultaneous equation system is estimated 
with two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression.  
 Panel E of Table 2.8 reports the estimation results. In the capital ratio equation, we find 
that NSFR has a significantly negative effect on capital for large and medium banks, and positive 
and significant effect on capital for small banks. It suggests that large and medium size banks 
tend to increase their capital ratio when facing higher liquidity risk, while small banks tend to 
become more balance sheet insolvent with greater exposure to liquidity risk over the previous 
four quarters. In the liquidity risk equation, we continue to find a negative and significant effect 
of capital on NSFR for large and medium banks, and a positive and significant effect for small 
banks.  
2.7.5 Additional robustness test 
 We have also checked the robustness of our results to the use of a modified version of 
NSFR, the net stable funding gap (NSFG). NSFG is calculated as the dollar amount of ASF minus 
the dollar amount of RSF. A positive value represents a stable funding surplus, while a negative 
value indicates a stable funding shortage. We obtain similar results if we use NSFG normalized 
by GTA as the dependent variables (not shown for brevity). 
 In further robustness tests, we use an alternative size cutoff. The definition of small 
banks with GTA of up to $1 billion captures community banks. And the remaining observations 
were roughly split in half with the $3 billion cutoff (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). We test 
whether the results are sensitive to size cutoffs. In particular, we use $5 billion for GTA as cutoff 
for large and medium banks, the results are similar(not shown for brevity).  
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 All of the analysis presented so far is done with observations given equal weight. 
Although we divide banks into three size groups, size varies greatly within the large bank size 
category particularly. For robustness, we rerun all the regressions with weighted least 
square(WLS) method. The weight for an observation is the share of total assets of all banks in 
the same size class held by a bank. Hence, a larger bank is assigned a bigger weight relative to a 
smaller bank in the same size category. The WLS regressions yield results qualitatively similar to 
the unweighted least square regressions (not shown for brevity). However, we do find that the 
coefficient on EQRAT for large banks becomes more negative, while small banks have a less 
positive factor loading on EQRAT, compared with the values obtained with the unweighted 
analysis.   
  In addition, most regulatory authorities emphasize the importance of “systemically 
important financial institutions" following the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. We rerun our 
analysis for the systemically important banks (SIB). 50 SIBs have an average NSFR around 0.72, 
with the minimum value of 0.63 at the end of 2007, implying that SIBs on average experience a 
significant NSFR shortfall (i.e., a shortage of stable funding sources). The regression results 
support our prior findings (not shown for brevity). On the one hand, we find that the least-
capitalized SIBs do not alter their liquidity risk level even if their capital level has improved. On 
the other hand, we do find that the SIB with higher capital position tend to take more liquidity 
risk even when they are highly illiquid, which provides support for the implementation of 
liquidity risk regulations on large banks especially the SIBs.  
 
                                                             
50 According to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-
Frank Act), a bank or bank holding company is classified as "systemically important" if it holds 
more than $50 billion in assets. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
 This chapter estimates the NSFR as defined in the Basel III accord (BCBS, 2010) with the 
publicly available bank call report data on almost all the US commercial banks from 2001 to 
2013. The NSFR is considered a proxy for funding liquidity risk. Compared to traditional liquidity 
risk measures and the NSFR estimated in the related literature, the NSFR based on our 
calibration is more comprehensive in evaluating funding liquidity risk on banks' balance sheet 
and off-balance sheet activities and also is superior in capturing the changes in liquidity risk over 
time. Our calculations  suggest that the majority of large banks had a NSFR shortfall at the end 
of 2013, while most small banks met the 100% NSFR threshold.51 We also provide graphical 
evidence that the detrended NSFR is able to detect the excessive liquidity risk taking behaviors 
of the banking sector in advance of financial stress.  
 Guided by the existing theories, this chapter tests the relationship between capital and 
funding liquidity risk. Our two main results are as follows. First, large and medium size banks, 
especially the SIBs, with higher capital positions tend to decrease their liquidity profile, i.e., 
increase exposure to liquidity risk during both normal times and the financial crisis. This finding 
provides empirical support for the theories predicting that higher capital expands risk-bearing 
capacity and induces banks to take more risk. Second, small banks with higher capital positions 
tend to improve their liquidity profile, i.e., decrease liquidity risk exposure. This finding is 
consistent with the theory put forth in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001), which suggests a less 
fragile capital structure make banks lend more liquid loans and less illiquid loans. We perform a 
variety of robustness tests and obtain similar results.  
                                                             
51In the robustness test, we also estimate the NSFR measure based on the latest revision of 
NSFR (BCBS, 2014). Some of the revisions are expected to help improve the NSFR for most 
banks. Based on the latest revision, only 40% of large banks and less than 4% of small banks did 
not meet the requirement of 100% NSFR at the end of 2013.  
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 Our findings raise questions about the implementation of uniform capital and liquidity 
requirements for all types of banks.  A positive relationship between capital and liquidity risk for 
large and medium banks indicates that regulators may be able to improve the probability of 
survival for banks by imposing higher capital requirements, but this benefit is associated with 
the cost of greater exposure to funding liquidity risk by large and medium size banks. 
Nonetheless, our findings do support imposing stricter capital requirement for small banks to 
improve both balance sheet and liquidity solvency, especially the funding illiquid ones, and 
minimum liquidity standards to discourage excessive liquidity risk-taking at large and medium 
banks.  
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 Figure 2.1. Box plot of the estimated NSFR for large banks over 2001-2013. This figure plots 
the distribution of the NSFR based on three estimation methods for large banks (real GTA 
greater than $3 billion). The boxes contain 50% of the observations for each year with the 
center line indicating the median and the circle indicating the mean. The bottom and top of the 
box are the first and third quartiles. The dashed grey bar indicates the 100% NSFR threshold.  
 
 
 
 Figure 2.2. Box plot of the estimated NSFR for medium banks over 2001-2013. This figure plots 
the distribution of the NSFR based on three estimation methods for medium banks (real GTA 
between $1 billion and $3 billion). The boxes contain 50% of the observations for each year with 
the center line indicating the median and the circle indicating the mean. The bottom and top of 
the box are the first and third quartiles. The dashed grey bar indicates the 100% NSFR threshold.  
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 Figure 2.3. Box plot of the estimated NSFR measures for small banks over 2001-2013. This 
figure plots the distribution of NSFR based on three estimation methods for small banks (real 
GTA up to $1 billion). The boxes contain 50% of the observations for each year with the center 
line indicating the median and the circle indicating the mean. The bottom and top of the box are 
the first and third quartiles. The dashed grey bar indicates the 100% NSFR threshold.  
 
 
 
 Figure 2.4. Total available amount of stable funding (ASF) in $billion and total required 
amount of stable funding (RSF) in $billion for large banks over 2001-2013. ASF is defined as the 
portion of amount of equity and liability financing expected to be reliable sources of funds over 
a one-year horizon, and RSF is a function of the liquidity characteristics of various type of assets 
held and OBS commitments and contingencies. This figure plots the ASF and RSF time series 
estimated with our method for large banks. 
$
 b
ill
io
n
2000
4000
6000
8000
Date
2001/03 2002/03 2003/03 2004/03 2005/03 2006/03 2007/03 2008/03 2009/03 2010/03 2011/03 2012/03 2013/03 2014/03
ASF and RSF in $ billion for Large banks over 2001-2013
 Data Sources: Bank Call Reports.
Real ASF Real RSF
104 
 
 
 Figure 2.5. Total available amount of stable funding (ASF) in $billion and total required 
amount of stable funding (RSF) in $billion for medium banks over 2001-2013. ASF is defined as 
the portion of amount of equity and liability financing expected to be reliable sources of funds 
over a one-year horizon, and RSF is a function of the liquidity characteristics of various type of 
assets held and OBS commitments and contingencies. This figure plots the ASF and RSF time 
series estimated with our method for medium banks. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Total available amount of stable funding (ASF) in $billion and total required 
amount of stable funding (RSF) in $billion for small banks over 2001-2013. ASF is defined as the 
portion of amount of equity and liability financing expected to be reliable sources of funds over 
a one-year horizon, and RSF is a function of the liquidity characteristics of various type of assets 
held and OBS commitments and contingencies. This figure plots the ASF and RSF time series 
estimated with our method for small banks. 
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Figure 2.7. Percentage of large banks with NSFR smaller than one over 2001-2013 based on 
three estimation methods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.8. Percentage of medium banks with NSFR smaller than one over 2001-2013 based 
on three estimation methods.  
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 Figure 2.9. Percentage of small banks with NSFR smaller than one over 2001-2013 based on 
three estimation methods.  
  
 
 
 
 Figure 2.10. Average quarterly NSFR for large banks over 2001-2013. The estimated NSFR is 
averaged across banks for each size class at each quarter. The dashed grey bar indicates the 100% 
NSFR threshold. The time series of average NSFR based on three estimation methods are plotted 
for large banks. 
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Figure 2.11. Average quarterly NSFR for medium banks over 2001-2013. The estimated NSFR is 
averaged across banks for each size class at each quarter. The dashed grey bar indicates the 100% 
NSFR threshold. The time series of average NSFR based on three estimation methods are plotted 
for medium banks. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Average quarterly NSFR for small banks over 2001-2013. The estimated NSFR is 
averaged across banks for each size class at each quarter. The dashed grey bar indicates the 100% 
NSFR threshold. The time series of average NSFR based on three estimation methods are plotted 
for small banks. 
  
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 N
S
F
R
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
Date
2001/03 2002/03 2003/03 2004/03 2005/03 2006/03 2007/03 2008/03 2009/03 2010/03 2011/03 2012/03 2013/03 2014/03
Average Quarterly Net Stable Funding Ratios for Medium Banks over 2001-2013
 Data Sources: Bank Call Reports.
the mean, NSFR the mean, NSFR_King the mean, NSFR_Roulet
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 N
S
F
R
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Date
2001/03 2002/03 2003/03 2004/03 2005/03 2006/03 2007/03 2008/03 2009/03 2010/03 2011/03 2012/03 2013/03 2014/03
Average Quarterly Net Stable Funding Ratios for Small Banks over 2001-2013
 Data Sources: Bank Call Reports.
the mean, NSFR the mean, NSFR_King the mean, NSFR_Roulet
108 
 
 
Figure 2.13. Detrended NSFR based on our estimation method for large banks over 2001-2013. 
The average NSFR for large banks based on our method is first deseasonalized with the X11 
procedure, and then detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.14. Detrended NSFR based on our estimation method for medium banks over 2001-
2013. The average NSFR for medium banks based on our method is first deseasonalized with the 
X11 procedure, and then detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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Figure 2.15. Detrended NSFR based on our estimation method for small banks over 2001-2013. 
The average NSFR for small banks based on our method is first deseasonalized with the X11 
procedure, and then detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16. Detrended NSFR based on King(2010) for large banks over 2001-2013. The average 
NSFR based on King(2010) for large banks is first deseasonalized with the X11 procedure, and 
then detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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Figure 2.17. Detrended NSFR based on King(2010) for medium banks over 2001-2013. The 
average NSFR based on King(2010) for medium banks is first deseasonalized with the X11 
procedure, and then detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
 
Figure 2.18. Detrended NSFR based on King(2010) for small banks over 2001-2013. The average 
NSFR based on King(2010) for small banks is first deseasonalized with the X11 procedure, and 
then detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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Figure 2.19. Detrended NSFR based on Roulet(2011) for large banks over 2001-2013. The 
average NSFR based on Roulet(2011) for large banks is first deseasonalized with the X11 
procedure, and then detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.20. Detrended NSFR based on Roulet(2011) for medium banks over 2001-2013. The 
average NSFR based on Roulet(2011) for medium banks is first deseasonalized with the X11 
procedure, and then detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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Figure 2.21. Detrended NSFR based on Roulet(2011) for small banks over 2001-2013. The 
average NSFR based on Roulet(2011) for small banks is first deseasonalized with the X11 
procedure, and then detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
 
 
   
Figure 2.22. Percentage of large banks with NSFR smaller than 1 over 2001-2013 based on the 
2010 version of NSFR and 2014 revision of NSFR. 
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Figure 2.23. Percentage of medium banks with NSFR smaller than 1 over 2001-2013 based on 
the 2010 version of NSFR and 2014 revision of NSFR 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.24. Percentage of small banks with NSFR smaller than 1 over 2001-2013 based on the 
2010 version of NSFR and 2014 revision of NSFR 
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Table 2.1. Summary of NSFR components and associated factors defined in King (2010), Roulet (2011), and the BCBS (2010) 
Panel A summarizes the components of each ASF category and the associated ASF factor to be applied in calculating a bank's total amount of 
available stable funding (ASF) under the BCBS (2010), King (2010), and Roulet (2011), respectively. Panel B summarizes the specific types of 
assets to be assigned to each asset category and the associated RSF factor under the BCBS (2010), King (2010), and Roulet (2011), respectively. 
Panel C summarizes the composition of off-balance sheet categories and associated RSF factors under the BCBS (2010), King (2010), and Roulet 
(2011), respectively. The ASF and RSF factors range from 100 percent to 0 percent to reflect the stability of funding for liability categories and 
the liquidity of assets and OBS categories, respectively. A higher ASF factor is assigned to more stable and reliable funding source, while a 
lower RSF factor is assigned to relatively more liquid assets and OBS exposures. 
 
Panel A: components of available stable funding and associated ASF factors 
King(2010) 
ASF Factor 
Roulet(2011)      
ASF Factor 
BCBS(2010) 
ASF Factor  
Components of ASF Category  
  
100% 
Total amount of Capital, Other preferred shares and capital instruments having an effective maturity >= 1yr, and  secured and 
unsecured borrowings and liabilities  with effective remaining maturities(RM) >= 1 yr. 
100% 100% 
 
        Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments 
100% 100% 
 
        Time Deposits with RM >= 1yr 
100% 100% 
 
       Other long-term liabilities with RM >= 1yr 
        
  
90% 
 "Stable" non-maturity deposits and/or term deposits with RM < 1yr, provided by retail and small business customers52. 
90% 70% 
 
        "Insured" demand deposits of retail and small business customers. 
90% 70% 
 
        "Insured" saving deposits of retail and small business customers. 
90% 100% 
 
        "Insured" time deposits of retail and small business customers, with RM < 1yr 
        
  80%  "Less stable" non-maturity deposits and/or term deposits with RM < 1yr, provided by retail and small business customers.  
80% 70% 
 
        "Uninsured" demand deposits of retail and small business customers. 
80% 70% 
 
        "Uninsured" saving deposits of retail and small business customers. 
80% 100% 
 
        "Uninsured" time deposits of retail and small business customers, with RM < 1yr 
        
  
50% 
Unsecured wholesale funding, non-maturity deposits and term deposits with a RM < 1yr, provided by non-financial corporates, 
sovereigns, central banks, multilateral development banks and PSEs.  
80% 70% 
 
         Demand deposits provided by wholesale clients.  
80% 70% 
 
         Saving deposits provided by wholesale clients..  
80% 100% 
 
         Time deposits provided by wholesale clients with RM < 1yr. 
                                                             
52 Funding provided by small business customers is treated the same way as retail deposits in Basel III (BCBS, 2010). 
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  0%  All other liabilities and equity categories not included in the above categories. 
90% or 80% 70% or 100% 
 
         Deposits of Commercial banks and other depository institutions 
90% or 80% 70% or 100% 
 
         Deposits in foreign offices 
0 0 
 
         All other liabilities 
        
  
 
 
Panel B: components of available stable funding and associated ASF factors 
King(2010) 
RSF Factor 
Roulet(2011) 
RSF Factor 
BCBS(2010) 
RSF Factor 
Components of RSF Category 
    0%   
0% 0% 
 
Cash 
0% 0% 
 
Short-term unsecured actively traded instruments with outstanding maturity < 1 yr 
0% 0% 
 
Unencumbered securities with exactly offsetting reverse repo 
0% 0% 
 
Unencumbered securities with RM < 1 yr 
0% 0% 
 
Unencumbered nonrenewable loans to financial entities with RM < 1 yr 
  
 
 
    5%   
5% 0% 
 
Unencumbered marketable securities issued or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, BIS, IMF, EC, non-central government 
PSEs or multilateral development banks with risk weight (RW) of 0% under the Basel II Standardized Approach for credit risk (SA) 
and RM >= 1yr 
        
  20% 
 
100% 50% 
 
Unencumbered corporate bonds or covered bonds rated AA- or higher satisfying all the conditions for "level 2 assets" in the LCR 
with RM>=1yr 
100% 50% 
 
Unencumbered marketable securities issued or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, BIS, IMF, EC, non-central government 
PSEs or multilateral development banks with RW of 20% under SA and RM >= 1yr 
        
  50% 
 
100% 50% 
 
Unencumbered listed equity securities 
100% 50% 
 
Unencumbered nonfinancial corporate bonds or cover bonds rated A+ to A- with RM >= 1yr 
50% 100% 
 
Unencumbered loans to nonfinancial corporate clients, sovereigns, central banks, and PSEs with RM < 1yr 
        
  65% 
 
65% 85% 
 
Unencumbered residential mortgages of any maturity with RW <= 35% under SA  
100% 100% 
 
Other unencumbered loans(excluding financial institution loans) with RW <= 35% under SA and RM >= 1yr  
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  85% 
 
85% 85% 
 
Unencumbered loans to retail customers (i.e. natural persons)  with RW > 35% under SA and RM < 1yr 
50% 100% 
 
Unencumbered loans to small business customers (as defined in the LCR) with RW > 35% under SA and RM < 1yr 
    
    
  100% All other assets not included in the above categories   
100% 85% 
 
         Loans to retail customers (i.e. natural persons)  having a RM >= 1yr 
100% 100% 
 
         Loans to small business customers (as defined in the LCR) having a RM >= 1yr 
100% 100% 
 
         Loans to wholesale clients secured by commercial real estate of any maturity 
100% 0% 
 
         Loans to financial entities with RM >= 1 yr 
100% 100% 
 
         Agricultural Loans to big farms 
100% 100% 
 
         Other loans including loans in the foreign offices 
100% 50% 
 
         Securities with RW of 100% under SA  
100% 100% 
 
         All other assets 
    
    
Panel C: Composition of off-balance sheet categories and associated RSF factor 
King(2010) 
RSF Factor 
Roulet(2011) 
RSF Factor 
BCBS(2010) 
RSF Factor 
Components of Off-balance Sheet category 
0% 0% 5% Undrawn amount of committed credit and liquidity facilities 
0% 0% Factor at 
discretion 
of national 
supervisors 
 
Other contingent funding obligations 
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Table 2.2. Summary statistics of all banks over 2001-2013 
The Net Stable Funding Ratio(NSFR) is calculated as available amount of stable funding (ASF) divided by required amount of stable funding 
(RSF), where ASF is defined as the portion of amount of equity and liability financing expected to be reliable sources of funds over a one-year 
horizon, and RSF is a function of the liquidity characteristics of various type of assets held and OBS commitments and contingencies.  Higher 
value of NSFR indicates lower funding liquidity risk. NSFR denotes the net stable funding ratio based on our estimation method. NSFR_King 
denotes the net stable funding ratio calculated with King (2010)'s assumptions and specifications. NSFR_Roulet denotes the value estimated by 
following Roulet (2011). iNSFR, iNSFR_King, and iNSFR_Roulet are the inverse of NSFR, NSFR_King, and NSFR_Roulet, respectively. Loan to 
deposit ratio is calculated as the bank's total loans divided by total deposits. Short-term funding ratio is defined as the ratio of total loans to 
short-term funding. Core funding ratio is calculated as the total loans divided by the core deposits. EQRAT is the equity capital to GTA ratio, 
where GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve. Tier1&2 Capital Ratio is the 
total risk-based capital ratio which is defined as total capital divided by risk-weighted assets in the Basel I capital standards. We include almost 
all commercial banks in the U.S that file the call report during the period of 2001 to 2013. We exclude a bank if it (1)has zero or negative equity 
capital in the current year; (2)its average lagged GTA below $25 million; (3)has less than 12 quarter history. The final dataset has 358,201 bank-
quarter observations. All the dollar values are expressed in real 2009 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator.  
  Variable Mean Median Standard deviation 
NSFR 1.219 1.168 0.291 
NSFR_King 1.034 1.018 0.116 
NSFR_Roulet 1.072 1.041 0.166 
iNSFR 0.864 0.856 0.197 
iNSFR_King 0.979 0.982 0.109 
iNSFR_Roulet 0.954 0.961 0.139 
LoanToDepositRatio 0.782 0.795 0.193 
ShortTermFundingRatio 0.904 0.905 0.261 
CoreFundingRatio 0.985 0.941 0.484 
EQRAT 0.106 0.097 0.037 
Tier1&2 Capital Ratio 0.159 0.141 0.078 
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Table 2.3. Summary statistics on funding liquidity risk for banks split by size 
Stable funding shortage (SFshrtg) is measured as the difference of ASF and RSF. A negative value indicates a shortage of stable funding. iNSFR 
denotes the inverse of the NSFR. This table shows summary statistics on funding liquidity risk indicators based on our estimation, King (2010), 
and Roulet (2011) for all banks and separately for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 
billion), and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion) in 2001 and in 2013, respectively. All the dollar values are expressed in real 2009 dollars 
using the implicit GDP price deflator. 
 
    2001 Net Stable Funding Ratio Information   2013 Net Stable Funding Ratio Information 
 
  N 
ASF     
$ bill 
RSF      
$ bill 
SFshrtg     
$ bill 
GTA     
$ bill 
   
   
 
   
   
 
N
SFR
 
iN
SFR
   N 
ASF     
$ bill 
RSF      
$ bill 
SFshrtg     
$ bill 
GTA     
$ bill 
   
   
 
   
   
 
N
SFR
 
iN
SFR
 
BCBS    
(2010) 
All 7441 4394 5777 -1382 7856 0.56 0.74 0.76 1.31 
 
5901 7465 8441 -976 12501 0.60 0.68 0.88 1.13 
Large 203 3090 4642 -1552 6157 0.50 0.75 0.67 1.50 
 
195 6185 7276 -1091 10778 0.57 0.68 0.85 1.18 
Medium 273 321 307 14 453 0.71 0.68 1.05 0.96 
 
326 378 373 5 536 0.70 0.69 1.01 0.99 
Small 6965 983 828 155 1246 0.79 0.66 1.19 0.84 
 
5380 902 792 110 1187 0.76 0.67 1.14 0.88 
 
                    
                     
King   
(2010) 
All 7441 5015 6449 -1434 7856 0.64 0.82 0.78 1.29 
 
5901 8943 9726 -784 12501 0.72 0.78 0.92 1.09 
Large 203 3582 5005 -1423 6157 0.58 0.81 0.72 1.40 
 
195 7456 8259 -803 10778 0.69 0.77 0.90 1.11 
Medium 273 365 388 -23 453 0.81 0.86 0.94 1.06 
 
326 456 463 -7 536 0.85 0.86 0.98 1.02 
Small 6965 1068 1056 12 1246 0.86 0.85 1.01 0.99 
 
5380 1031 1004 27 1187 0.87 0.85 1.03 0.97 
 
                    
 
                    
Roulet 
(2011) 
All 7441 4646 5991 -1346 7856 0.59 0.76 0.78 1.29 
 
5901 7837 8921 -1085 12501 0.63 0.71 0.88 1.14 
Large 203 3280 4664 -1384 6157 0.53 0.76 0.70 1.42 
 
195 6485 7552 -1068 10778 0.60 0.70 0.86 1.16 
Medium 273 345 357 -12 453 0.76 0.79 0.97 1.03 
 
326 408 434 -26 536 0.76 0.81 0.94 1.06 
Small 6965 1021 971 50 1246 0.82 0.78 1.05 0.95 
 
5380 944 935 9 1187 0.80 0.79 1.01 0.99 
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Table 2.4. Definitions and summary statistics for exogenous variables 
The exogenous variables except quarter dummies and bank dummies are created by using the 4-quarter lagged average values. The sample 
period is 2001-2013. Sample means are provided for all banks and separately for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA 
between $1 billion and $3 billion) and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). All the dollar values are expressed in real 2009 dollars using 
the implicit GDP price deflator. Data source: Bank Call Reports, FDIC Summary of Deposits, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau 
 
 
Variable Definition 
Mean for 
all banks 
Mean for 
large 
banks 
Mean for 
medium 
banks 
Mean for 
small 
banks 
Bank capital ratio 
     
EQRAT Equity capital ratio: total equity capital divided by GTA 0.106 0.104 0.097 0.107 
 
 
    Bank size  
    Ln(GTA) Natural log of gross total asset(GTA thereafter), where GTA equals total assets plus 
the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve 
12.027 16.190 14.218 11.792 
     Bank risk measure  
    EARNVOL Earning volatility: calculated as the standard deviation of the bank's quarterly return 
on assets over the previous twelve quarters, multiplied by 100 
0.187 0.178 0.154 0.189 
     CREDITRISK Credit risk measure: calculated as the banks' Basel I risk-weighted assets and off-
balance sheet activities divided by GTA 
0.679 0.716 0.723 0.676 
     ZSCORE Distance to default: measured as the bank's return on assets plus the equity 
capital/GTA ratio, divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets 
1.404 1.609 1.767 1.380 
     ALLLRatio Allowance for loan loss to total loans ratio 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015 
      Potentially securitizable loans 
     RetailSMEloanRatio Loans to retail and small- and medium-sized entity (SME) customers divided by total 
loans 
0.800 0.567 0.615 0.816 
Activity diversification 
     OtherEarningAssetRatio Other earning assets to total earning assets ratio 0.256 0.269 0.236 0.257 
      Bank performance 
     Growth in Income The quarterly growth rate in net income  measured over the previous four quarters 0.027 0.042 0.034 0.026 
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      Bank credit expansion 
     Growth in Loan The quarterly growth rate in total loans measured over the previous four quarters 0.021 0.028 0.023 0.020 
      Bank deposit insurance coverage 
     InsuredDepRatio The proportion of insured deposits to total deposits 0.771 0.609 0.684 0.781 
     Mergers and Acquisitions, Publicly-traded, Bank holding company status 
    D_M&A A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the bank was involved in one or more 
mergers over  the previous three years 
0.083 0.607 0.337 0.055 
     
D_PUBLIC 
A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the bank has been a publicly-traded 
commercial bank or part of a publicly-traded bank holding company over the past 
three years 
0.111 0.712 0.477 0.074 
     D_MBHC A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the bank has been part of a multibank 
holding company over the previous three years 
0.198 0.456 0.263 0.187 
     D_OBHC A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the bank has been part of a one-bank 
holding company over the previous three years 
0.612 0.469 0.630 0.616 
     Local market competition 
     HERF A bank-level Herfindahl index based on bank and thrift deposits 0.183 0.149 0.151 0.186 
SHARE-ML 
Share of market bank and thrift deposits held by medium and large banks(GTA 
greater than $1 billon) 0.521 0.837 0.772 0.499 
      Local market economic environment 
    Ln(POP) Natural log of weighted average population in all markets in which a bank has 
deposits, using the proportion of deposits held by a bank in each market as weights 
12.401 14.698 14.037 12.253 
     Ln(DENSITY) Natural log of weighted average population density(population per square mile) in all 
markets in which a bank has deposits, using the proportion of deposits held by a bank 
in each market as weights 
4.815 6.334 5.913 4.716 
     INC-GROWTH Weighted average personal income growth in all markets in which a bank has 
deposits,  using the proportion of deposits held by a bank in each market as weights 
0.021 0.019 0.019 0.021 
     
      Fixed effects 
     Time fixed effects Set of dummy variables for all but one quarter 
    Bank fixed effects Set of dummy variables for all but one bank 
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Table 2.5. The impact of capital on funding liquidity risk  
This table presents regression results. The dependent variables are the estimated NSFR based on three estimation methods. Higher value of 
the NSFR indicates lower funding liquidity risk. Panels A, B, and C report the results for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks 
(GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion) respectively. The exogenous variables are defined in Table 
2.4. All regressions are run with both quarter dummies and bank dummies. The sample period is 2001-2013. Standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Panel A: Regression results for large banks  Panel B: Regression results for medium banks  Panel C: Regression results for small banks 
 NSFR NSFR_King NSFR_Roulet  NSFR NSFR_King NSFR_Roulet  NSFR  NSFR_King NSFR_Roulet 
EQRAT -0.6355 0.1231 0.1381  -0.7964 -0.0772 -0.1134  0.7571 0.3768 0.4995 
 (0.2369)*** (0.2213) (0.2305)  (0.1520)*** (0.1072) (0.1322)  (0.0410)*** (0.0212)*** (0.0266)*** 
Ln(GTA) -0.0381 -0.0152 -0.0117  -0.0583 -0.0487 -0.0354  -0.0595 -0.0492 -0.0316 
 (0.0192)** (0.0188) (0.0182)  (0.0138)*** (0.0114)*** (0.0130)***  (0.0035)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0026)*** 
EARNVOL 0.0099 0.0025 0.0029  0.0228 0.0117 0.0216  -0.0935 -0.0229 -0.0154 
 (0.0159) (0.0147) (0.0150)  (0.0115)** (0.0100) (0.0117)*  (0.0039)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0031)*** 
CREDIT RISK -0.8878 -0.4979 -0.5338  -0.7923 -0.2955 -0.3083  -1.1806 -0.4240 -0.4430 
 (0.1016)*** (0.0844)*** (0.1052)***  (0.0600)*** (0.0495)*** (0.0524)***  (0.0211)*** (0.0138)*** (0.0163)*** 
ZSCORE 0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0015  0.0025 0.0012 0.0009  0.0164 0.0063 0.0067 
 (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0022)  (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0016)  (0.0008)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0006)*** 
ALLL Ratio -1.9820 -0.6296 -0.6613  2.4986 1.2386 2.0344  2.3833 1.1967 1.7767 
 (0.7873)** (0.7352) (0.8983)  (0.5165)*** (0.4463)*** (0.4722)***  (0.1642)*** (0.1002)*** (0.1206)*** 
Retail&SMELoan 0.2483 0.0275 0.1238  0.2159 -0.0185 0.0124  0.2739 0.0009 -0.0037 
Ratio (0.0585)*** (0.0524) (0.0596)**  (0.0372)*** (0.0289) (0.0409)  (0.0098)*** (0.0056) (0.0068) 
OtherEarningAsset 0.0048 -0.3412 -0.0791  0.1636 -0.1273 0.1096  0.2284 -0.1284 0.2053 
Ratio (0.0916) (0.0703)*** (0.0913)  (0.0545)*** (0.0466)*** (0.0459)**  (0.0148)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0119)*** 
Growth in Loan -0.1512 -0.1296 -0.1764  -0.1504 -0.1080 -0.1597  -0.2756 -0.1122 -0.1839 
 (0.0473)*** (0.0402)*** (0.0436)***  (0.0477)*** (0.0315)*** (0.0364)***  (0.0160)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0115)*** 
Growth in Income 0.0075 0.0127 0.0108  -0.0075 -0.0032 -0.0032  -0.0131 -0.0041 -0.0072 
 (0.0103) (0.0090) (0.0093)  (0.0077) (0.0057) (0.0063)  (0.0023)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0017)*** 
InsuredDepRatio  0.1538 0.0390 0.0663  0.0724 0.0400 0.0717  0.0094 -0.0369 0.0082 
 (0.0642)** (0.0451) (0.0510)  (0.0301)** (0.0289) (0.0352)**  (0.0123) (0.0080)*** (0.0095) 
D-M&A -0.0360 -0.0117 -0.0161  0.0024 0.0072 0.0031  -0.0167 -0.0009 -0.0038 
 (0.0070)*** (0.0060)* (0.0066)**  (0.0042) (0.0038)* (0.0042)  (0.0022)*** (0.0014) (0.0016)** 
D-PUBLIC 0.1069 0.0613 0.0578  -0.0115 -0.0046 -0.0050  -0.0178 -0.0005 0.0002 
 (0.0298)*** (0.0223)*** (0.0224)**  (0.0227) (0.0187) (0.0186)  (0.0093)* (0.0045) (0.0057) 
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D-MBHC -0.1070 -0.0384 -0.0393  -0.0805 -0.0411 -0.0423  -0.0927 -0.0349 -0.0381 
 (0.0470)** (0.0277) (0.0265)  (0.0165)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0146)***  (0.0056)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0036)*** 
D-OBHC -0.0808 -0.0348 -0.0357  -0.0516 -0.0347 -0.0368  -0.0432 -0.0219 -0.0251 
 (0.0490) (0.0239) (0.0243)  (0.0148)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0145)**  (0.0042)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0029)*** 
HERF -0.3148 -0.2053 -0.2736  0.0482 -0.0901 0.0073  0.0982 0.0384 0.1465 
 (0.4058) (0.4201) (0.4419)  (0.2521) (0.1462) (0.1712)  (0.0729) (0.0405) (0.0520)*** 
SHARE-ML 0.5562 0.2179 0.3857  -0.1136 0.0730 -0.0761  -0.1224 -0.0284 -0.1651 
 (0.5174) (0.4691) (0.4957)  (0.2812) (0.1704) (0.1977)  (0.0795) (0.0438) (0.0567)*** 
Ln(POP)  0.1556 0.0254 0.0898  -0.0667 0.0236 -0.0406  -0.0404 -0.0072 -0.0545 
 (0.1686) (0.1523) (0.1616)  (0.1047) (0.0611) (0.0715)  (0.0288) (0.0158) (0.0205)*** 
Ln(Density)  0.1988 0.0583 0.1416  -0.0385 0.0539 -0.0180  -0.0509 -0.0110 -0.0683 
 (0.2116) (0.1888) (0.2029)  (0.1347) (0.0779) (0.0923)  (0.0398) (0.0224) (0.0284)** 
INC-GROWTH 0.0486 0.1459 -0.0456  -0.1482 0.0176 -0.0748  0.1697 0.1605 0.1293 
 (0.2380) (0.2018) (0.2134)  (0.1336) (0.0840) (0.0933)  (0.0341)*** (0.0210)*** (0.0251)*** 
Constant 1.3265 1.1191 0.9519  1.7704 1.7229 1.4081  1.6338 1.6868 1.3412 
 (0.2945)*** (0.3009)*** (0.2974)***  (0.1993)*** (0.1726)*** (0.1850)***  (0.0484)*** (0.0291)*** (0.0357)*** 
Quarter dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Bank dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 9485 9485 9485  16327 16327 16327  324169 324169 324169 
R2 0.871 0.775 0.779  0.886 0.700 0.769  0.888 0.706 0.815 
Adjusted R2 0.864 0.763 0.768  0.880 0.683 0.756  0.885 0.697 0.810 
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Table 2.6. Asymmetric impact of capital on the components of NSFR measures 
This table presents regression results for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion) and 
small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion) respectively. The dependent variables are the dollar amount of the individual NSFR components (i.e., 
ASF and RSF) normalized by GTA.  The dollar amount of ASF and RSF are calculated with our estimation method. GTA equals total assets plus 
the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve. The exogenous variables are defined in Table 2.4. All regressions 
are run with both quarter dummies and bank dummies. The sample period is 2001-2013. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank 
level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2)     (3) (4)     (5) (6) 
 Regression results for large banks   Regression results for medium banks   Regression results for small banks 
 ASF/GTA RSF/GTA   ASF/GTA RSF/GTA   ASF/GTA RSF/GTA 
EQRAT 0.0251 0.6464     -0.1109 0.5819     0.1450 -0.2634 
 (0.1219) (0.2313)***   (0.0716) (0.0719)***   (0.0140)*** (0.0157)*** 
Ln(GTA) -0.0099 0.0032   -0.0136 0.0329   -0.0120 0.0270 
 (0.0089) (0.0171)   (0.0060)** (0.0060)***   (0.0014)*** (0.0013)*** 
EARNVOL 0.0095 -0.0006   0.0112 -0.0056   -0.0049 0.0448 
 (0.0083) (0.0078)   (0.0057)** (0.0058)   (0.0015)*** (0.0016)*** 
CREDIT RISK -0.0326 0.6682   0.0224 0.5957   -0.0031 0.6385 
 (0.0520) (0.0631)***   (0.0233) (0.0336)***   (0.0057) (0.0089)*** 
ZSCORE -0.0006 -0.0031   -0.0007 -0.0022   0.0000 -0.0085 
 (0.0013) (0.0013)**   (0.0009) (0.0008)***   (0.0002) (0.0003)*** 
ALLL Ratio -0.0512 1.6473   -0.0191 -1.6721   -0.2104 -1.6221 
 (0.4386) (0.5076)***   (0.2363) (0.2107)***   (0.0530)*** (0.0569)*** 
Retail&SMELoanRatio 0.2173 -0.0165   0.1693 -0.0016   0.1833 -0.0026 
 (0.0288)*** (0.0368)   (0.0187)*** (0.0166)   (0.0032)*** (0.0038) 
OtherEarningAssetRatio -0.1246 -0.0946   -0.0093 -0.0674   -0.0175 -0.0895 
 (0.0441)*** (0.0612)   (0.0213) (0.0290)**   (0.0037)*** (0.0056)*** 
Growth in Loan -0.0107 0.1163   -0.0257 0.0929   -0.0442 0.1053 
 (0.0223) (0.0226)***   (0.0229) (0.0219)***   (0.0055)*** (0.0067)*** 
Growth in Income 0.0062 -0.0032   -0.0037 0.0000   -0.0029 0.0012 
 (0.0057) (0.0057)   (0.0034) (0.0041)   (0.0008)*** (0.0010) 
InsuredDepRatio  0.0536 -0.0369   0.0644 0.0040   0.0740 0.0334 
 (0.0387) (0.0267)   (0.0178)*** (0.0143)   (0.0057)*** (0.0045)*** 
D-M&A 0.0038 0.0210   -0.0010 -0.0040   -0.0014 0.0070 
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 (0.0038) (0.0030)***   (0.0021) (0.0019)**   (0.0009) (0.0009)*** 
D-PUBLIC 0.0460 -0.0383   -0.0046 0.0093   -0.0206 0.0032 
 (0.0121)*** (0.0124)***   (0.0112) (0.0099)   (0.0037)*** (0.0031) 
D-MBHC -0.0367 0.0063   -0.0142 0.0388   -0.0138 0.0380 
 (0.0154)** (0.0266)   (0.0104) (0.0085)***   (0.0018)*** (0.0019)*** 
D-OBHC -0.0316 -0.0042   -0.0045 0.0285   -0.0017 0.0207 
 (0.0145)** (0.0246)   (0.0103) (0.0075)***   (0.0013) (0.0015)*** 
HERF 0.2465 0.3252   -0.0034 -0.0279   -0.0391 -0.0187 
 (0.2472) (0.2843)   (0.0968) (0.1413)   (0.0218)* (0.0251) 
SHARE-ML -0.2268 -0.1005   -0.0155 0.0554   0.0470 0.0364 
 (0.3275) (0.2323)   (0.1094) (0.1543)   (0.0231)** (0.0273) 
Ln(POP)  -0.0756 -0.0368   -0.0126 0.0263   0.0165 0.0102 
 (0.1069) (0.0806)   (0.0408) (0.0573)   (0.0083)** (0.0099) 
Ln(Density)  -0.0988 -0.0602   0.0044 0.0189   0.0244 0.0159 
 (0.1309) (0.1095)   (0.0542) (0.0742)   (0.0114)** (0.0138) 
INC-GROWTH 0.1898 0.1322   -0.0124 0.0094   0.0073 -0.0714 
 (0.1022)* (0.1322)   (0.0613) (0.0598)   (0.0100) (0.0126)*** 
Constant 0.6731 0.668   0.7807 0.1651   0.726 0.349 
 (0.1424)*** (0.2883)**   (0.0917)*** (0.0852)*   (0.0187)*** (0.0190)*** 
Quarter dummies YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Bank dummies YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Observations 9485 9485   16327 16327   324169 324169 
R2 0.867 0.856   0.87 0.902   0.836 0.883 
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.849     0.863 0.897     0.831 0.879 
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Table 2.7. The effect of capital on funding liquidity risk during the normal times and the period after the crisis emerged  
This table presents regression results. The dependent variables are the estimated NSFR based on our method. Higher value of NSFR indicates 
lower funding liquidity risk. Panel A and B report the results for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 
billion and $3 billion) and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion) during the period of 2001:Q1 to 2007:Q2, and the period of 2007:Q3 to 
2013:Q4, respectively. The exogenous variables are defined in Table 2.4. All regressions are run with both quarter dummies and bank dummies. 
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  Panel A: Period of 2001:Q1—2007:Q2   Panel B: Period of 2007:Q3—2013:Q4 
  
Large banks            
NSFR 
Medium banks            
NSFR 
Small banks            
NSFR   
Large banks            
NSFR 
Medium banks            
NSFR 
Small banks            
NSFR 
EQRAT -0.7077 -1.0254 0.4759 
 
-0.6084 -0.5306 0.6648 
 (0.2797)** (0.2186)*** (0.0601)*** 
 
(0.2667)** (0.1994)*** (0.0522)*** 
Ln(GTA) -0.0526 -0.0373 -0.0369 
 
-0.0445 -0.0636 -0.0720 
 (0.0234)** (0.0205)* (0.0044)*** 
 
(0.0233)* (0.0197)*** (0.0064)*** 
EARNVOL -0.0307 -0.0660 -0.0349 
 
0.0144 0.0319 -0.0770 
 (0.0740) (0.0647) (0.0054)*** 
 
(0.0134) (0.0127)** (0.0051)*** 
CREDIT RISK -0.8852 -0.6659 -1.0084 
 
-0.5345 -0.6917 -1.0873 
 (0.1118)*** (0.0857)*** (0.0246)*** 
 
(0.1098)*** (0.0660)*** (0.0244)*** 
ZSCORE -0.0004 -0.0016 0.0130 
 
0.0025 -0.0001 0.0125 
 (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0009)*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0011)*** 
ALLL Ratio -1.8577 2.5735 5.0424 
 
-1.5936 1.9927 2.0463 
 (0.8684)** (1.6100) (0.2873)*** 
 
(0.7199)** (0.5901)*** (0.1770)*** 
Retail&SMELoanRatio 0.0977 0.2102 0.1842 
 
0.2395 0.2807 0.2525 
 (0.0792) (0.0437)*** (0.0118)*** 
 
(0.0851)*** (0.0434)*** (0.0148)*** 
OtherEarningAssetRatio -0.1246 0.1711 0.1779 
 
0.0497 0.1501 0.1302 
 (0.1014) (0.0568)*** (0.0187)*** 
 
(0.1151) (0.0595)** (0.0189)*** 
Growth in Loan -0.2111 -0.1364 -0.3566 
 
-0.0443 -0.1947 -0.1928 
 (0.0642)*** (0.0669)** (0.0207)*** 
 
(0.0833) (0.0662)*** (0.0222)*** 
Growth in Income 0.0734 0.0358 -0.0095 
 
-0.0105 -0.0082 -0.0062 
 (0.0310)** (0.0218) (0.0040)** 
 
(0.0087) (0.0073) (0.0025)** 
InsuredDepRatio  0.0188 0.0175 0.0627 
 
0.1421 0.0626 -0.0377 
 (0.0900) (0.0540) (0.0162)*** 
 
(0.0923) (0.0436) (0.0175)** 
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D-M&A -0.0328 0.0049 -0.0160 
 
-0.0234 0.0004 -0.0111 
 (0.0095)*** (0.0071) (0.0029)*** 
 
(0.0076)*** (0.0041) (0.0032)*** 
D-PUBLIC 0.0356 0.0076 -0.0333 
 
0.0877 -0.0260 0.0322 
 (0.0443) (0.0332) (0.0102)*** 
 
(0.0292)*** (0.0253) (0.0129)** 
D-MBHC -0.0602 -0.0896 -0.0845 
 
-0.0814 -0.0496 -0.0696 
 (0.0706) (0.0278)*** (0.0063)*** 
 
(0.0387)** (0.0202)** (0.0085)*** 
D-OBHC -0.0317 -0.0545 -0.0305 
 
-0.0427 -0.0305 -0.0384 
 (0.0750) (0.0263)** (0.0042)*** 
 
(0.0359) (0.0177)* (0.0064)*** 
HERF 1.1731 -0.2522 -0.1674 
 
0.3464 0.5737 0.3196 
 (0.4753)** (0.3758) (0.0847)** 
 
(0.6759) (0.3129)* (0.1341)** 
SHARE-ML -1.0130 0.1515 0.1708 
 
-0.3427 -0.6878 -0.3922 
 (0.5824)* (0.4253) (0.0950)* 
 
(0.8439) (0.3423)** (0.1456)*** 
Ln(POP)  -0.3516 0.0259 0.0684 
 
-0.0602 -0.2634 -0.1222 
 (0.1942)* (0.1569) (0.0351)* 
 
(0.2785) (0.1282)** (0.0520)** 
Ln(Density)  -0.4270 0.1970 0.0890 
 
-0.0398 -0.3610 -0.1772 
 (0.2351)* (0.2132) (0.0473)* 
 
(0.3515) (0.1621)** (0.0764)** 
INC-GROWTH 0.0292 -0.6324 0.0673 
 
0.2009 0.1604 0.1563 
 
(0.3080) (0.2411)*** (0.0413) 
 
(0.2656) (0.1357) (0.0694)** 
Constant 1.8995 1.5375 1.3973 
 
1.5344 1.8141 1.8634 
 
(0.3962)*** (0.2709)*** (0.0602)*** 
 
(0.3842)*** (0.2979)*** (0.0846)*** 
Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5148 7945 177645 
 
4333 8378 146431 
R2 0.908 0.919 0.908 
 
0.895 0.893 0.916 
Adjusted R2 0.901 0.912 0.904   0.886 0.885 0.912 
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Table 2.8. Robustness Tests 
This table presents the results of robustness tests for large banks (GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA between $1 billion and $3 
billion) and small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion) separately. Panel A uses regulatory capital ratio (TOTRAT) instead of the equity-to-assets 
ratio (EQRAT). TOTRAT denotes the ratio of total capital to GTA, where total capital as defined in the Basel I capital standards (1988) is the sum 
of the bank’s Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital, and GTA equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer 
risk reserve. Panel B tests the effect of capital on funding liquidity risk for "strongly-capitalized" and "weakly-capitalized" banks in each size 
class. Strongly and weakly capitalized banks are defined as those in the top 25% and bottom 25% by EQRAT, respectively. Panel C tests the 
effect of capital on funding liquidity risk for "funding illiquid" and "funding liquid" banks in each size class. Banks in each size class with NSFR 
below 100% are classified as "funding illiquid banks", and with NSFR above 100% as "funding liquid banks".  Panel D estimates the NSFR based 
on the latest Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) revision to the NSFR. The revisions are captured in the consultation paper (BCBS, 
2014) published in January 2014. Table 2.9 shows the main changes since 2010. Panel E deals with the potential endogeneity issues by 
estimating a simultaneous equation model. In the capital ratio equation, EQRAT is regressed on NSFR and all the control variables defined in 
Table 2.4 as well as ROA and ROE. In the liquidity risk equation, NSFR is regressed on EQRAT and the full set of exogenous variables. The 
simultaneous equation system is estimated with two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression.  
To preserve space, all panels show only the coefficients on the key variables, although all the control variables (see Table 2.4) are included in 
the regressions. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Robustness  –  Use regulatory capital ratios 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Key variable 
Large banks            
NSFR 
Medium banks            
NSFR 
Small banks            
NSFR 
TOTRAT -0.7085 -0.7836 0.7557 
 (0.2014)*** (0.1546)*** (0.0409)*** 
    Observations 9485 16327 324169 
R
2
 0.871 0.886 0.888 
Adjusted R2 0.865 0.880 0.885 
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Panel B: Robustness  –  The effect of capital on liquidity risk for strongly-capitalized banks and weakly-capitalized banks in each size class 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
 
Large banks    
 
Medium banks      
 
Small banks  
Key variable 
Strongly-capitalized                                                                               
(Top 25%) 
Weakly-capitalized                                                                              
(Bottom 25%)   
Strongly-capitalized                                                                               
(Top 25%) 
Weakly-capitalized                                                                           
(Bottom 25%)   
Strongly-capitalized                                                       
(Top 25%) 
Weakly-capitalized                                            
(Bottom 25%) 
EQRAT -0.5923 0.1327 
 
-0.7604 -1.3465 
 
0.7804 0.3811 
 
(0.3145)* (0.5483) 
 
(0.3049)** (0.5702)** 
 
(0.0663)*** (0.1449)*** 
         Observations 2092 2250 
 
3673 4160 
 
71550 85331 
R2 0.881 0.917 
 
0.914 0.904 
 
0.911 0.888 
Adjusted R2 0.865 0.905 
 
0.903 0.891 
 
0.905 0.880 
                  
 
 
Panel C: Robustness  –  The effect of capital on liquidity risk for funding illiquid banks and funding liquid banks in each size class 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
 
Large banks             
 
Medium banks 
 
Small banks 
Key variable 
Illiquid banks       
   (NSFR<1) 
Liquid Banks 
(NSFR >1)   
Illiquid banks       
   (NSFR <1) 
Liquid Banks 
(NSFR >1)   
Illiquid banks         
(NSFR<1) 
Liquid Banks           
(NSFR>1) 
EQRAT -0.6501 -0.6583 
 
-0.9451 -0.4886 
 
0.1790 0.6452 
 
(0.2403)*** (0.3507)* 
 
(0.1565)*** (0.2689)* 
 
(0.0584)*** (0.0450)*** 
 
        
Observations 6647 2937 
 
8410 8031 
 
58465 268978 
R2 0.802 0.831 
 
0.786 0.846 
 
0.629 0.871 
Adjusted R2 0.789 0.811 
 
0.768 0.832 
 
0.599 0.866 
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Panel D: Robustness  –  Estimate NSFR based on the latest BCBS revision (BCBS, 2014) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Key variable 
Large banks            
NSFR_2014 
Medium banks            
NSFR_2014 
Small banks            
NSFR_2014 
EQRAT -0.6254 -0.9042 0.7908 
 
(0.2820)** (0.1824)*** (0.0574)*** 
    Observations 9485 16327 324169 
R2 0.871 0.892 0.895 
Adjusted R2 0.864 0.886 0.892 
        
 
 
Panel E: Robustness  －Estimate a simultaneous equation model  
   (1) (2) (3) 
Key variable Large banks Medium banks Small banks 
  Capital Equation 
   
    NSFR -0.0375 -0.0404 0.0035 
 
(0.0111)*** (0.0100)*** (0.0019)* 
            
    Liquidity Risk Equation    
    EQRAT -8.4174 -7.4222 10.0080 
 
(0.7180)*** (0.6896)*** (0.3128)*** 
    Observations 8825 15090 306023 
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Table 2.9. The Basel Committee’s January 2014 proposed revisions to the NSFR 
This table presents the revisions of NSFR since 2010. RM stands for remaining maturities. HQLA stands for High Quality Liquid Assets. NBFIs 
stands for non-bank financial institutions. SME stands for small- and medium-sized entity. RW stands for risk weight. SA stands for the Basel II 
standardized approach for credit risk. 
 
 
Dec 2010 Jan 2014 
ASF ASF factor ASF factor 
Stable deposits  90% 95% 
Less stable deposits  80% 90% 
Operational deposits  0% 50% 
Wholesale funding with RM of 6m-1y  0% 50% 
   
 
Dec 2010 Jan 2014 
RSF RSF factor RSF factor 
Unencumbered Level 1 securities with RM <1y  0% 5% 
Unencumbered Level 2a securities with RM <1y  0% 15% 
Unencumbered Level 2a securities with RM >=1y  20% 15% 
Unencumbered Level 2b securities with RM <1y  0% 50% 
Encumbered HQLAs with RM of 6m - 1y  0% 50% 
Non HQLA securities and non renewable loans to NBFIs with RM < 1y  0% 50% 
Wholesale lending with RM of 6m-1y  0% 50% 
Unencumbered loans to retail and SMEs with RW ≤ 35% under SA and RM of < 1y  65% 50% 
Unencumbered loans to retail and SMEs with RW > 35% under SA and RM of < 1y  85% 50% 
Unencumbered loans with RW≤ 35% under SA with RM ≥ 1y  65% 65% 
Unencumbered residential mortgages with RW≤ 35% under SA with RM ≥ 1y  65% 65% 
Other unencumbered performing loans with RW> 35% under SA with RM ≥ 1y  100% 85% 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EFFECTIVENESS IN PREDICTING BANK FINANCIAL DISTRESS OF THE 
NSFR MEASURE ADJUSTED FOR BROKERED DEPOSITS  
 
3.1 Introduction and literature review 
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s a surge of bank failures occurred in the United States 
due to regional economic difficulties. But thereafter, since 1995, very few bank failed. For 
instance, from 2003 to mid-2007 only two commercial banks failed each year on average. 
However, during the recent global financial crisis, a tremendous number of banks failed or were 
bailed out by government, which greatly surprised regulators and the financial community. 
According to an FDIC report, more than 300 banks were closed during 2008–2010 at an 
estimated cost of more than $80 billion. Hence, the ability to predict bank failures has drawn 
much attention. A model that can correctly forecast bank failures is a highly useful tool for 
supervisory authorities to prevent or mitigate the impact of a bank failure and reduce the costs 
of failures in future financial crises and economic recessions. 
 Over the past decades, a wide variety of methods have been employed to predict bank 
failure.53 The most popular and frequently used one is logistic regression. This method uses a 
non-normal distribution to determine the probability of an event occurring. Usually, it is 
estimated with internal bank data collected based on the CAMEL(S) bank rating system. The 
CAMEL(S) systems was developed and implemented in the late 1970s to assess the condition of 
a bank's capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management competence and expertise (M), 
                                                             
53 In this chapter we will not try to provide a complete literature review on the bank failure 
prediction model because recent papers by Tatom and Houston (2011) and Mayes and 
Stremmel (2014) contain extensive reviews; we refer interested readers to those studies for 
further depth. 
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earning ability and strength (E), Liquidity (L), and sensitivity to market risk (S), jointly referred to 
as CAMEL(S).54 As the ratings for each component are not released to the public, researchers use 
financial report data to compute the corresponding categories of variables underlying the 
CAMELS framework. Much of the early literature focuses on constructing the logit model with 
proxies for the C, A, and E components, where the liquidity component(L) is usually ignored.55 
However, a number of recent studies emphasize that financial market failures and liquidity 
shortage are among the root causes of the 2007-2009 financial crisis (Adrian and Shin, 2009; 
Allen and Carletti, 2008; Pedersen, 2008; Roulet, 2011). Liquidity risk has become a major risk 
factor for banks. Realizing the importance of liquidity risk in contributing to bank defaults, 
recent literature measures bank liquidity risk with simple liquidity ratios, such as the liquid 
assets to total deposits ratio or the total loans to total deposits ratio, and includes them in the 
logit model together with the other CAMELS proxies.56 Nevertheless, Poorman and Blake (2005) 
suggest that the use of liquidity ratios could be inaccurate on certain occasions. They show that 
a bank could go bankrupt as a result of its inability to fulfill obligations claimed on demand with 
its liquid assets, despite having a normal ratio of liquid assets to total assets. 57 Bonfim and Kim 
(2013) also point out that liquidity ratios do not take into account the maturity mismatch 
                                                             
54 Sensitivity to market risk, the "S" in CAMELS, was added in 1995 to address interest rate risk, 
i.e., the sensitivity of all loans and deposits to relatively abrupt and unexpected shifts in interest 
rates, which is a forward look approach. Before 1995, the framework was referred to as the 
CAMEL system.  
55 For instance, the models employed by Martin (1977), Avery and Hanweck (1984), Pantalone 
and Platt (1987), Abrams and Huang (1987), Berg and Hexeberg (1994), Estrella, Park and 
Peristiani (2000), Halling and Hayden (2006), Toma (2010), and Jin, Kanagaretnam and Lobo 
(2011) do not take into account the liquidity risk of banks. 
56 For instance, Kolari et al. (2002) use the total loans to total assets ratio, Tatom and Houston 
(2011) and Mayes and Stremmel (2014) use the total loans to total deposits ratio, Cole and 
White (2012) use liquid assets to total assets ratio. 
57 The Southeast Bank of Miami was closed in September 1991 when it was unable to repay 
some liabilities claimed on demand with its liquid assets although it had a ratio of liquid assets 
to total assets above 30%. 
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between assets and liabilities. In addition, Bradley and Shibut (2006), Borio (2010), and Huang 
and Ratnovski (2011), among many others, emphasize that both small and large banks are 
increasingly using wholesale funding sources, so they are exposed not only to traditional runs 
from depositors, but also to the drying up of funds in wholesale and interbank markets. In this 
regard, liquidity ratios that focus on deposits ignores the widely used alternative funding 
sources.  
 In recognition of the need to improve bank liquidity risk management, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision (BCBS) developed a framework for the bank 
liquidity risk regulation in Dec 2010. The new regulation is based upon two liquidity risk 
measures: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The NSFR 
measure is designed to promote longer term funding of assets and off-balance sheet (OBS) 
activities in times of stress and limit banks’ over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding 
sources. It is a complement to the LCR standard.58 The NSFR is defined as the ratio of the 
amount of stable funding a bank employs to the amount of assets and OBS commitments and 
obligations that would have to be funded. This ratio should be greater than 100% on an on-
going basis. A lower value of NSFR indicates that the amount of assets and OBS obligations that 
require funding support deviates from  the amount of available stable funding, thus the bank 
may experience more difficulty in meeting its liquidity needs. A higher value is associated with 
lower liquidity risk. As discussed in Chapter II, the advantage of the NSFR measure is that it 
includes the evaluation of the liquidity risk imbedded in different categories of assets, liabilities, 
as well as OBS items. Thus, the NSFR is a more comprehensive measure for capturing banks' 
                                                             
58 The Liquidity Coverage Ratio(LCR) is designed to promote short-term resiliency of a bank's 
liquidity risk profiles by ensuring that it has an adequate stock of unencumbered high-quality 
liquid resources to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. This 
ratio requires the use of monthly data to estimate, which is not available. So this chapter does 
not compute the LCR measure. 
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liquidity risk. One concern is that the NSFR measure does not deal with brokered deposits.59 The 
study by Bradley and Shibut (2006) notes that commercial banks’ use of brokered deposits has 
exploded in recent years.60 As brokered deposits are not based on a customer relationship, they 
can be withdrawn easily and quickly when banks are under stress (FDIC, 2011). Hence, banks 
that rely more on brokered deposits to fund their asset growth generally face more liquidity risk 
than those that rely less. Besides, recent work finds that high levels of brokered deposits 
increase the likelihood of bank failure (FDIC, 2011; Bennett and Unal, 2011; Flannery, 2011a, 
2011b; and Cole and White, 2012), and banks with higher levels of brokered deposits are more 
costly to the government in general when they do fail (Schaeck, 2008; FDIC, 2011; Bennett and 
Unal, 2011). In this context, a modified version of the NSFR measure incorporating the liquidity 
risk of brokered deposits (adjusted NSFR) is expected to perform no worse than the original 
NSFR measure as defined in the Basel III in explaining bank default probability. Thus far, most 
empirical studies on bank failure prediction models either do not consider liquidity risk in their 
logit model(see footnote 55), or use simple liquidity ratios as the proxy for the liquidity 
component(see footnote 56). 
  In this chapter, we examine whether the NSFR or the adjusted NSFR measure provide 
significant additional information to predict subsequent bank failures during the period of 2007-
2013 with a standard logit model. A small variation to the NSFR measure is made to 
accommodate banks' increasing use of brokered deposit, which is referred to as adj.NSFR. We 
estimate the NSFR and adj.NSFR in the same way as in chapter II with data collected from the 
FDIC Bank Call Report. We include virtually every US bank in the sample period.  We first fit the 
                                                             
59 The term “brokered deposit” is defined in the FDIC’s regulations as “any deposit that is 
obtained, directly or indirectly, from or through the mediation or assistance of a deposit 
broker.”( See 12 C.F.R. § 337.6(a)(2)) 
60 Commercial banks had $72.6 billion in brokered deposits at the end of 1990, and this number 
increased to $500 billion at the end of 2005. 
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logit model with each liquidity indicator individually (i.e., NSFR, adj.NSFR, or the four widely 
used liquidity ratios).61 In a further examination, we introduce both the adj.NSFR and each of the 
four liquidity ratios into the logit model. All the exogenous variables are lagged values created 
using quarterly data averaged over the previous four quarters, so that our out-of-sample 
prediction is realistic. We measure in-sample goodness-of-fit by likelihood value and out-of-
sample performance by the prediction accuracy.  
 We find that logit models based on historical information do work quite well. In 
particular, proxies for capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), earning ability and strength (E) and 
liquidity (L) ratings prove to be powerful predictors of bank failures during 2007–2013. We also 
find that the model with the adj.NSFR as liquidity indicator does perform better in explaining 
bank default probability in-sample than the model with the NSFR or simple liquidity ratios. 
Moreover, the model with both the adj.NSFR and liquid assets to total assets ratio(LA_TA) as the 
liquidity proxies provides tighter fit and more accurate in-sample prediction than the model with 
LA_TA alone. These results indicate the adj.NSFR measure adds predictive power to the model 
relying on simple liquidity ratios. The recursive out-of-sample tests show that the model with 
both the adj.NSFR and LA_TA is able to correctly classify more non-default banks than other 
models, while it forecasts less accurately for distressed banks than the model with LA_TA alone 
as the liquidity proxy. Besides, the model with the adj.NSFR though exhibits superior ability to 
detect default banks in-sample, does not have a clear advantage in out-of-sample prediction of 
failures over the model with LA_TA. These findings do not imply that we should restrict the use 
of the NSFR or the adj.NSFR measure in assessing banks' liquidity risk, but that a simple measure 
                                                             
61 The four widely used liquidity ratios are the liquid assets to total assets ratio(LA_TA), the 
liquid assets to total deposits ratio(LA_TDEP), the total loans to total assets ratio(LN_TA), and 
the total loans to total deposits ratio(LN_TDEP). 
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as LA_TA which is more difficult to manipulate, may also be a good indicator of underlying 
problems when things start to go wrong. 
 The evidence in the paper has several practical implications. First, in-sample diagnostic 
analysis alone is inadequate; examining out-of-sample predictive ability of the bank failure 
forecasting model is also important and necessary. Second, no single model is best and the 
relative prediction accuracy of these forecasting models tends to evolve over time with the size 
of the training sample and estimation time window. One feasible way to improve the overall 
prediction accuracy for a given critical value is to combine the forecasting results of two models 
(such as the model with the adj.NSFR and the model with LA_TA).  
 The findings in this chapter also have important policy implications. Supervisors with 
access to confidential data of banks should be able to make better judgments regarding the 
safety and soundness of commercial banks than we are able to with only published information. 
Improving the definition of bank liquidity risk is important, and the liquidity risk regulation and 
the capital adequacy standards proposed in the Basel III need to be implemented to promote a 
more stable banking sector. In addition, our results emphasize the importance of close and 
active monitoring of the use of brokered deposits and taking into account the possible impact of 
brokered deposits when computing the NSFR and LCR measures.  
 This chapter extends the current literature in several ways. Firstly, it adds to the strand 
of existing empirical studies on the NSFR measure, by applying a variation to the NSFR measure 
to accommodate brokered deposits. The NSFR measure is computed by following almost all the 
decompositions of on-balance and OBS categories and the associated weights proposed in the 
Basel III. Secondly, we examine both in-sample and out-of-sample performance of a series of 
bank failure forecasting models. Specifically, we adopt a recursive rolling window approach to 
exam the out-of-sample performance. Thirdly, this chapter includes almost all the U.S. 
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commercial banks rather than focusing on a small and restricted sample.62 Therefore, our results 
could be applied to the entire commercial banking industry. Fourthly, our sample period covers 
both crisis and post-crisis periods. Lastly, we carefully examine a series of subsamples which are 
composed of different numbers of randomly chosen non-failed banks and all the failed banks, 
and show that the ratio of non-failed banks to failed banks in the estimation sample could 
greatly affect the in-sample and out-of-sample prediction accuracy.63  
   The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. 
Section 3.3 presents the logit regression model and statistical procedures for estimation and 
forecast. Section 3.4 reports the empirical results. Robustness tests are shown in Section 3.5. 
Finally, section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data description 
 Our sample includes almost all commercial banks in the U.S that filed the call report 
over the 2007-2013 period, when bank failures were most common.64 Quarterly financial 
statements are collected from the Report of Condition and Income (also named as “Call 
Report”). The study also includes data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to compute 
the macroeconomic variables. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized 
                                                             
62 For instance, Barr and Siems (1997) use only non-De novo commercial banks that have total 
assets between $20 million and $200 million; Boyacioglu et al. (2009) use a data set of 21 failed 
banks and 44 non-failed banks; Kolari, Glennon et al. (2002) use a sample of 100 large banks; 
Roulet (2011) studies a sample of U.S. and European publicly traded commercial banks.   
63 A banks is defined as a "distressed" bank if the bank is failed or in distress and receiving 
assistance by a transaction from the FDIC. Throughout the chapter, the phrase "distressed 
banks" is used synonymously and interchangeably with the phrase "failed banks" or "default 
banks" unless the context suggests otherwise.  
64 Banks that do not have sufficient available data to calculate the adj.NSFR variable are 
excluded. 
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at the 1% level. All the dollar values are expressed in real 2009 dollars using the implicit GDP 
price deflator.  
 The information of failed banks since 2007 is extracted from FDIC. Over the sample 
period, 486 banks are identified as distressed or failed banks. Out of 486 banks, 13 banks got 
into distress and received assistance by a transaction from the FDIC, and 473 banks failed. We 
drop 38 troubled banks from the sample that do not have sufficient available data to compute 
the NSFR or adj.NSFR for the distressed period. The final sample consists of 448 events of bank 
distress (445 banks failures, and 3 banks receiving assistance). Table 3.1 shows the number of 
distressed banks every year for large, medium and small banks from 2001 to 2013.65 Not 
surprisingly, most of the failed banks are small banks.  
 
3.3 Empirical method  
3.3.1 Model description 
 The logit model is the most widely used approach to predict bank failure. This method 
uses a logistic distribution to compute the probability of a particular outcomes, such as a bank 
failure: 
                                                                                                   .     
otherwise       ,0
fails bank if  ,1




 i
Yi  
 The logit model ensures the estimated probability values range between zero and one. 
The general logit model and its cumulative probability distribution function are given by the 
following expressions: 
                                                             
65 Banks that do not have sufficient available data points for the troubled period are removed. 
Also, we follow Berger and Bouwman(2009)'s definitions to split the sample into large banks 
(GTA greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA in between $1 billion and $3 billion), and 
small banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). GTA is short for Gross Total Asset, which equals total 
assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve. 
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 In order to be comparable  with more related work, we use the logit model in our 
analysis. The logit model has several advantages. It is easy-to-implement and computationally 
more tractable. And it is an appropriate methodology to apply to large data sets both in terms of 
the number of determinants and the number of observations (Mayes and Stremmel, 2014). 
Although the results of the logit model are relatively sensitive to variable choices, the problem 
should be alleviated with an increasing number of observations (Kolari, 2002; Mayes and 
Stremmel, 2014). 
 The multivariate logit estimation is applied in a panel data environment. The dependent 
variable Y is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 at time t if the bank is failed or in distress 
and receives assistance by a transaction from the FDIC at time t + 1 and a value of 0 otherwise. 
As most default events are identified ex post and the values of some exogenous variables at 
time t + 1 are likely to be affected by the default event itself, we exclude all observations at time 
t + 1 from the panel for banks in default or distress at time t + 1 so as to mitigate feedback 
effects that are likely to disturb the relationship and to make out-of-sample prediction more 
realistic.66 One year of quarterly data is collected for each bank prior to failure (survival), and the 
quarterly data for each exogenous variable is averaged to provide a single measure for each 
bank at time t. The dependent variable tY  is regressed on the set of explanatory variables that 
correspond to time t. The multivariate logit model has the following specification:  
                                                             
66 We follow Roulet (2011)'s approach here.  
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where subscripts i and t denote bank and period, respectively. The vector of explanatory 
variables X contains: the proxy variables for capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management 
efficiency (M), earning ability and strength (E), and Liquidity (L) ratings, as well as three control 
variables.   
3.3.2 Determinants of bank financial distress 
 To be consistent with previous studies, we use a set of variables to represent capital 
adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management efficiency (M), earning ability and strength (E), and 
liquidity (L).  
 Capital adequacy is considered very important in the Basel framework for ensuring 
healthy banks, as Bank’s capital serves as a cushion to absorb losses and shocks. The decline in 
capital relative to assets is an indication for potential financial difficulties (Oshinsky et al., 2005; 
Campbell, 2007). This study uses the capital ratio as a proxy for capital adequacy.67 We expect 
that the capital ratio is negatively associated with the likelihood of bank default. 
 Asset quality is measured by the ratio of non-performing assets to total loans (NPA 
ratio).68 A higher ratio signals future trouble, as the bank is more vulnerable to losses by holding 
more uncollectible debt on their books. Hence, we expect a  positive relationship between the 
NPA ratio and bank failure probability.  
                                                             
67 Recent research shows that the capital ratio performs better than the risk-weighted capital 
ratio in explaining bank failure (Mayes and Stremmel, 2014).  
68 Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) defines "Nonperforming loans are those loans that 
bank managers classify as 90-days or more past due or nonaccrual in the call report". Studies by 
Halling and Hayden (2006), Tatom and Houston (2011), Cole and White (2012), and Mayes and 
Stremmel (2014), et al., apply the non-performing assets to total loans ratio. 
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 The efficiency ratio provided by FDIC is used to assess management quality.69 It is 
defined as a bank’s non-interest expense as a percent of net interest income plus noninterest 
income. The value of this ratio reflects the ability of managers to minimize operating costs. As 
high operating costs are likely to increase bank fragility, a positive sign is expected for the 
efficiency ratio in the determination of bank default probability.  
 We follow most empirical work and use return on assets (ROA) to represent earning 
ability. A higher level of profitability should allow banks to improve their capital and economic 
performance. A negative influence on the probability of bank failure is expected.  
 For liquidity risk, this chapter applies four most commonly used liquidity ratios in the 
recent literature as well as the original and adjusted NSFR measures so as to determine which 
one works best in bank failure prediction. The first one is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
(LA_TA, used in Arena, 2005; Cole and White, 2012). A higher value of this ratio indicates higher 
bank liquidity. The second one is the ratio of liquid assets to total deposits (LA_TDEP, used in 
Shen, et al., 2001; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014). The ratio indicates how much of unexpected 
deposit withdraw could be met by disposing the liquid assets. The lower the value of the ratio, 
the more illiquid the bank is and more vulnerable to a classic run on the bank. The third one is 
the total loans to total assets ratio (LN_TA, used in Kolari et al., 2002). As loans are generally 
long-term assets, a higher value of this ratio implies lower liquidity of the asset portfolio. The 
fourth one is the total loans to total deposits ratio(LN_TDEP, used in Alam et al., 2000; Tatom 
and Houston, 2011; Mayes and Stremmel, 2014). A higher value of this ratio indicates greater 
difficulty for a bank with more illiquid loans to meet the unexpected deposits withdraws. We 
                                                             
69 For instance, Hays, et al. (2009), Jacewitz and Kupiec (2012) and Mayes and Stremmel (2014) 
employ such ratios.  
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expect LA_TA and LA_TDEP are negatively related to the probability of bank failure, while LN_TA 
and LN_TDEP are expected to have a positive influence on the probability of bank failure.  
 Although the four liquidity ratios mentioned above are easy to calculate, they fail to 
consider the liquidity mismatch of assets and liabilities and alternative funding sources in 
assessing banks' liquidity risk. Thus, we employ the NSFR and adj.NSFR as alternative liquidity 
risk measures.70 The NSFR is one of two measures proposed in the Third Basel Accord to assess 
the liquidity risk. It is designed to promote longer term funding of assets and OBS activities in 
times of stress and limit banks’ over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding sources. The 
measure is calculated as  
     
                                       
                                      
  
                                                
                          
 
   
                  
 
                    
    
   
        
 
where ASF is defined as the portion of equity and liability financing expected to be reliable 
sources of funds over a one-year horizon, and RSF is a function of the liquidity characteristics of 
various types of assets held and OBS commitments and contingencies. The ASF and RSF factors 
range from 100 percent to 0 percent to reflect the stability of funding for liability categories and 
the liquidity of assets and OBS categories, respectively.71 A higher ASF factor is assigned to more 
stable and reliable funding sources, while relatively more liquid assets and OBS exposures 
                                                             
70 Roulet (2011) also employs the NSFR as a proxy for liquidity risk in the logit model. We 
highlight a few key differences between her approach and ours. First, Roulet (2011) estimates a 
simplified version of the NSFR due to the data limitation (See chapter II for a detailed discussion). 
Second, Roulet (2011) studies a sample of publicly traded commercial banks with annual data in 
the period of 2005 to 2009 extracted from Bloomberg. Third, we take a recursive rolling window 
approach to perform the out-of-sample tests for several periods, while Roulet (2011) exams the 
out-of-sample performance for just one period.   
71 Table 2.1 of Chapter II summarizes the composition of asset, liability, and OBS categories and 
the associated factors as defined in the Basel III Accord. 
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receive lower RSF factors. Generally, the larger the required amount of stable funding compared 
with the available amount of stable funding, the higher liquidity risk a bank exhibits. In other 
words, a lower value of the NSFR measure implies that a bank may experience more difficulties 
in meet its commitments and obligations. Hence, we expect a negative sign for the coefficient of 
the NSFR in determining bank failure probability. 
 Since the NSFR measure does not factor in brokered deposits, we apply a small variation 
to the NSFR to accommodate the increasing use of brokered deposits among large banks and 
small banks. Specifically, we take out the portion of deposits that are obtained through deposit 
brokers from all categories of deposits, and assign them new ASF factors whose values are one 
level lower than their original values.72 With all other details remaining the same, we again 
compute the NSFR. The result is adj.NSFR.73 The value of the NSFR and Adj. NSFR should be the 
same for banks with no brokered deposits. But a bank that accepts brokered deposits should 
have a smaller value of the adj.NSFR than the NSFR. The more brokered deposits a bank 
accumulates, the lower the value of the adj.NSFR. Similar to the NSFR, a lower value of the 
adj.NSFR indicates higher liquidity risk. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between 
the adj.NSFR and the likelihood of bank default.  
 Besides proxies for CAMEL ratings, we include a set of other explanatory variables as 
control variables. The natural log of bank GTA (Ln(GTA)) is included to control for bank size. On 
                                                             
72 For example, we subtract the portion of brokered deposits from the category of "insured 
saving deposits" with a 90% ASF factor, at the same time we give this portion of brokered 
deposits a new ASF factor of 80%. 
73 Call reports disclose the following information about the usage of brokered deposits in a bank: 
the total amount of brokered deposits, the amount of insured brokered deposits, the amount of 
insured brokered deposits with a remaining maturity(RM) of less than one year, as well as the 
amount of uninsured brokered deposits with a RM of less than one year. We make two 
assumptions to compute the adj.NSFR: first, brokered deposits with a RM of over one year are 
time deposits; second, the ratio of brokered time deposits with a RM of less than one year to 
brokered saving deposits is the same as the ratio of time deposits with a RM of less than one 
year to saving deposits. 
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one hand, smaller banks are generally more prone to failure than are larger banks. On the other 
hand, large banks might take excessive risk because of their "too-big-to-fail" position. Hence, the 
expected direction of influence is ambiguous. In addition, this study controls for the liquidity 
pressures on the interbank money market with the spread between the one-month LIBOR rate 
and the effective federal funds rate (LIBOR-DFF). A higher spread is typically interpreted as an 
indication of a decreased willingness to lend by major banks, which makes it more difficult for 
banks to borrow from the interbank market and will therefore increase the failure rate. But a 
lower spread indicates higher liquidity in the market. We expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of LIBOR-DFF in determining bank failure probability. The last control variable is the 
age of a bank (Age, in years). As younger banks are more prone to fail than are older banks (Cole 
and Whilte, 2012), a negative relationship is expected between Age and bank default probability. 
 Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of all exogenous variables for the total sample 
(Panel A), and separately for surviving banks and distressed banks in all size classifications (Panel 
B). Not surprisingly, the means values of the surviving and distressed groups are clearly 
different.74 Banks in distress have significantly lower average values of the capital ratio, ROA, 
and Age, but significantly higher average values of the NPA ratio and efficiency ratio than non-
failed banks. Regarding liquidity measures, distressed banks have significantly lower average 
values of the LA_TA, NSFR, and adj.NSFR but higher average value of the LN_TA than non-
distressed banks for all size classifications. What is worth noting is that banks in distress have 
average values of the NSFR or adj.NSFR lower than the 100% threshold, while surviving banks 
except the large ones on average meet the threshold. Our estimation suggests that the NSFR 
and adj.NSFR are very good indication of liquidity stress. The mean and standard deviation for 
                                                             
74 We do a t-test for significant differences in the means of the non-failed banks and troubled 
banks. For brevity, t-test results are not shown. Almost all the two group means are significantly 
different, except the average LN_TDEP. 
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the brokered deposits to total deposits ratio (BRKDEP_TDEP) for each size group is also 
reported. We notice that distressed banks have much higher BRKDEP_TDEP than the non-
distressed banks. Particularly, an average of 20.6% of deposits held by medium distressed banks 
are obtained through deposit brokers, while medium non-distressed banks only have 5.7% of 
total deposits in the form of brokered deposits on average. Thus, it might help in explaining 
bank default probability if the liquidity risk of brokered deposits is considered in the 
computation of the NSFR measure.    
 Table 3.3 shows the correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables. The 
variables representing the CAMEL ratings are weakly correlated with each other. Moreover, we 
check variance inflation factors and find no abnormality. Therefore, we don't need to worry 
about the multicollinearity problem in estimation.  
 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Logit regression results 
 In this part, we present our regression results. The logit regression model (Equation 
(3.4)) is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood over the 2007-2013 period. The 
standard errors are adjusted for correlation across time with the Huber–White method.75 The 
quality of the model fit is assessed by the log likelihood value and information criteria (AIC and 
BIC).  
 Recent studies examine a restricted sample of commercial banks, such as listed banks, 
large banks, small banks, or community banks. This study aims to test if a logit model with the 
                                                             
75 Thompson(2011) argues that there is no need to double-cluster at all if the dimensions are 
extremely unbalanced, while double-clustering is most important when the number of firms and 
time periods are not too different. In this study, the number of banks is far more than the 
number of periods, so we calculate the single-clustered standard errors. Our results remain the 
same if we use the double-clustered standard errors. 
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NSFR or adj.NSFR as the liquidity indicator can be applied to the entire commercial banking 
industry without restrictions, and if it has an advantage over models with simple liquidity ratios 
in detecting bank failures. However, distress events only take up 0.2% of all observations in our 
data sample. The estimated model would very likely incorrectly classify most of the distressed 
banks as survivors if all the 200,240 observations were included in the logit regression. To 
achieve our goals, we follow Tatom and Houston (2011)'s method of forming a training sample. 
We first determine a ratio of non-failed banks to distressed banks in a training sample. The ratio 
is referred to as R. Then R times as many non-failed banks as distressed ones are randomly 
drawn from each size group in each quarter without replacement.76 Tatom and Houston (2011) 
use a ratio of 2 in their analysis, which means one third of banks failed in the training sample. 
We allow R to take values from 2 to 70, and a training sample is constructed for each value of 
R.77 Logit regressions are run separately for each training sample, so that we are able to 
compare and find the most adequate training sample. For the sake of brevity, only the 
regression results for R equal to 6 are presented.78 The sample consists of 448 distressed banks 
(24 large banks, 36 medium banks, and 388 small banks), and 2688 non-failed banks (144 large 
banks, 216 medium banks, and 2328 small banks). 
 Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the logit regression results with each of the six liquidity 
proxies introduced into the model individually. Column 1 shows a significant negative 
                                                             
76 We follow Berger and Bouwman (2009)'s definitions to split the sample into large banks (GTA 
greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA in between $1 billion and $3 billion), and small 
banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). GTA is short for Gross Total Asset, which equals total assets 
plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve. 
77 The highest ratio of surviving banks to failed banks found in recent empirical studies is about 
70 (Roulet, 2011). 
78 When R is equal to 2, the coefficients of the efficiency ratio are not significant in all 
regressions. As we raise the value of R, we observe that the estimated coefficients of exogenous 
variables are similar to those obtained at R=6. But the AIC value increases. These results imply 
that increasing the number of non-failed banks relative to failed banks will reduce goodness-of-
fit of logit models. 
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relationship between adj.NSFR and bank failure, as is NSFR shown in Column 2. It indicates that 
liquidity pressures on banks are significantly damaging. Banks tend to be more fragile and thus 
more likely to fail following an exogenous and unexpected liquidity shock. The four liquidity 
ratios are all significant, and their coefficients have the expected signs (Columns 3 to 6). Higher 
liquid assets ratios are associated with a lower probability of default, while higher loan ratios are 
associated with a higher default probability. The coefficients of the other four CAMEL proxies 
are all highly significant and have the expected signs in all the regressions. Weak capital support 
as measured by the capital ratio is associated with a higher probability of failure, as is the 
deterioration of asset quality as assessed by the NPA ratio, inferior management efficiency as 
measured by the efficiency ratio, and lower earnings strength as measured by ROA. The size  
(Ln(GTA)) and age (Age) variables are generally not found to be significant, while the coefficients 
of the spread of the one-month LIBOR and federal funds rate (LIBOR-DFF) are significantly 
positive in all models. It implies that higher liquidity pressures on the interbank market are 
related with a higher likelihood of bank failure. This finding illustrates the importance of 
considering the impact of interbank market liquidity on individual bank failure. The goodness-of-
fit is assessed by likelihood value, AIC and BIC criteria.79 We find the model with the adj.NSFR 
(MODEL I) has the highest log likelihood value, and smallest AIC and BIC value, hence it offers 
                                                             
79 According to Long (1997), an equivalent statistic to R-squared  does not exist when analyzing 
data with a logistic regression. Some studies, such as Roulet (2011) and Tatom and Houston 
(2011), use McFadden Pseudo-R2 to measure how well the model fits the data. The Pseudo-R2 is 
calculated as 
)ˆ(
)ˆ(
1
onlyintercept 
model full2
LLog
LLog
R  , where model fullLˆ is the estimated likelihood value of the 
full model, and onlyintercept Lˆ is the estimated likelihood value of the model with intercept only. 
Higher values indicate better model fit. As a robustness check, we compute the Pseudo-R2 for 
the six models(not shown). Consistent with AIC and BIC criteria, the model with the adj.NSFR has 
higher Pseudo-R2 than others and hence provides better fit. 
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tighter fit than the models with the four simple liquidity ratios.80 And it performs a little better 
than the model with the NSFR (MODEL II), as their log likelihood values, AIC and BIC values are 
quite close. The findings emphasize the relevance and importance of including liquidity 
measures to explain bank failure probability, and the need of monitoring bank liquidity risk to 
promote a more stable banking sector.  
 To further test the prediction power of the adj.NSFR, we re-estimate the logit regression 
by introducing each liquidity ratio individually with the adj.NSFR. Panel B of Table 3.4 presents 
the results for the training sample with R equal to 6. We notice that the coefficients of the 
adj.NSFR are all significantly negative in the four models. In contrast, only the coefficient of 
LA_TA is significant and has the expected sign (MODEL VII, shown in Column 1). The LA_TDEP, 
LN_TA, and LN_TDEP lose significance in explaining bank default probability (shown in Columns 
2 to 4). This implies that the adj.NSFR captures a large part of the information provided by the 
simple liquidity ratios. In addition, a likelihood ratio test (LR) is performed to test the joint 
significance of regressors by comparing the log likelihood value of the full model with that of a 
model without the adj.NSFR as explanatory variable. The test statistics are all significant in the 
four models, suggesting that the adj.NSFR measure contains additional information that 
traditional liquidity ratios ignore and including the adj.NSFR adds significant explanatory power 
to the models relying on these simple liquidity ratios. Moreover, the logit regressions are rerun 
for a number of training samples.81 As we increase R from 2 to 70, the coefficients of the 
adj.NSFR keep significantly negative. However, the three liquidity ratios, i.e. LA_TDEP, LN_TA, 
and LN_TDEP, are not found to be significant for the vast majority of the training samples. Thus, 
                                                             
80 Generally, a lower AIC or BIC means a model is considered to be closer to the truth.  
81 For the sake of brevity, regression results are not shown for other training samples. 
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we do not include these three models in the following analysis. The experiment further supports 
the adj.NSFR is a robust predictor for bank default.  
3.4.2 In-sample prediction accuracy 
 We next evaluate the in-sample classification accuracy of the fitted logit models.82 
Following previous research, the critical value for failure probability is set equal to 0.5. If the 
probability of failure estimated with the logit model was greater than this value, it is considered 
as a failure. Figure 3.1 displays a scatter plot of the probability of failure estimated with MODEL I 
for each bank included in the "R=2" training sample. The failure probability varies between zero 
and one, and banks numbered 1 through 896 on the horizontal axis survive while banks 
numbered 897 through 1344 were in trouble. The two groups of banks are shown clearly to be 
distinct, as survivors generally have a failure probability smaller than 0.5, and banks in default or 
distress generally have a failure probability greater than 0.5. Figure 3.2 shows a scatter plot for 
the "R=6" training sample based on MODEL I. Banks numbered 1 through 2688 survive while 
banks numbered 2689 through 3136 failed. The patterns of the two groups are similar to those 
in Figure 3.1. However, it seems that the number of failed banks with estimated failure 
probability smaller than 0.5 increases, suggesting the prediction accuracy based on a larger 
training sample deteriorates. 
 Table 3.5 shows the in-sample prediction accuracy for the logit models based on 
different training samples. We observe that the percentage of overall correct classification is 
above 95%, regardless of the liquidity measures and R values, which is mainly due to the high 
correct prediction rate of non-default banks and the overwhelming majority of surviving banks 
                                                             
82 Since the three liquidity ratios, i.e. LA_TDEP, LN_TA, and LN_TDEP, are not significant with 
the introduction of adj.NSFR for most of the training samples, the predictive ability of the 
three models is quite similar to that of the model with adj.NSFR only as the liquidity risk 
indicator. For brevity, the classification accuracy for the three models are not reported. 
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in comparison to distressed banks. Not surprisingly, prediction accuracy of failures worsens and 
prediction accuracy of survivals improves as the number of surviving banks in the training 
sample increases. The model with the adj.NSFR (MODEL I) has the highest overall prediction 
accuracy, and the highest percentage of correct prediction of bank failures for most of the R 
values. Hence, both model fitness tests and in-sample prediction accuracy tests show that 
MODEL I outperforms the other models, which implies that the adj.NSFR does have an 
advantage over simple liquidity ratios in explaining and identifying bank failures in-sample.  
 When R is equal to 6, MODEL I correctly classifies 84.82% of failed banks, and 98.77% of 
surviving banks, thus the model misclassifies 15.18% of failed banks as survivors (Type I error) 
and 1.23% of non-failed banks as in financial distress (Type II error). We are more interested in 
the model that provides highly accurate classification of failed banks. However, as the number 
of surviving banks is so large, even a small decrease in prediction accuracy of survivals could 
result in a sizeable amount of surviving banks being falsely classified as failed banks. Therefore, 
an ideal model should also have a limited type II prediction error. In this regard, the training 
sample with R equal to 15 is preferred over other samples. As R increases from 6 to 15, the type 
I error increases about 1%, and the type II error decreases 0.7% to about 0.5%. However, the 
type I error increases over 5%, and the type II error decreases less than 0.06% when R further 
increases to 25. Hence a training sample with a ratio of randomly selected non-failed banks to 
failed banks equal to 15 is adequately representative of the survival banks and produces in-
sample prediction results with a well-balanced composition of type I and type II errors.  
3.4.3 Out-of-sample prediction accuracy 
 As it is also interesting to consider whether the models could be used as a forecasting 
tool to identify future bank failures by regulators, we examine the out-of-sample one-step-
ahead predictive ability of the logit models. We apply a recursive rolling regression, with the 
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starting year fixed at 2007. For each year of 2009 to 2012 the model is re-estimated to take all 
the available data in a training sample into account.83 First, the model is estimated on the period 
2007 to 2009 and out-of-sample classifications are performed on the year 2010. We then roll 
the end date of the panel forward a year at a time until 2012 and predict failures in the next 
year.84 As mentioned in Section 3.3, to make our out-of-sample forecast more realistic, the 
explanatory variables are all lagged one period relative to bank failure or distress events. 
Moreover, the out-of-sample data covers all observations in the forecasting year.85 We expect 
that the in-sample and out-of-sample prediction ability rises with a growing window size. Table 
3.6 reports the forecasting performance of different time windows. In almost all cases, the 
coefficients of the adj.NSFR, NSFR and LA_TA are significant and have the expected sign except 
for the time window of 2007-2009 with the "R=2" training sample. However, LA_TDEP, LN_TA, 
and LN_TDEP are found significant mainly for training samples with R greater than 25 at a 
window size of over 4 years. These findings confirm that MODEL I, II, III, and VII are more robust. 
Therefore, we only show results for the four models in Table 3.6 for brevity. 
 Panel A shows the evaluation for the logit model with the adj.NSFR as the liquidity 
indicator (MODEL I). The quality of the in-sample classification of both distressed banks and 
survivors improves steadily as window size increases. However, the out-of-sample performance 
is quite different from in-sample. The prediction accuracy of failed banks based on the time 
windows of 2007-2009 and 2007-2010 is extremely good, outperforming the in-sample 
                                                             
83 Some proxies for CAMEL ratings are not significant when the model is estimated with the 
2007 and 2008 data only. In order to make prediction results comparable, the estimation 
window starts from 2007-2009.   
84 As a robustness check, we roll the end date of the panel forward a quarter at a time until 
2013:Q3 and predict failures in the next quarter. Our main conclusion does not change.  
85 We give out-of-sample forecasts for all banks in the next year. Thus we are able to check how 
well the non-default banks in the training sample represent all surviving banks, which is 
indicated by the out-of-sample prediction accuracy for survivors. 
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forecasts. Over 92% of failed banks in the out-of-sample period of 2010 are correctly detected 
regardless of training samples. The percentage of correct prediction of failures in the out-of-
sample period of 2011 improves to 100% for the relative smaller training samples. However, the 
quality of the out-of-sample prediction for failures greatly deteriorates when 2011 or 2012 data 
is added, indicating that the features of bank failures change after the global financial crisis. 
Similar to what we find in Table 3.5, for each estimation window, the type I error of one-step-
ahead out-of-sample forecast is positively related with the value of R. In sharp contrast, the type 
II error is inversely related with the value of R and the window size. Overall, the combined 
prediction accuracy beats the in-sample forecasts and exceeds 96% for all training samples.
 The out-of-sample prediction accuracy of failures for the model with the NSFR as the 
liquidity indicator (MODEL II) is very close to that of MODEL I. However, MODEL I shows a 
smaller Type II error. These results suggest that the variation to the NSFR to accommodate 
brokered deposits can help increase the overall predictive power.  
 Panel C shows the results for the model with LA_TA as the liquidity proxy (MODEL III). 
MODEL III generally misclassifies more non-failed banks as in financial distress than MODEL I 
regardless of in-sample or out-of-sample. It is worth noting that MODEL I is able to correctly 
detect 2% more distressed banks in-sample, in some cases over 6%, than MODEL III, but the 
advantage of MODEL I is not so obvious in the out-of-sample forecast. For the time window of 
2007-2011, MODEL I performs worse than MODEL III in predicting failures in 2012. These results 
suggest that superior in-sample prediction cannot guarantee the model will perform well out-of-
sample, which is in line with the findings of Hong, et al. (2004).86 One possible reason may be 
the existence of structural breaks or regime shifts in the sample data.  
                                                             
86 Hong, et al. (2004) study the out-of-sample performance of a wide variety of spot rate 
models in forecasting the probability density of future interest rates. They find that two 
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 Panel D presents the forecasting results for MODEL VII which include both the adj.NSFR 
and LA_TA. Similar to MODEL I, its in-sample classification accuracy of both survivors and 
distressed banks is much higher than MODEL III, while it forecasts failed banks less accurately in 
the out-of-sample period of 2012 than MODEL III. Since MODEL VII is more complicated than 
MODEL III, it can always fit a given dataset better than a parsimonious model such as MODEL III. 
However, it may overfit some idiosyncratic features of the data, which may adversely affect the 
out-of-sample prediction accuracy (Hong et al., 2004). Besides, unforeseen structural breaks in 
the sample data also have an influence on the out-of-sample predictive ability. Therefore, 
MODEL VII is not found to outperform the other three models in out-of-sample forecasts of 
failures. By simply comparing the log likelihood values of two nested models, Roulet (2011) 
concludes that introduction of the inverse of the NSFR measure significantly adds predictive 
value both in-sample and out-of-sample to the models that rely on simple liquidity ratios. As log 
likelihood values are estimated with in-sample data, it is not appropriate to draw a conclusion 
without comparing the out-of-sample prediction precision of the two models. Moreover, Roulet 
(2011) performs the out-of-sample forecasts for only one period, making their conclusions less 
convincing. 
 In a further examination of forecasts based on the estimation window of 2007-2011, we 
find that although MODEL III correctly identifies more failed banks than MODEL I, about 8% of 
failed banks that are correctly classified by MODEL I are falsely predicted as survivors by MODEL 
III. This finding suggests that combining the forecasts of MODEL I and MODEL III may improve 
the prediction accuracy of failures. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
types of nonlinear drift models have the worst out-of-sample density forecasts, although 
they have the highest in-sample likelihood values.  
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  To sum up, from the out-of-sample tests we find no single best forecasting model, and 
the relative prediction accuracy of models tends to evolve over time with the size of the training 
sample and estimation window. Moreover, a parsimonious model, like MODEL III, seems to 
forecast more accurately out-of-sample than the relatively more complicated model, such as 
MODEL VII.  
 
3.5 Robustness checks 
 In this section, several robustness checks are performed. Our main conclusions are not 
altered. 
 First, we consider the possible colinearity issues of the adj.NSFR with the four liquidity 
ratios. We orthogonalize the adj.NSFR variable with each liquidity ratio, and re-estimate the 
logit models. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Panel B of Table 3.4(For brevity, 
regression results are not shown). The coefficients of the orthogonalized adj.NSFR are 
significantly negative in all regressions, while only the coefficients of LA_TA are significant and 
have the expected sign. The other three liquidity ratios do not enter significantly for most of the 
training samples. Moreover, we also apply the recursive rolling regression approach to the 
model with both LA_TA and the corresponding orthogonalized adj.NSFR as the liquidity risk 
measures. Its in-sample and out-of-sample predictive ability is almost the same as MODEL VII. 
Hence, our main findings are robust to the choice of original value or orthogonalized value of 
the adj.NSFR.  
 Second, we check if the logit model with the adj.NSFR (MODEL I) has the same 
predictive ability as the model with the NSFR and the brokered deposit ratio introduced 
simultaneously. The logit regression results based on the "R=6" training sample are shown in 
Table 3.7. In line with the findings of recent studies on brokered deposits (e.g., FDIC, 2011; 
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Bennett and Unal, 2011; Flannery, 2011a, 2011b; Cole and White, 2012), the coefficient of the 
brokered deposit ratio is significantly positive, implying that banks relying on more brokered 
deposits tend to have a higher probability of failure. The coefficient of the NSFR is significant 
and has the expected sign. The in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts are shown in Table 3.8. 
We find that it has the smallest out-of-sample type II error, and the highest type I error, 
compared with MODEL I, II, and III. This implies that incorporating brokered deposits in the NSFR 
measure is a better way to account for the impact of brokered deposits in the bank failure 
prediction model. 
 Third, we allow critical values to vary in a wide range and see if a change in the critical 
value alters our main results. According to Barr and Siems (1997) and Tatom and Houston 
(2011), a change in the critical value could substantially affect type I and type II prediction 
errors. Increasing the critical value for the probability of failure, more banks will be classified as 
survivors, and vice versa. Table 3.9 shows the out-of-sample performance for various critical 
values based on the "R=15" training sample. For the sake of brevity, only MODEL I and MODEL III 
are reported. We observe that based on MODEL I, the prediction accuracy of non-failed banks 
does not decrease below 90% even when the critical value is set to 0.025 (not shown here). For 
the out-of-sample period of 2010, we are able to correctly identify over 91% of failed banks with 
MODEL I when the critical value is raised to 0.8. However, for the period of  2012, we need to 
decrease the critical value below 0.3 to obtain a prediction accuracy of default banks that is 
greater than 90%. Besides, we find that MODEL I produces consistently higher quality 
forecasting results for non-failed banks than MODEL III, when the critical value increases from 
0.1 to 0.9. However, MODEL III has a smaller out-of-sample Type I error based on the estimation 
window of 2007-2011 for most of the critical values. Hence, our main conclusions are robust to 
the choice of critical values.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, proxies for bank-specific CAMEL ratings are included in a model with 
bank size, age and macroeconomic variables. Our goal is to investigate the advantage of using 
the brokered deposits adjusted NSFR measure (adj.NSFR) over the traditional liquidity ratios as 
the liquidity proxy in predicting bank financial distress with a standard logit model. We include 
virtually every US bank during the period of 2007-2013.  
 We find that proxies for capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management efficiency 
(M), earning ability and strength (E) and liquidity (L) are powerful predictors of bank failures 
during the sample period. We also find that the model with the adj.NSFR as the liquidity 
indicator does perform better in explaining bank default probability in-sample than the model 
with the NSFR or simple liquidity ratios. Moreover, the model with both the adj.NSFR and the 
liquid assets to total assets ratio(LA_TA) as the liquidity proxies provides tighter fit and more 
accurate in-sample prediction than the model with LA_TA alone. These results indicate the 
adj.NSFR measure adds predictive power to the model relying on simple liquidity ratios in-
sample.  
 The recursive out-of-sample tests show that the model with both the adj.NSFR and 
LA_TA is able to correctly identify more non-distressed banks than other models, while it 
forecasts less accurately for distressed banks than the model with LA_TA alone as the liquidity 
proxy. Despite the fact that the model with the adj.NSFR shows superior ability to detect default 
banks in-sample, it does not exhibit a clear advantage over the model with LA_TA in the out-of-
sample prediction of failures. More importantly, the overall prediction accuracy in the out-of-
sample period is generally better than that in the in-sample period, and exceeds 96% (critical 
value =0.5) regardless of training samples and estimation windows. These findings imply that in-
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sample diagnostic analysis alone is inadequate, and it is also important and necessary to 
examine the out-of-sample predictive ability of the bank failure forecasting model. Our results 
are robust to alternative training samples, alternative critical values, and choice of original or 
orthogonalized values of the adj.NSFR.  
 The In-sample and out-of-sample analysis offers strong support for the CAMEL approach 
to judge the safety of commercial banks, and points out the relevance and benefits of employing 
the adj.NSFR as the liquidity proxy to explain bank failure. The results also suggest that the 
model with LA_TA could be a supplementary method to the model with the adj.NSFR, since the 
relative out-of-sample prediction accuracy of the two models evolves over time and with the 
size of training sample and estimation window. From a policy perspective, these findings 
highlight the importance of improving the definition of bank liquidity risk and implementing the 
capital adequacy standards as well as the liquidity risk regulation as proposed in the Basel III to 
strengthen the stability of the banking sector. In addition, our results emphasize close and active 
monitoring of the use of brokered deposits and taking into account the possible impact of 
brokered deposits when computing the NSFR and LCR measures.  
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Figure 3.1. In-sample probability of failure for the training sample with R equal to 2.  
The failure probability is estimated with MODEL I which uses the adj.NSFR measure as the 
liquidity risk indicator. R is defined as the ratio of non-failed banks to distressed banks in a 
training sample. Banks numbered 1 through 896 on the horizontal axis survive while banks 
numbered 897 through 1344 were in trouble.  
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Figure 3.2. In-sample probability of failure for the training sample with R equal to 6.  
The failure probability is estimated with MODEL I which uses the adj.NSFR measure as the 
liquidity risk indicator. R is defined as the ratio of non-failed banks to distressed banks in a 
training sample. Banks numbered 1 through 2688 survive while banks numbered 2689 
through 3136 failed.  
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Table 3.1. Number of banks failed or received assistance by a transaction from the FDIC during 
the period of 2001-2013.  
Banks that do not have sufficient available data points for the troubled period are removed. And 
we follow Berger and Bouwman (2009)'s definitions to split the sample into large banks (GTA 
greater than $3 billion), medium banks (GTA in between $1 billion and $3 billion), and small 
banks (GTA smaller than $1 billion). GTA is short for Gross Total Asset, which equals total assets 
plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve. 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 All 
Large 
Banks 
. . . . . . 10 8 6 . . . 24 
Medium 
Banks 
1 1 . . . . 7 17 7 4 . 1 38 
Small 
Banks 
7 4 4 1 1 3 31 111 113 71 35 24 405 
All 8 5 4 1 1 3 48 136 126 75 35 25 467 
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Table 3.2. Summary statistics of exogenous variables during the 2007-2013 period.  
The sample includes almost all commercial banks in the U.S that file the call report over the 2007-2013 period. Capital ratio is calculated as 
total equity capital divided by GTA. NPA ratio is defined as non-performing loans to total loans, where nonperforming loans are those loans 
that bank managers classify as 90-days or more past due or nonaccrual in the call report. Efficiency ratio provided by FDIC is defined as a bank’s 
non-interest expense as a percent of net interest income plus noninterest income. ROA is calculated as net income divided by GTA. NSFR is 
calculated as the available amount of stable funding (ASF) divided by the required amount of stable funding (RSF). Adj.NSFR is the NSFR 
measure adjusted for brokered deposits. LA_TA denotes the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. LA_TDEP denotes the ratio of liquid assets to 
total deposits. LN_TA denotes total loans to total assets ratio. LN_TDEP denotes total loans to total deposits ratio. Ln(GTA) denotes the natural 
log of bank GTA. Age denotes the age of a bank in years. BRKDEP_TDEP is calculated as brokered deposits divided by total deposits. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the total sample 
 
Total Sample 
N Mean Std 
    
Capital Ratio 200240 0.111 0.05 
NPA Ratio 200161 0.021 0.03 
Efficiency Ratio 199624 0.758 0.27 
ROA(annualized) 200240 0.37% 0.46 
NSFR 200240 1.239 0.35 
adj.NSFR 200240 1.236 0.35 
LA_TA 200240 0.289 0.16 
LA_TDEP 200223 0.355 0.19 
LN_TA 200240 0.627 0.16 
LN_TDEP 200223 0.772 0.21 
Ln(GTA) 200240 12.02 1.23 
Age 200240 70.22 44.1 
BRKDEP_TDEP 200223 0.035 0.07 
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 Panel B: Summary statistics for large banks, medium banks and small banks 
  
Large Banks   Medium Banks   Small Banks 
Surviving Banks 
 
Distressed Banks 
 
Surviving Banks 
 
Distressed Banks 
 
Surviving Banks 
 
Distressed Banks 
N Mean Std   N Mean Std   N Mean Std   N Mean Std   N Mean Std   N Mean Std 
                        
Capital 
ratio 
5976 0.117 0.04 
 
24 0.069 0.04 
 
10063 0.104 0.04 
 
36 0.055 0.03 
 
183753 0.112 0.05 
 
388 0.049 0.01 
NPA ratio 5976 0.028 0.03 
 
24 0.083 0.05 
 
10050 0.027 0.03 
 
36 0.119 0.03 
 
183687 0.021 0.03 
 
388 0.116 0.04 
Efficiency 
ratio 
5935 0.642 0.25 
 
22 1.000 0.51 
 
10030 0.692 0.24 
 
30 1.462 0.45 
 
183258 0.764 0.27 
 
349 1.522 0.48 
ROA 5976 0.63% 0.03 
 
24 -7.57% 0.10 
 
10063 0.54% 0.02 
 
36 -7.62% 0.08 
 
183753 0.37% 0.48 
 
388 -7.78% 0.1 
NSFR 5976 0.962 0.28 
 
24 0.822 0.18 
 
10063 1.040 0.28 
 
36 0.881 0.14 
 
183753 1.260 0.35 
 
388 0.975 0.21 
adj.NSFR 5976 0.955 0.27 
 
24 0.815 0.17 
 
10063 1.036 0.28 
 
36 0.872 0.13 
 
183753 1.257 0.35 
 
388 0.969 0.21 
LA_TA 5976 0.269 0.15 
 
24 0.215 0.13 
 
10063 0.262 0.14 
 
36 0.182 0.1 
 
183753 0.291 0.16 
 
388 0.191 0.1 
LA_TDEP 5976 0.385 0.21 
 
24 0.430 0.26 
 
10061 0.339 0.18 
 
36 0.225 0.13 
 
183738 0.355 0.19 
 
388 0.215 0.11 
LN_TA 5976 0.633 0.16 
 
24 0.681 0.15 
 
10063 0.659 0.14 
 
36 0.718 0.1 
 
183753 0.625 0.16 
 
388 0.678 0.1 
LN_TDEP 5976 0.868 0.23 
 
24 0.936 0.25 
 
10061 0.847 0.19 
 
36 0.866 0.12 
 
183738 0.765 0.20 
 
388 0.761 0.13 
Ln(GTA) 5976 15.40 0.2 
 
24 15.32 0.17 
 
10063 14.27 0.31 
 
36 14.28 0.34 
 
183753 11.78 0.96 
 
388 12.07 0.92 
Age 5976 76.14 52.2 
 
24 42.38 33 
 
10063 68.86 45.8 
 
36 41.08 35.3 
 
183753 70.18 43.7 
 
388 36.68 39 
BRKDEP 
_TDEP 
5976 0.069 0.1 
 
24 0.145 0.15 
 
10061 0.057 0.09 
 
36 0.206 0.14 
 
183738 0.032 0.07 
 
388 0.085 0.12 
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Table 3.3. Correlations among the explanatory variables for the period of 2007-2013.  
This table presents the Pearson’s coefficients of correlation for the explanatory variables during the period of 2007-2013, and p-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
Variable 
Capital 
Ratio 
NPA Ratio 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ROA adj.NSFR LA_TA LA_TDEP LN_TA LN_TDEP Age Ln(GTA) 
Capital Ratio 1.00 
           
           NPA Ratio -0.0621 1.0000 
          (0.0000)  
Efficiency Ratio 0.1783 0.2421 1.0000 
         (0.0000) (0.0000)  
ROA -0.0071 -0.1745 -0.0477 1.0000 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
adj.NSFR 0.2625 -0.0827 0.0891 -0.0026 1.0000 
       (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0729)  
LA_TA 0.1103 -0.0301 -0.0189 -0.0017 0.6715 1.0000 
      (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2525) (0.0000)  
LA_TDEP 0.2204 -0.0347 -0.0106 0.0307 0.6261 0.9503 1.0000 
     (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
LN_TA -0.2633 0.0144 -0.1030 0.0084 -0.7582 -0.8916 -0.8750 1.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
LN_TDEP -0.0679 0.0028 -0.0744 0.0035 -0.7412 -0.8392 -0.7307 0.9059 1.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0555) (0.0000) (0.0169) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Age -0.0660 -0.0160 -0.1801 0.0090 0.1485 0.2207 0.1908 -0.1373 -0.1464 1.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Ln(GTA) -0.2091 0.0702 -0.2162 0.0096 -0.3706 -0.1361 -0.0743 0.1826 0.2643 -0.0060 1.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
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Table 3.4. Logit regression results for the training sample with R equal to 6. 
This table shows the results of estimating equation (3.4) with a standard logit model. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 at time t if the bank is failed 
or in distress and receives assistance by a transaction from the FDIC at time t + 1 and a value of 
0 otherwise. The logit regression is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood for a 
training sample with R equal to 6 over the 2007-2013 period. R denotes the ratio of non-failed 
banks to distressed banks in a training sample. R times as many non-failed banks as distressed 
ones are randomly drawn from each size group in each quarter without replacement. There 
are 448 distressed banks (24 large banks, 36 medium banks, and 388 small banks), and 2688 
non-failed banks (144 large banks, 216 medium banks, and 2328 small banks) in the "R=6" 
training sample. The quality of the model fit is assessed by the log likelihood value and 
information criteria. The likelihood ratio test (LR) in Panel B is performed to test the joint 
significance of regressors by comparing the likelihood of the model with that of a model 
without adj.NSFR as explanatory variable. The standard errors are adjusted for correlation 
across time with Huber–White method. The p-value for the chi-square statistics is shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: the logit regression results with each of the six liquidity proxies introduced into the model individually(R=6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV MODEL V MODEL VI 
  adj.NSFR NSFR LA_TA LA_TDEP LN_TA LN_TDEP 
Intercept 5.783 5.448 -0.14 -1.12 -3.297 -2.155 
(0.040)** (0.051)* (0.937) (0.551) (0.032)** (0.224) 
adj.NSFR -3.9      
(0.000)***      
NSFR  -3.729     
 (0.000)***     
LA_TA   -5.838    
  (0.000)***    
LA_TDEP    -2.547   
   (0.091)*   
LN_TA     2.803  
    (0.004)***  
LN_TDEP      2.135 
     (0.002)*** 
Capital ratio -76.594 -76.252 -76.592 -74.727 -74.705 -76.084 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
NPA ratio 19.468 19.514 20.291 19.699 20.493 21.354 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Efficiency 
ratio 
1.917 1.926 1.945 1.971 2.088 2.079 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
ROA -1.095 -1.084 -1.143 -1.07 -1.036 -0.984 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Ln(GTA) -0.069 -0.056 0.18 0.209 0.16 0.085 
(0.553) (0.628) (0.098)* (0.042)** (0.160) (0.458) 
Age 0 0 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.898) (0.962) (0.855) (0.626) (0.589) (0.551) 
LIBOR_DFF 1.213 1.219 1.193 1.22 1.241 1.235 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
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AIC 761 764.49 777.2 800.73 802.83 802.2 
BIC 815.46 818.94 831.66 855.19 857.28 856.65 
2 Log L -743 -746.49 -759.2 -782.73 -784.83 -784.2 
# of Obs. 3136 3136 3136 3136 3136 3136 
# of failures 448 448 448 448 448 448 
  
Panel B: the logit regression results with each of the four liquidity ratios and adj.NSFR introduced simultaneously(R=6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 MODEL VII MODEL VIII MODEL IX MODEL X 
  Adj.NSFR & LA_TA Adj.NSFR & LA_TDEP Adj.NSFR & LN_TA Adj.NSFR & LN_TDEP 
Intercept 5.051 5.536 6.014 5.998 
(0.100) (0.051)* (0.013)** (0.034)** 
adj.NSFR -3.159 -3.744 -3.949 -3.975 
(0.011)** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
LA_TA -3.189    
(0.019)**    
LA_TDEP  -0.647   
 (0.612)   
LN_TA   -0.202  
  (0.764)  
LN_TDEP    -0.208 
   (0.695) 
Capital ratio -78.097 -76.972 -76.541 -76.421 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
NPA ratio 19.692 19.328 19.445 19.345 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Efficiency ratio 1.856 1.887 1.915 1.915 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
ROA -1.19 -1.129 -1.089 -1.093 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Ln(GTA) -0.008 -0.043 -0.072 -0.066 
(0.952) (0.689) (0.516) (0.567) 
Age 0.001 0 0 0 
(0.737) (0.876) (0.914) (0.914) 
LIBOR_DFF 1.177 1.201 1.216 1.217 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
AIC 754.42 762.19 762.96 762.92 
BIC 814.93 822.7 823.47 823.43 
2 Log L -734.42 -742.19 -742.96 -742.92 
LR 24.78*** 40.54*** 41.87*** 41.28*** 
# of Obs. 3136 3136 3136 3136 
# of failures 448 448 448 448 
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Table 3.5. In-sample prediction accuracy for the logit models based on different training 
samples. 
This table reports the in-sample prediction accuracy for the seven logit models based on 6 
training samples. The critical value is 0.5. The number of banks in default or distressed in every 
training sample is 448. R times as many non-failed banks as distressed ones are randomly drawn 
from each size group in each quarter without replacement.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
MODEL 
 I 
MODEL  
II 
MODEL  
III 
MODEL 
 IV 
MODEL  
V 
MODEL  
VI 
MODEL 
VII 
  
adj.NSFR NSFR LA_TA LA_TDEP LN_TA LN_TDEP 
Adj.NSFR 
& LA_TA 
       
 
# of Distressed Banks 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 
R=2 
      
 
# of Observations 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 
Overall % correct 97.173% 97.098% 96.503% 96.652% 96.652% 96.652% 96.726% 
Failure(Y=1) % correct 94.643% 94.643% 93.750% 93.973% 93.973% 93.973% 93.973% 
Survival(Y=0) % correct 98.438% 98.326% 97.879% 97.991% 97.991% 97.991% 98.103% 
R=6 
      
 
# of Observations 3136 3136 3136 3136 3136 3136 3136 
Overall % correct 96.779% 96.716% 96.429% 96.460% 96.460% 96.460% 96.875% 
Failure(Y=1) % correct 84.821% 84.375% 83.482% 83.482% 83.036% 83.036% 85.045% 
Survival(Y=0) % correct 98.772% 98.772% 98.586% 98.624% 98.698% 98.698% 98.847% 
R=15 
      
 
# of Observations 7168 7168 7168 7168 7168 7168 7168 
Overall % correct 98.479% 98.479% 98.438% 98.438% 98.424% 98.410% 98.438% 
Failure(Y=1) % correct 83.482% 83.482% 82.589% 82.813% 82.813% 82.813% 83.259% 
Survival(Y=0) % correct 99.479% 99.479% 99.494% 99.479% 99.464% 99.449% 99.449% 
R=25 
      
 
# of Observations 11648 11648 11648 11648 11648 11648 11648 
Overall % correct 98.712% 98.729% 98.592% 98.644% 98.618% 98.618% 98.652% 
Failure(Y=1) % correct 78.125% 78.348% 75.446% 76.339% 75.670% 76.116% 77.009% 
Survival(Y=0) % correct 99.536% 99.545% 99.518% 99.536% 99.536% 99.518% 99.518% 
R=40 
      
 
# of Observations 18289 18289 18289 18289 18289 18289 18289 
Overall % correct 99.038% 99.027% 98.972% 98.983% 98.939% 98.945% 99.021% 
Failure(Y=1) % correct 73.438% 73.214% 71.205% 72.321% 70.759% 70.536% 72.545% 
Survival(Y=0) % correct 99.681% 99.675% 99.669% 99.652% 99.647% 99.658% 99.686% 
R=70 
      
 
# of Observations 31002 31002 31002 31002 31002 31002 31002 
Overall % correct 99.123% 99.110% 99.113% 99.107% 99.071% 99.097% 99.126% 
Failure(Y=1) % correct 49.777% 48.884% 49.107% 49.330% 47.321% 48.438% 50.000% 
Survival(Y=0) % correct 99.846% 99.846% 99.846% 99.836% 99.830% 99.840% 99.846% 
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Table 3.6. Out-of-sample prediction accuracy for the logit models based on different training samples. 
This table reports the in-sample and one-step-ahead out-of-sample prediction accuracy for four logit models. We apply a recursive rolling 
regression, with the starting year fixed at 2007. For each year of 2009 to 2012 the model is re-estimated to take all the available data in a 
training sample into account, and the out-of-sample classifications are performed on all observations in the next year. The critical value is 0.5.  
 
Panel A: prediction accuracy for the model with adj.NSFR as the liquidity risk proxy (MODEL I) 
        
Estimation 
Window 
Out-of-
Sample 
Period R 
MODEL I    
In-Sample 
 
Out-of-Sample 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
% correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
% correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
% correct 
 
% correct # of Obs. 
 
% correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
% correct 
                  
2007-2009 2010 
2 97.59% 374 
 
88.24% 187 
 
94.47% 
 
96.61% 27087 
 
96.83% 126 
 
96.61% 
6 98.57% 1122 
 
83.42% 187 
 
96.41% 
 
97.99% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
97.98% 
15 99.64% 2805 
 
74.87% 187 
 
98.09% 
 
98.59% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
98.58% 
25 99.61% 4675 
 
71.12% 187 
 
98.52% 
 
99.12% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
99.11% 
40 99.77% 7439 
 
66.31% 187 
 
98.95% 
 
99.20% 27087 
 
95.24% 126 
 
99.18% 
70 99.93% 12502 
 
60.96% 187 
 
99.35% 
 
99.46% 27087 
 
92.06% 126 
 
99.42% 
                  
2007-2010 2011 
2 98.40% 626 
 
92.01% 313 
 
96.27% 
 
97.26% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
97.27% 
6 98.88% 1878 
 
81.15% 313 
 
96.35% 
 
97.63% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
97.64% 
15 99.55% 4695 
 
81.79% 313 
 
98.44% 
 
98.87% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
98.88% 
25 99.54% 7825 
 
75.40% 313 
 
98.61% 
 
99.35% 25638 
 
96.00% 75 
 
99.34% 
40 99.69% 12441 
 
69.97% 313 
 
98.97% 
 
99.36% 25638 
 
94.67% 75 
 
99.35% 
70 99.91% 21104 
 
49.84% 313 
 
99.18% 
 
99.50% 25638 
 
80.00% 75 
 
99.44% 
                  
2007-2011 2012 
2 98.45% 776 
 
93.56% 388 
 
96.82% 
 
98.27% 25988 
 
100% 35 
 
98.27% 
6 98.67% 2328 
 
84.02% 388 
 
96.58% 
 
98.48% 25988 
 
85.71% 35 
 
98.46% 
15 99.52% 5820 
 
84.02% 388 
 
98.55% 
 
99.57% 25988 
 
80.00% 35 
 
99.54% 
25 99.53% 9700 
 
78.09% 388 
 
98.70% 
 
99.79% 25988 
 
62.86% 35 
 
99.74% 
40 99.70% 15441 
 
71.65% 388 
 
99.01% 
 
99.82% 25988 
 
48.57% 35 
 
99.75% 
70 99.86% 26354 
 
49.48% 388 
 
99.12% 
 
99.86% 25988 
 
37.14% 35 
 
99.77% 
                  
2007-2012 2013 
2 98.11% 846 
 
94.09% 423 
 
96.77% 
 
99.04% 25357 
 
88.00% 25 
 
99.03% 
6 98.74% 2538 
 
85.11% 423 
 
96.79% 
 
99.00% 25357 
 
68.00% 25 
 
98.97% 
15 99.46% 6345 
 
85.11% 423 
 
98.57% 
 
99.86% 25357 
 
56.00% 25 
 
99.82% 
25 99.54% 10575 
 
78.01% 423 
 
98.71% 
 
99.93% 25357 
 
32.00% 25 
 
99.87% 
40 99.69% 16841 
 
73.05% 423 
 
99.03% 
 
99.96% 25357 
 
20.00% 25 
 
99.88% 
70 99.85% 28804 
 
50.59% 423 
 
99.13% 
 
99.99% 25357 
 
4.00% 25 
 
99.90% 
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Panel B: prediction accuracy for the model with NSFR as the liquidity risk proxy (MODEL II) 
        
Estimation 
Window 
Out-of-
Sample 
Period R 
MODEL II 
In-Sample 
 
Out-of-Sample 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
% correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
% correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
% correct 
 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
                  
2007-2009 2010 
2 97.59% 374 
 
88.24% 187 
 
94.47% 
 
96.60% 27087 
 
96.83% 126 
 
96.60% 
6 98.57% 1122 
 
83.42% 187 
 
96.41% 
 
97.95% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
97.95% 
15 99.61% 2805 
 
74.87% 187 
 
98.06% 
 
98.59% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
98.58% 
25 99.61% 4675 
 
71.12% 187 
 
98.52% 
 
99.10% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
99.09% 
40 99.77% 7439 
 
65.78% 187 
 
98.94% 
 
99.20% 27087 
 
95.24% 126 
 
99.18% 
70 99.92% 12502 
 
60.43% 187 
 
99.34% 
 
99.45% 27087 
 
92.86% 126 
 
99.42% 
 
 
                
2007-2010 2011 
2 98.08% 626 
 
92.01% 313 
 
96.06% 
 
97.23% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
97.24% 
6 98.88% 1878 
 
80.51% 313 
 
96.26% 
 
97.61% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
97.61% 
15 99.55% 4695 
 
81.79% 313 
 
98.44% 
 
98.85% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
98.85% 
25 99.54% 7825 
 
75.08% 313 
 
98.60% 
 
99.32% 25638 
 
96.00% 75 
 
99.31% 
40 99.69% 12441 
 
69.65% 313 
 
98.96% 
 
99.36% 25638 
 
94.67% 75 
 
99.34% 
70 99.91% 21104 
 
49.52% 313 
 
99.17% 
 
99.49% 25638 
 
80.00% 75 
 
99.43% 
 
 
                
2007-2011 2012 
2 98.45% 776 
 
93.30% 388 
 
96.74% 
 
98.25% 25988 
 
100% 35 
 
98.25% 
6 98.63% 2328 
 
82.99% 388 
 
96.39% 
 
98.46% 25988 
 
85.71% 35 
 
98.45% 
15 99.50% 5820 
 
84.28% 388 
 
98.55% 
 
99.55% 25988 
 
80.00% 35 
 
99.53% 
25 99.54% 9700 
 
78.35% 388 
 
98.72% 
 
99.78% 25988 
 
62.86% 35 
 
99.73% 
40 99.70% 15441 
 
71.39% 388 
 
99.01% 
 
99.81% 25988 
 
54.29% 35 
 
99.75% 
70 99.85% 26354 
 
50.26% 388 
 
99.13% 
 
99.85% 25988 
 
37.14% 35 
 
99.77% 
 
 
                
2007-2012 2013 
2 98.11% 846 
 
94.09% 423 
 
96.77% 
 
99.03% 25357 
 
88.00% 25 
 
99.02% 
6 98.74% 2538 
 
84.40% 423 
 
96.69% 
 
98.97% 25357 
 
72.00% 25 
 
98.94% 
15 99.46% 6345 
 
85.11% 423 
 
98.57% 
 
99.86% 25357 
 
56.00% 25 
 
99.82% 
25 99.54% 10575 
 
77.78% 423 
 
98.70% 
 
99.93% 25357 
 
32.00% 25 
 
99.87% 
40 99.69% 16841 
 
72.81% 423 
 
99.03% 
 
99.96% 25357 
 
20.00% 25 
 
99.88% 
70 99.86% 28804 
 
50.12% 423 
 
99.14% 
 
99.99% 25357 
 
4.00% 25 
 
99.90% 
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Panel C: prediction accuracy for the model with liquid assets to total assets ratio(LA_TA) as the liquidity risk proxy (MODEL III) 
  
Estimation 
Window 
Out-of-
Sampl
e 
Period R 
MODEL III 
In-Sample 
 
Out-of-Sample 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
                  
2007-2009 2010 
2 97.06% 374 
 
88.24% 187 
 
94.12% 
 
96.46% 27087 
 
97.62% 126 
 
96.47% 
6 98.84% 1122 
 
81.82% 187 
 
96.41% 
 
97.96% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
97.95% 
15 99.57% 2805 
 
74.87% 187 
 
98.03% 
 
98.55% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
98.54% 
25 99.59% 4675 
 
70.59% 187 
 
98.48% 
 
99.14% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
99.12% 
40 99.78% 7439 
 
61.50% 187 
 
98.85% 
 
99.23% 27087 
 
95.24% 126 
 
99.21% 
70 99.89% 12502 
 
53.48% 187 
 
99.20% 
 
99.48% 27087 
 
92.06% 126 
 
99.44% 
                  
2007-2010 2011 
2 97.60% 626 
 
90.42% 313 
 
95.21% 
 
97.03% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
97.04% 
6 98.72% 1878 
 
78.59% 313 
 
95.85% 
 
97.54% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
97.55% 
15 99.60% 4695 
 
79.87% 313 
 
98.36% 
 
98.86% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
98.86% 
25 99.58% 7825 
 
73.16% 313 
 
98.56% 
 
99.35% 25638 
 
94.67% 75 
 
99.33% 
40 99.71% 12441 
 
69.33% 313 
 
98.97% 
 
99.37% 25638 
 
94.67% 75 
 
99.36% 
70 99.89% 21104 
 
48.56% 313 
 
99.14% 
 
99.58% 25638 
 
80.00% 75 
 
99.52% 
                  
2007-2011 2012 
2 97.81% 776 
 
92.27% 388 
 
95.96% 
 
98.09% 25988 
 
100% 35 
 
98.09% 
6 98.54% 2328 
 
82.22% 388 
 
96.21% 
 
98.38% 25988 
 
97.14% 35 
 
98.38% 
15 99.57% 5820 
 
82.99% 388 
 
98.53% 
 
99.50% 25988 
 
88.57% 35 
 
99.48% 
25 99.58% 9700 
 
77.32% 388 
 
98.72% 
 
99.79% 25988 
 
68.57% 35 
 
99.75% 
40 99.70% 15441 
 
72.68% 388 
 
99.04% 
 
99.83% 25988 
 
65.71% 35 
 
99.78% 
70 99.86% 26354 
 
51.03% 388 
 
99.15% 
 
99.88% 25988 
 
42.86% 35 
 
99.81% 
                  
2007-2012 2013 
2 97.75% 846 
 
92.91% 423 
 
96.14% 
 
98.89% 25357 
 
84.00% 25 
 
98.88% 
6 98.54% 2538 
 
83.69% 423 
 
96.42% 
 
98.88% 25357 
 
72.00% 25 
 
98.85% 
15 99.51% 6345 
 
84.16% 423 
 
98.55% 
 
99.89% 25357 
 
52.00% 25 
 
99.85% 
25 99.57% 10575 
 
76.83% 423 
 
98.69% 
 
99.93% 25357 
 
28.00% 25 
 
99.86% 
40 99.69% 16841 
 
72.81% 423 
 
99.03% 
 
99.96% 25357 
 
20.00% 25 
 
99.88% 
70 99.85% 28804 
 
51.54% 423 
 
99.15% 
 
99.99% 25357 
 
4.00% 25 
 
99.89% 
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Panel D: prediction accuracy for the model with both adj.NSFR and liquid assets to total assets ratio (LA_TA) as the liquidity risk proxies (MODEL VII) 
Estimation 
Window 
Out-of-
Sample 
Period R 
MODEL VII 
In-Sample 
 
Out-of-Sample 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
%correct 
                  
2007-2009 2010 
2 97.33% 374 
 
88.24% 187 
 
94.30% 
 
96.57% 27087 
 
97.62% 126 
 
96.57% 
6 98.57% 1122 
 
83.96% 187 
 
96.49% 
 
97.98% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
97.97% 
15 99.61% 2805 
 
75.40% 187 
 
98.09% 
 
98.58% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
98.57% 
25 99.61% 4675 
 
72.19% 187 
 
98.56% 
 
99.13% 27087 
 
96.03% 126 
 
99.11% 
40 99.77% 7439 
 
64.71% 187 
 
98.91% 
 
99.18% 27087 
 
95.24% 126 
 
99.16% 
70 99.91% 12502 
 
58.82% 187 
 
99.31% 
 
99.48% 27087 
 
92.06% 126 
 
99.44% 
                  
2007-2010 2011 
2 97.92% 626 
 
91.69% 313 
 
95.85% 
 
97.27% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
97.28% 
6 98.88% 1878 
 
80.83% 313 
 
96.30% 
 
97.66% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
97.66% 
15 99.57% 4695 
 
81.79% 313 
 
98.46% 
 
98.91% 25638 
 
100% 75 
 
98.91% 
25 99.55% 7825 
 
74.12% 313 
 
98.57% 
 
99.39% 25638 
 
93.33% 75 
 
99.37% 
40 99.72% 12441 
 
70.29% 313 
 
99.00% 
 
99.43% 25638 
 
93.33% 75 
 
99.41% 
70 99.91% 21104 
 
49.20% 313 
 
99.16% 
 
99.54% 25638 
 
77.33% 75 
 
99.47% 
                  
2007-2011 2012 
2 98.07% 776 
 
92.78% 388 
 
96.31% 
 
98.30% 25988 
 
100% 35 
 
98.30% 
6 98.71% 2328 
 
84.54% 388 
 
96.69% 
 
98.56% 25988 
 
88.57% 35 
 
98.54% 
15 99.48% 5820 
 
84.54% 388 
 
98.55% 
 
99.58% 25988 
 
80.00% 35 
 
99.55% 
25 99.55% 9700 
 
77.58% 388 
 
98.70% 
 
99.80% 25988 
 
65.71% 35 
 
99.75% 
40 99.71% 15441 
 
73.20% 388 
 
99.06% 
 
99.85% 25988 
 
54.29% 35 
 
99.78% 
70 99.86% 26354 
 
51.29% 388 
 
99.15% 
 
99.88% 25988 
 
42.86% 35 
 
99.81% 
                  
2007-2012 2013 
2 97.99% 846 
 
93.62% 423 
 
96.53% 
 
99.05% 25357 
 
84.00% 25 
 
99.03% 
6 98.82% 2538 
 
85.11% 423 
 
96.86% 
 
99.09% 25357 
 
72.00% 25 
 
99.07% 
15 99.45% 6345 
 
84.63% 423 
 
98.52% 
 
99.87% 25357 
 
52.00% 25 
 
99.82% 
25 99.53% 10575 
 
78.01% 423 
 
98.70% 
 
99.94% 25357 
 
24.00% 25 
 
99.86% 
40 99.71% 16841 
 
74.00% 423 
 
99.08% 
 
99.97% 25357 
 
20.00% 25 
 
99.89% 
70 99.85% 28804 
 
52.01% 423 
 
99.15% 
 
100% 25357 
 
12.00% 25 
 
99.91% 
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Table 3.7. Logit regression results for the model with both NSFR and brokered deposits to 
total deposits ratio (BRKDEP_TDEP). 
This table shows the logit regression results for the model with both the NSFR and 
BRKDEP_TDEP as the liquidity proxies. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes on 
a value of 1 at time t if the bank is failed or in distress and receives assistance by a transaction 
from the FDIC at time t + 1 and a value of 0 otherwise. The logit regression is estimated by the 
method of maximum likelihood for a training sample with R equal to 6 over the 2007-2013 
period. R denotes the ratio of non-failed banks to distressed banks in a training sample. R times 
as many non-failed banks as distressed ones are randomly drawn from each size group in each 
quarter without replacement. There are 448 distressed banks (24 large banks, 36 medium 
banks, and 388 small banks), and 2688 non-failed banks (144 large banks, 216 medium banks, 
and 2328 small banks) in the "R=6" training sample. The quality of the model fit is assessed by 
the log likelihood value and information criteria. The in-sample classification accuracy is 
reported with a critical value of 0.5. The standard errors are adjusted for correlation across time 
with Huber–White method. The p-value for the chi-square statistics is shown in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Parameter MODEL XI 
  Intercept 6.381 
(0.030)** 
NSFR -3.555 
(0.001)*** 
BRKDEP_TDEP 4.707 
(0.000)*** 
Capital ratio -79.035 
(0.000)*** 
NPA ratio 19.166 
(0.000)*** 
Efficiency ratio 1.829 
(0.000)*** 
ROA -1.112 
(0.000)*** 
Ln(GTA) -0.162 
(0.196) 
Age 0.002 
(0.499) 
LIBOR_DFF 1.229 
(0.001)*** 
AIC 741.29 
SC 801.79 
2 Log L -721.29 
# of Obs. 3136 
# of failures 448 
Overall % correct 96.716% 
Failure(Y=1) % correct 84.375% 
Survival(Y=0) % correct 98.772% 
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Table 3.8. Prediction accuracy for the model with both NSFR and brokered deposits to total deposits(BRKDEP_TDEP). 
This table reports the in-sample and one-step-ahead out-of-sample prediction accuracy for the logit model with both the NSFR and 
BRKDEP_TDEP as the liquidity proxies. We apply a recursive rolling regression, with the starting year fixed at 2007. For each year of 2009 to 
2012 the model is re-estimated to take all the available data in a training sample into account, and the out-of-sample classifications are 
performed on all observations in the next year. The critical value is 0.5.  
      
Estimation 
Window 
Out-of-
Sample 
Period R 
MODEL XI 
In-Sample 
 
Out-of-Sample 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
 
Surviving banks 
 
Distressed banks 
 
Combined 
% correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
% correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
% correct 
 
% correct 
# of 
Obs. 
 
% correct # of Obs. 
 
% correct 
   
                              
2007-
2009 
2010 
2 98.13% 374   90.91% 187   95.72%   96.80% 27087   96.83% 126   96.80% 
6 98.84% 1122   83.96% 187   96.72%   98.16% 27087   96.03% 126   98.15% 
15 99.61% 2805   78.61% 187   98.30%   98.75% 27087   96.03% 126   98.74% 
25 99.61% 4675   71.66% 187   98.54%   99.23% 27087   96.03% 126   99.22% 
40 99.78% 7439   65.78% 187   98.95%   99.27% 27087   93.65% 126   99.24% 
70 99.92% 12502   59.89% 187   99.33%   99.54% 27087   90.48% 126   99.50% 
                  
2007-
2010 
2011 
2 98.24% 626   92.65% 313   96.38%   97.41% 25638   100% 75   97.42% 
6 98.94% 1878   81.15% 313   96.39%   97.89% 25638   100% 75   97.89% 
15 99.55% 4695   82.11% 313   98.46%   99.06% 25638   98.67% 75   99.06% 
25 99.63% 7825   74.76% 313   98.67%   99.45% 25638   93.33% 75   99.43% 
40 99.74% 12441   70.93% 313   99.04%   99.45% 25638   90.67% 75   99.42% 
70 99.91% 21104   50.16% 313   99.18%   99.57% 25638   76.00% 75   99.51% 
                  
2007-
2011 
2012 
2 98.45% 776   94.07% 388   96.99%   98.41% 25988   100% 35   98.41% 
6 98.71% 2328   83.51% 388   96.54%   98.72% 25988   77.14% 35   98.69% 
15 99.52% 5820   84.79% 388   98.60%   99.65% 25988   74.29% 35   99.62% 
25 99.60% 9700   79.12% 388   98.81%   99.85% 25988   51.43% 35   99.78% 
40 99.73% 15441   72.94% 388   99.07%   99.86% 25988   48.57% 35   99.79% 
70 99.86% 26354   52.58% 388   99.17%   99.90% 25988   31.43% 35   99.81% 
                  
2007-
2012 
2013 
2 98.35% 846   94.33% 423   97.01%   99.12% 25357   88.00% 25   99.11% 
6 98.70% 2538   84.87% 423   96.72%   99.21% 25357   68.00% 25   99.18% 
15 99.46% 6345   85.34% 423   98.58%   99.92% 25357   48.00% 25   99.87% 
25 99.57% 10575   78.25% 423   98.75%   99.94% 25357   28.00% 25   99.87% 
40 99.71% 16841   73.29% 423   99.06%   99.97% 25357   24.00% 25   99.89% 
70 99.85% 28804   52.01% 423   99.16%   100% 25357   0 25   99.90% 
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Table 3.9. Prediction accuracy for MODEL I and MODEL III for various critical values based on the "R=15" training sample. 
This table demonstrates how a change in the critical value alters the in-sample and out-of-sample prediction accuracy based on the training 
sample with R equal to 15. R denotes the ratio of non-failed banks to distressed banks in a training sample. R times as many non-failed banks as 
distressed ones are randomly drawn from each size group in each quarter without replacement. In the "R=15" training sample, the number of 
banks in default or distressed is 448, and the number of non-failed banks are 6720.Model I employs the adj.NSFR as the liquidity risk proxy. 
Model III uses the liquid assets to total assets ratio(LA_TA) as the liquidity risk proxy. We apply a recursive rolling regression, with the starting 
year fixed at 2007. For each year of 2009 to 2012 the model is re-estimated to take all the available data in the training sample into account, 
and the out-of-sample classifications are performed on all observations in the next year.  
 
Est. 
Wdw 
Out-of-
Sample 
Period 
Critical 
Value 
MODEL I 
 
MODEL III 
In-Sample 
 
Out-of-Sample 
 
In-Sample 
 
Out-of-Sample 
Survival Failure Combined 
 
Survival Failure Combined 
 
Survival Failure Combined 
 
Survival Failure Combined 
                  
2007-
2009 
2010 
0.1 96.72% 90.91% 96.36% 
 
95.51% 97.62% 95.52% 
 
96.79% 90.37% 96.39% 
 
95.27% 97.62% 95.29% 
0.3 98.93% 85.56% 98.09% 
 
97.83% 96.83% 97.82% 
 
98.82% 83.96% 97.89% 
 
97.72% 96.83% 97.71% 
0.5 99.64% 74.87% 98.09% 
 
98.59% 96.03% 98.58% 
 
99.57% 74.87% 98.03% 
 
98.55% 96.03% 98.54% 
0.7 99.82% 67.38% 97.79% 
 
99.16% 94.44% 99.14% 
 
99.79% 65.24% 97.63% 
 
99.18% 94.44% 99.16% 
0.8 99.89% 59.89% 97.39% 
 
99.41% 91.27% 99.37% 
 
99.82% 54.01% 96.96% 
 
99.41% 90.48% 99.36% 
0.9 99.96% 41.18% 96.29% 
 
99.66% 77.78% 99.56% 
 
99.93% 41.18% 96.26% 
 
99.69% 81.75% 99.61% 
                  
2007-
2010 
2011 
0.1 97.57% 92.33% 97.24% 
 
96.56% 100% 96.57% 
 
97.32% 92.97% 97.04% 
 
96.39% 100% 96.40% 
0.3 99.08% 88.18% 98.40% 
 
98.11% 100% 98.12% 
 
99.13% 86.90% 98.36% 
 
98.08% 100% 98.08% 
0.5 99.55% 81.79% 98.44% 
 
98.87% 100% 98.88% 
 
99.60% 79.87% 98.36% 
 
98.86% 100% 98.86% 
0.7 99.79% 71.88% 98.04% 
 
99.47% 90.67% 99.44% 
 
99.79% 70.61% 97.96% 
 
99.45% 94.67% 99.44% 
0.8 99.94% 61.34% 97.52% 
 
99.68% 78.67% 99.61% 
 
99.94% 63.90% 97.68% 
 
99.68% 80.00% 99.62% 
0.9 99.98% 43.13% 96.43% 
 
99.86% 53.33% 99.72% 
 
99.94% 42.17% 96.33% 
 
99.86% 52.00% 99.72% 
                  
2007-
2011 
2012 
0.1 97.61% 93.56% 97.36% 
 
97.68% 100% 97.68% 
 
97.41% 93.81% 97.18% 
 
97.44% 100% 97.44% 
0.3 98.97% 89.69% 98.39% 
 
98.90% 88.57% 98.89% 
 
99.04% 89.18% 98.42% 
 
98.83% 94.29% 98.82% 
0.5 99.52% 84.02% 98.55% 
 
99.57% 80.00% 99.54% 
 
99.57% 82.99% 98.53% 
 
99.50% 88.57% 99.48% 
0.7 99.85% 73.97% 98.23% 
 
99.86% 48.57% 99.79% 
 
99.79% 73.45% 98.15% 
 
99.87% 60.00% 99.82% 
0.8 99.93% 62.37% 97.58% 
 
99.92% 34.29% 99.83% 
 
99.90% 63.40% 97.62% 
 
99.95% 42.86% 99.87% 
0.9 99.97% 42.01% 96.34% 
 
99.97% 22.86% 99.87% 
 
99.91% 41.24% 96.25% 
 
99.98% 20.00% 99.87% 
                  
2007-
2012 
2013 
0.1 97.54% 94.33% 97.34% 
 
98.29% 100% 98.29% 
 
97.49% 93.62% 97.25% 
 
98.09% 100% 98.09% 
0.3 98.94% 90.54% 98.42% 
 
99.52% 72.00% 99.49% 
 
98.99% 90.07% 98.43% 
 
99.44% 76.00% 99.42% 
0.5 99.46% 85.11% 98.57% 
 
99.86% 56.00% 99.82% 
 
99.51% 84.16% 98.55% 
 
99.89% 52.00% 99.85% 
0.7 99.80% 74.23% 98.20% 
 
99.95% 28.00% 99.88% 
 
99.80% 74.47% 98.21% 
 
99.94% 20.00% 99.86% 
174 
 
0.8 99.94% 63.59% 97.67% 
 
99.97% 8.00% 99.88% 
 
99.91% 64.78% 97.71% 
 
99.96% 12.00% 99.88% 
0.9 99.97% 43.50% 96.44% 
 
99.98% 8.00% 99.89% 
 
99.92% 41.84% 96.29% 
 
99.98% 8.00% 99.89% 
                  
2007-
2013 
 
0.1 97.50% 94.42% 97.31% 
     
97.37% 94.20% 97.17% 
    
 
0.3 98.93% 89.96% 98.37% 
     
98.96% 89.96% 98.40% 
    
 
0.5 99.48% 83.48% 98.48% 
     
99.49% 82.59% 98.44% 
    
 
0.7 99.76% 74.78% 98.20% 
     
99.76% 73.21% 98.10% 
    
 
0.8 99.93% 63.84% 97.67% 
     
99.90% 64.06% 97.66% 
    
 
0.9 99.97% 43.75% 96.46% 
     
99.93% 43.75% 96.41% 
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APPENDIX 
CONSTRUCTION OF “CAT FAT” MEASURE 
The “cat fat” liquidity creation measure is calculated according to the following formula: 
 
         
 
 
                                     
 
 
                                     
 
 
 
                                                                                      
 
 
 
                               
 
 
                                        
                         
 
 
                   
                                 
 
 
                     
 
The “cat fat” measure classifies all bank activities other than loans based on product category 
and maturity, and loans by category only.  
 
Assets:  
Illiquid assets = Commercial real estate loans + Loans to financial agricultural production 
               + Commercial and industrial loans + Other loans and lease financing receivables  
+ Other real estate owned + Customers’ liability on bankers acceptances  
+ Investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Premises  
+ Other assets 
Semiliquid assets = Residential real estate loans + Consumer loans  
      + Loans to depository institutions + Loans to state and local governments  
                           + Loans to foreign governments  
Liquid assets = Cash and due from other institutions + All securities (regardless of maturity)  
+ Trading assets + Fed funds sold  
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Liabilities plus equity: 
Liquid liabilities = Transactions deposits + Savings deposits + Overnight federal funds purchased  
   + Trading liabilities 
Semiliquid liabilities = Time deposits + Other borrowed money 
Illiquid liabilities plus equity = Bank’s liability on bankers acceptances + Subordinated debt 
           + Other liabilities + Equity 
 
Off-balance sheet guarantees: 
Illiquid guarantees = Unused commitments + Net standby letters of credit 
            + Commercial and similar letters of credit  
         + All other off-balance sheet liabilities 
Semiliquid guarantees = Net credit derivatives + Net securities lent 
Liquid guarantees = Net participations acquired 
 
Off-balance sheet derivatives: 
Liquid derivatives = interest rate derivatives + Foreign exchange derivatives 
       + Equity and commodity derivatives 
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